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Abstract
Afghanistan remains fragmented and disintegrated along ethnic and linguistic
lines. This fragmentation has prevented the Afghan people from achieving its most
important and immediate goal: nationhood. This failed quest for nationhood renders
progress in other areas insignificant and irrelevant. Corruption is a major culprit that has
contributed to disintegration and remains as a major impediment to the struggle of the
Afghan people to achieve nationhood. Corruption corrodes some of the most valued
features of a society. For instance, corruption is reported to undermine trust among
people, erode trust in public institutions and the leaders who lead them, and impede
political and civic participation. In the literature, these features combined are referred to
as social capital.
Recognizing the widespread nature of corruption in Afghanistan and that
Afghanistan continues to fail in its pursuit of nationhood, this study sets out to explore
the potential impacts of corruption on social capital. This study employs a convergent
mixed methods design to explore empirically the corrosive effects of government
corruption on social capital. Exploring the nature of this link as well as the extent of the
link might help leaders devise specific and actionable strategies to tackle corruption.
Doing so could also aid the people of Afghanistan achieve the ever elusive goal:
nationhood.
Keywords: government corruption; social capital; mixed methods;
transformational leadership; leadership failure; Afghanistan
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Government corruption plagues many post-conflict countries by undermining the
very legitimacy of government institutions. For example, corruption has become an
endemic problem in Afghanistan since the removal of the Taliban regime in 2001 by the
United States and its allies. General John Allen, former commander of NATO’s
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFORA), warned of the grave threat that corruption poses in Afghanistan, saying: “The
existential threat to the long-term viability of modern Afghanistan is corruption”
(SIGAR, 2016, p. 50). Ryan Crocker, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, expressed
similar concern regarding corruption in Afghanistan: “…the ultimate point of failure for
our efforts [in Afghanistan] … wasn’t an insurgency. It was the weight of endemic
corruption” (SIGAR, 2016, p. 10).
According to surveys of the Afghan people that the Asia Foundation (from 2007
to 2018) conducted, corruption has been among the top three major problems at the
national level since 2010, alongside insecurity and poor economy. According to
Transparency International (see reports for period 2007-2018), Afghanistan has ranked
among the top eight most corrupt countries in its Corruption Perception Index (CPI),
which is based on the assessment of international businesspeople and staff in
international organizations. If corruption trends are plotted as measured by Transparency
International’s (TI) index, we see that the level of perceived corruption has risen steadily
over the period 2007-2018. Trust in public institutions, meanwhile, has declined during
this period (Asia Foundation surveys, 2007-2018). Thus, a negative relationship between
perceived government corruption and trust in public institutions becomes apparent.
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What makes these assessments concerning is that these sobering figures are not
mere anecdotes and estimates that one could dismiss just as easily. Instead, they are
grounded in reality as indicated by two separate reports by a United Nations agency that
captured Afghan citizens’ experiences with corruption, rather than perceptions of
corruption. For instance, in 2010, Afghans paid US$2.5 in bribes to public officials in
order to access a range of free public services/goods (UNODC, 2010). In 2012, likewise,
Afghans paid US$3.9 billion in bribes to public officials in order to access a range of free
public services/goods (UNODC, 2012). To put these staggering figures into perspective,
the cost of government corruption to the people of Afghanistan is nearly 20 percent of the
country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (UNODC, 2012). In addition, a large amount
of external aid to Afghanistan has been lost to grand scale and rampant corruption since
the U.S. and its allies intervened in Afghanistan in late 2001.
These findings establish that corruption in Afghanistan occurs in both the ‘petty’
and ‘grand’ forms such that it is widespread and permeates all levels of the Afghan
government. Because they have lived through and experienced the adverse effects of
widespread corruption, the peoples of Afghanistan have repeatedly expressed their
dissatisfaction with how corruption has been handled. For instance, since the Asia
Foundation began its survey in Afghanistan in 20006, the percentage of Afghans
believing that the country is headed in the wrong direction has steadily increased (61% in
2018 vs 21% in 2006). Having witnessed the unprecedented scale of corruption since
their involvement in Afghanistan, numerous western governments and international
organizations supporting the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA)
have repeatedly implored the Afghan government to take decisive actions against
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corruption. Such pleas, however, have largely gone unheeded. Corruption continues to
hinder reconstruction efforts and economic development (SIGAR, 2019), threaten
stability (Kugelman, 2016) and is reported to fuel terrorism in Afghanistan (Goldstein,
2015).
While the Karzai administration (re: 2002-2014) had largely been slow to
respond, and at times antagonistic, to such international appeals, the Ghani administration
has responded with several measures. A 2018 United Nations (UN) report (UNAMA,
2018) praised the personal commitment of President Ghani to implementing
anticorruption measures. His cabinet members and other key personnel, however, have
largely failed to deliver on that commitment. The report (UNAMA, 2018), concluded:
“not all ministers and institutions proved able to implement reforms at the expected pace”
(p. 67). The report was also critical of the legislative branch’s performance in combatting
corruption in Afghanistan, claiming that: “the legislative branch could neither improve
internal accountability and integrity measures nor its ability to exercise oversight
functions” (p. 67).
A follow up report in 2019 by the same UN agency warns that frequent changes
in legislation, inconsistent application of the 2017 Anti-Corruption Strategy, and ad hoc
interventions to change a course of reform or rapid personnel turnover within key
institutions may have had a reverse effect (UNAMA, 2019). Witnessing the
underwhelming results of multiple anti-corruption strategies and institutions under
President Ghani, a report by the Afghanistan Analysts Network (2019) characterized
them as too many and with too few results.
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While anti-corruption strategies and institutions have proliferated as a formal
response mechanism to combat the prevalence of corruption in Afghanistan, these
initiatives have proved largely ineffective in Afghanistan (Afghanistan Analysts
Network, 2019). In describing the current state of government corruption in the country,
Afghanistan Analysts Network (2019) remarked that: “corruption in the Afghan state has
blossomed and bloomed in the years since 2001” (p.1).
While the scale of government corruption has been going up, many of the highly
valued aspects of the Afghan society have been on the decline. These include trust among
the diverse ethnic groups comprising Afghanistan, trust in public institutions and the
leaders managing them, citizens participating in political life, and citizens engaging with
and taking part in voluntary associations. These desired features of society are commonly
referred to as social capital (Fukuyama, 2001; Paxton, 2002; Putnam, 1993). While
surveys and news reports have highlighted decline in these highly valued societal features
in Afghanistan, no empirical study has explored this link between widespread
government corruption and declining social capital in that country.
Thus, there is a need to explore empirically the potential link between government
corruption and social capital with the purpose of illuminating factors contributing to
corruption and highlighting its corrosive effects on highly valued features of a society,
such as social capital. Social capital is considered to contribute positively both at
individual and societal levels. Because of the positive roles it plays for a society,
nurturing and protecting social capital is likely to yield dividends for a war-stricken
society such as Afghanistan. Identifying possible threats to social capital is therefore a
worthy endeavor.
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A World Bank report rightfully recognizes the instrumental role social capital
plays in rendering institutions functional (Mundial, 2017). The report finds that social
capital is particularly consequential for long-term development and security in
developing countries. Social capital has been linked with various desirable outcomes,
such as economic well-being (Stone, 2001), educational attainment (Coleman, 1988),
governmental performance (Putnam, 1993), facilitation of cooperation (Narayan &
Pritchett, 1999), reducing poverty (Grootaert & Bastelaer, 2002), and overcoming
collective actions problems in monitoring public officials (Knack & Keefer, 1997).
Social capital is reported to produce positive outcomes for citizens, both
individually and collectively. According to Brewer (2003), “trust is an indicator of social
cohesion and solidarity, a condition for advancing economic transactions between
strangers, and an impetus for participation in public life” (p. 8). Carothers and Ottaway
(2012), meanwhile, characterize the ‘norms of reciprocity and trust’ as providing “the
cultural pedestal on which democratic institutions are built” (p. 10). A recent systematic
review shows social capital to be positively related to such outcomes as education, and
voting behavior (Weiler, & Hinz, 2018).
However, when aspects of social capital are undermined, it imposes a cost on the
society. For instance, bonding social capital (a manifestation of deficient social capital) is
linked to corruption and cronyism (Narayan & Cassidy, 2001) and is said to present a
negative consequence for democracy (Paxton, 2002). Fukuyama (2001) offers an
explanation as to why government corruption is pervasive in countries where bridging
social capital is weak. In such a society, a weaker standard of moral conduct is applied
when one assumes government position. Accordingly, public officials feel justified to
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commit theft of public resources on behalf of one’s family or ethnicity, providing cultural
reinforcement for corruption (Fukuyama, 2001).
By preserving and revitalizing social capital, one could leverage strong social
capital to achieve the desired outcomes that social capital is said to facilitate, including
economic well-being, reduced poverty, and improved government performance.
Similarly, one could avoid negative outcomes associated with deficit social capital by
identifying and minimizing the threats posed to social capital.
This approach is likely to aid in better understanding of the government
corruption and the costs that it imposes on a society. Spelling out clearly the specific
negative impacts of corruption on a society is likely to help us uncover the true extent of
its damage. Incorporating new elements into the discourse is likely to broaden
understanding of government corruption. The fact that corruption has been linked with
terrorism and radicalization in countries that grapple with conflicts (e.g., Afghanistan,
Libya, Iraq) demonstrates its corrosive effects on other valued features of a society,
including social capital.
Mitigating corruption could thus help blunt the appeal of radical groups who have
exploited and weaponized the public’s dissatisfaction with government. The
dissatisfaction with the government is largely fueled by government corruption that has
enabled to accumulate wealth and power (Transparency International, 2015). Many of the
corrosive effects of corruption are evidently clear in Afghanistan, including the erosion of
public trust in political leaders and the institutions they lead, resulting in degradation of
trust and confidence among diverse groups, and the ever increasing gulf between the
governing and the governed classes (Asia Foundation, 2006-2018).
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Significance of This Study
Afghanistan remains disintegrated and fragmented along ethnic lines.
Fragmentation has prevented the Afghan people from achieving its most important and
most immediate goal: nationhood. Corruption is the underlying factor contributing to
disintegration. By attacking other important societal features, corruption causes far more
damage than the loss of public fund and resource. It is a major impediment to the
aspiration of the Afghan people to achieve nationhood. Corruption has been studied
exhaustively from numerous angles. Its negative impacts on a society have also been
studied extensively (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). However, I am not yet aware of
any study that explores the corrosive effects of government corruption on social capital at
the national level in a post-conflict context.
By anchoring this study to post-conflict Afghanistan, this study contributes to
discussions on both government corruption and social capital at a national level and in a
post-conflict context. Government corruption has skyrocketed since 2001. Government
legitimacy has never been this poor. Trust in leader and the institutions they lead has
never been lower. Inter-ethnic trust has hit a new low. This study sets out to explore
empirically the nature and the extent of the association between government corruption
and social capital.
This study employs a number of composites to sufficiently capture the underlying
concepts of government corruption and institutional trust. Instead of capturing these
critical concepts with single variable/indicators, this study sets out to use composites to
sufficiently capture these concepts. The composites representing government corruption
and institutional trust are each computed from at least four separate but related variables.
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Accurately capturing concepts used in a given study adds strength to the study and
enhances potential impact of that study.
The need to repair and foster trust among the diverse ethnic groups comprising
Afghanistan, on-going efforts to reconcile with the Taliban, and attempts to improve
public confidence in government institutions also attest to the significance of this study.
Both the U.S. and the Afghan governments have been repeatedly attempting to reconcile
with the Taliban (Constable, Ryan & Sonne, 2019; Mashal, 2019; Taylor, 2019). Inability
to trust one another was one of the chief factors that derailed prior attempts on many
occasions. Nearly 20 years after the Taliban regime was overthrown, a formal peace talk
has finally begun in which the government of Afghanistan, alongside the U.S., is
formally a party to the negotiation (George, 2020a).
Prior to this event, the Taliban repeatedly rejected the Afghan government’s
efforts for direct talks (Baker, Mashal & Crowley, 2019). In the meantime, the U.S. and
the Taliban held a number of peace talks from which the Afghan government was
excluded. A senior Afghan official once accused the U.S. chief negotiator, Zalmay
Khalilzad, of “delegitimizing” the Afghan government for having the Afghan
government excluded in its negotiations with the Taliban (Landay, 2019). The Afghan
government repeatedly remarked that the Taliban could not be trusted (Hadid, 2020).
Many critics of the deal with the Taliban also agreed (Reichmann, 2020).
In his remark during the opening ceremony of the 2020 peace talks in Doha,
Qatar, the Taliban representative called for an Afghanistan “where everyone lives in
peace and harmony and no one feels any discrimination” (George, 2020b). This comment
reveals that even the Taliban leaders recognize that the climate of trust among the peoples
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of Afghanistan has eroded. Having recognized a deficit in trust among the Afghan
people, both parties to the peace talks must therefore attempt, among other things, to
improve the climate of trust.
Lack of trust in public institutions and the leaders that manage them had a serious
impact on the legitimacy of the Afghan government. It is this loss of trust in public
institutions that has emboldened the Taliban and other anti-government elements in
Afghanistan. Corruption has been a key factor in the erosion of public trust in leaders and
public institutions. Thus, government corruption imposes costs upon the government and
the society at large. It has weakened government’s standing in the society, as evidenced
by widespread public apathy toward the government.
Confronting the corruption problem therefore presents benefits both to the
government and the society. It is in the government’s interest to tackle corruption: it will
help improve its legitimacy. It will also help gain public support for the government and
embolden its position should an opportunity to make a peace deal with the Taliban arises.
At the moment, the Afghan government is approaching peace negotiations with the
Taliban from the position of weakness, due largely to its bruised reputation in the society.
The fact that the Taliban successfully secured the release of over five thousand Taliban
prisoners (George, 2020a) epitomizes the weak position of the Afghan government.
Conversely, the Afghan government has not been able to convince the Taliban to agree to
a ceasefire while negotiations are currently underway in Doha, Qatar. Left unattended,
the cost of corruption is likely to become unbearable, and could potentially lead to the
downfall of the Ghani administration. Recognizing the threat corruption poses to
nationhood in Afghanistan, this study explores empirically the corrosive effect of
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government corruption on social capital in post-conflict Afghanistan. To date, the author
is unaware of any study that explores empirically this corrosive link between corruption
and social capital in the context of Afghanistan.
Purpose, Research Question and Variables
The purpose of this mixed methods study is to examine the corrosive effects of
government corruption on the many dimensions of social capital, including trust (interpersonal trust, trust in leadership, & trust in public institutions), political participation,
and associational life. This study answers two types of questions using the convergent
mixed methods design. The quantitative strand will answer questions related to the
relationship between government corruption and social capital. The qualitative strand,
meanwhile, will answer the following four qualitative questions:


How do participants evaluate the current climate of trust among different ethnic
groups in Afghanistan?



How do participants assess public trust in public institutions?



How do participants assess the current state of government corruption in
Afghanistan?



What role, if any, can leaders play to (a) improve the climate of trust among
diverse ethnic groups, and (b) bring down the scale of government corruption in
Afghanistan?
The target population for the qualitative strand is experienced public officials,

including bureaucrats and members of the executive and legislative branches, who have
expert knowledge on the topics that are germane to this study as well as other pertinent
sociocultural conditions in Afghanistan. In the qualitative strand, one-on-one interviews

Chapter 1 - Nuristani

11

were conducted with each participant and all data collection and data management
safeguards as recommended by James Madison University’s (JMU) institutional review
board (IRB) were put in place to ensure privacy and confidentiality of the participants.
The quantitative strand utilizes a dataset The Asia Foundation compiled (n.d.).
The quantitative data were analyzed using Binomial Logistic Regression to predict the
various dimensions of social capital (e.g., trust in institutions, trust in leadership,
associational membership & political participation) as a function of corruption perception
composite. The independent variable of interest is corruption perception index, a
composite computed from four separate but related variables that capture respondent’s
views on whether corruption is a problem in four different contexts: (a) Daily life, (b)
Local Authorities, (c) Provincial Government, and (d) Afghanistan as a whole. Control
variables include age (18 and older), and gender (male coded 1, female coded 0).
The dependent variable of interest is institutional trust index, a composite
computed from four related variables that capture whether or not respondents have trust
in four public institutions. These institutions include (a) National Parliament, (b) The
Courts, (c) Public Administration, and (d) Provincial Councils. Other dependent variables
used in this study include (a) trust in the president of Afghanistan, (b) trust in CEO
Abdullah, (c) membership in a voluntary association, (d) whether respondent voted in the
2014 presidential election, and (e) the 2010 parliamentary election, and (f) whether
respondent is generally trusting of others.
To achieve the above research plan, this study progresses through four more
chapters. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework providing the roadmap for this
study, along with a review of extant literature pertaining to corruption and social capital.
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Chapter 3 describes the methodology employed. Chapter 4 presents the results of both the
qualitative and quantitative strands of the convergent mixed methods design. Future
research direction and practical recommendations are presented in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework and Literature Review
The following chapter discusses the lens through which this proposed study is
conducted. The main theories undergirding this study are social capital, government
corruption, and transformational leadership.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework employed in this study has three components. First,
transformational leadership is used as the over-arching framework that serves as a vista
point from which leadership failure on many levels is observed. Not surprisingly,
leadership failure emerged as a major theme that cuts across the respondents and the
topics that this study covers. Second, a government corruption angle is used to identify
the main problem that has also assaulted other valued societal assets in Afghanistan.
Corruption antecedents, outcomes and contributing factors are also examined. Third, the
social capital lens is applied to assess the corrosive effects of government corruption on
the many dimensions of social capital, including trust (inter-personal trust, trust in
leadership, & trust in public institutions), political participation, and associational life.
Transformational Leadership
Warren Bennis (2017) eloquently described the importance of leadership to a
society, saying, “The quality of all our lives is dependent on the quality of our leadership.
… By definition, leaders wield power, and so we study them with the same self-interested
intensity with which we study diabetes and other life-threatening diseases” (p. 499).
Leadership, therefore, can both add to and detract from the quality of our lives. Effective
leadership brings about both material and psychological relief to followers. Conversely,
leadership failure is bound to impact negatively various aspects of a society. As it will
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become clear in later chapters, leadership failure is clearly on display in Afghanistan and
manifests in various forms. Leadership failure is epitomized by the inability or
unwillingness of elected leaders and government officials to mitigate the widespread
corruption that has reached the highest level of the government.
Since 2001, corruption has remained a constant presence in the daily life of the
peoples of Afghanistan. Despite repeated commitments by each incoming administration
to combat corruption, no progress in this regard can be verified. The public has also been
less than impressed by the proliferation of anti-corruption measures and institutions.
Because of the absence of political will in the top echelon of leadership to combat
corruption, the multiplicity of anti-corruption measures has been ineffective. As will
become clear in later chapters, the pubic doubts leaders’ commitment and political will to
tackle corruption.
Current leadership in Afghanistan fails to fulfill the essential task that Burns
(1978) considers essential for leaders to accomplish: “The most tangible act of leadership
is the creation of an institution—a nation, a social movement, a political party, a
bureaucracy—that continues to exert moral leadership and foster needed social change
long after the creative leaders are gone” (p. 454). Leaders in Afghanistan are foremost
concerned with preserving power and accumulating wealth. They continually stifle and
handicap anticorruption measures. They use enforcement selectively and as a tool to
punish their rivals whereas they shield their corrupt allies from legal prosecution. This
practice conflicts with the moral excellence that Burns’ (1978) transformational
leadership strives to uphold. The public attributes these failures to political leaders as
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they have both the means and the responsibility to mitigate the problem. Yet, they
continue to overlook or trivialize this systemic problem.
As the upper echelon theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) postulates, leaders can
effect changes by virtue of their position of authority within their respective
organizations; organizational outcomes are often viewed as “reflections of the values and
cognitive bases” of the top leadership (p. 193). True leadership, according to Burns
(1978), means “inducing followers to act for certain goals that represent the values and
motivations, the wants and deeds, the aspirations and expectations of both leaders and
followers” (p. 19). Leaders can leverage a combination of positional status (i.e., coercive
power) and intellectual status (i.e., referent and expert power) to lead their respective
organizations (or countries, in the case of this study) down a particular direction. Kotter
(2001) identified three essential functions of a leader: (a) setting vision, (b) aligning
people with the vision, and (c) motivating people with sufficient energy to overcome
obstacles along the way. The fusion of these actions, according to Kotter (2001), enables
a leader to “prepare organizations for change and help them cope as they struggle through
it” (p. 3).
Strategic leadership, similarly, gives credence to the potency of leaders to inspire
commitment and imbue followers with enthusiasm by invoking their positional, expert
and referent powers. Strategic leadership rejects the deterministic influence of the
external environment, and instead posits that leaders can and do determine desired end
state, formulate a strategy to achieve that end state and instill the hunger and motivation
in followers to pursue that end state (Hokisson et al., 2017). Leaders envision an ideal
end state and present a mental image of that vision to followers. That collective vision
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becomes the glue that holds together both the leader and the followers. To realize a
vision, leaders convert vision into actionable policies and goals that are pursued. Vision
essentially “acts [as] a road map for resource mobilization” (Antonakis, 2006, p. 10).
These various perspectives on leadership indicate that leaders are not static and impotent
figures, rather they have agency and the means to effect change.
Given the current climate of despair, turbulence, instability, and yearning for
effective leadership in Afghanistan, transformational leadership is the most relevant
theory which can also identify the fault lines in current Afghan leadership. Burns (1978)
proposed his transformational-transactional leadership model and highlighted the
transformative effect of leaders on followers. According to Burns (1978), transforming
leadership has a greater effect on followers and collectives. Transformative leaders,
according to Burns (1978), “raise the consciousness of followers for what is important,
especially with regards to moral and ethical implications, and make them transcend their
self-interest for that of the greater good” (p. 263). The quest to cleanse Afghanistan from
the immorality of corruption aligns with the moral excellence that transformational
leadership seeks and promotes. Transformational leadership “occurs when one or more
persons engage with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to
higher levels of motivation and morality” (Burns, 1978, p. 20). In this process, their goals
become fused and they strive toward achieving a shared goal. Leaders in Afghanistan
defy the concept of pursuing shared goals with followers. The conflict in goals pursued
by the leaders and those desired by citizens could not be clearer in Afghanistan. What
leaders pursue stands in opposition to the wants and needs of the citizens. This goal
incongruity calls for radical changes both in attitude and behavior, and transformational

Chapter 2 - Nuristani

17

leadership is equipped to deliver that transformation. Burns (1978) considers
transformational leadership the highest level, and Bass (1985b) argues that “higher-order
improvements calls for transformational leaders” (p. 27).
What renders transformational leadership relevant and useful to the context of
Afghanistan is Bass’s (1998) assertion that “transformational leaders shift goals [of
followers] away from personal safety and security toward achievement, selfactualization, and the greater good” (p. 41). Another aspect of transformational leadership
relevant to the context of Afghanistan is its utility in volatile, uncertain and turbulent
conditions. Bass (1990) considers transformational leadership to be more appropriate to
such conditions, unlike transactional leadership that may be more appropriate when
things are stable and demand for rapid change are low.
The elements that empower transformational leaders have profound and
extraordinary effects on their followers, including (i) idealized influence, (ii) inspirational
motivation, (iii) intellectual stimulation, and (iv) individualized consideration (Bass,
1985b). Idealized influence, the first subdimension of transformational leadership,
describes leaders “who by the power of their person have profound and extraordinary
effects on their followers” (p. 35). Followers idealize transformational leaders who are
role models and who provide them with a vision and purpose and consider the moral and
ethical implications of their conducts (Antonakis, 2012). Such leaders create strong
emotional appeal to and connection with the followers. Consequently, followers
transcend their self-interest in favor of the collective interests (Bass, 1985b). This
influence is not limited to a leader’s reward or punitive power, but also includes the
leader’s idealized and referent power (see French & Raven, 1968) such that followers
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willingly identify with the leader and wish to emulate their behavior believing in the
moral or ideal superiority of leader’s conduct and character (Antonakis, 2006).
Inspirational motivation, another subdimension of Bass’s transformational
leadership, “inspires and motivates followers to reach ambitious goals that may have
previously seem unreachable” (Antonakis, 2012, p. 266). Leaders elevate followers’
expectations and inspire actions by instilling them with confidence that their goals can be
achieved. By boosting follower’s confidence that they can achieve their goals leaders
essentially create a self-fulfilling prophecy that inspires followers to reach new heights of
achievements (Antonakis, 2012). Bass (1985b) provides a contrast of how transactional
and transformational leaders motivate followers. Transactional leadership does so by
“clarifying what performance is required and how [followers’] needs will be satisfied as a
consequence” (p. 31). Transformational leadership, in contrast, “induces additional effort
by directly increasing the follower’s confidence as well as by elevating the value of
outcomes through expanding his or her transcendental interests and level or breadth of
needs in Maslow’s hierarchy” (p. 31).
While transactional leaders seek to appeal to and fulfill lower level needs in
Maslow’s hierarchy, transformational leaders strive to elevate followers to new heights
by appealing to and fulfilling higher level needs in Maslow’s hierarchy. The former is
more self-serving, whereas the latter inspires selflessness in pursuit of the great good.
This pursuit of lower level needs in Maslow’s hierarchy describes leadership in
Afghanistan in that leaders utilize their positions to pursue self-interests and they model
desired behaviors. Their subordinates follow suit and the common good is trampled upon.
Similarly, replicating the conduct of their leaders, subordinates also pursue petty and
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lower level needs, thereby failing to realize higher levels of spiritual and intellectual
goals.
Intellectual stimulation, another subdimension of transformational leadership, is
concerned with the “rational” and “nonemotional” aspect of leadership by which “the
leader appeals to followers’ intellects by creating problem awareness and problem
solving, of thought and imagination, and of believes and values” (Antonakis, 2012, p.
267). As a result of intellectual stimulation, there is a “leap in the followers’
conceptualization, comprehension, and discernment of the nature of the problems they
and their solution” (Bass, 1985b, p. 37). Followers’ participation in the process, and buy
in from them, motivates them and induces commitments to realizing the objectives they
set out for themselves.
The failure of current leadership has grave consequences for the nation. The
country is at a crossroad moment, and the quality of leadership will determine whether
Afghanistan emerges victorious from the existential threat posed by the increasing
uncertainty and the onslaught from the Taliban. Leadership failure has given the Taliban
both the legitimacy and the strength to extract costly concessions both from the U.S. and
the government of Afghanistan. A notable and unprecedented concession is the release of
nearly five thousand Taliban fighters from Afghan prisons (Graham-Harrison, 2020).
Among the newly released members of the Taliban include high-value Taliban fighters
accused of killing American, French and Australian nationals (George, 2020a). These
appeasement approaches toward the Taliban were justified on the grounds that doing so
will pave the way for long-term peace and reduce violence in the short run. However,
violence has intensified since the peace talks began, and both Afghan civilians and
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security personnel continue to endure relentless deadly attacks by the Taliban. The
intensity of assaults by the Taliban was discussed by Afghan senators in a Senate session
that I attended. Senators lamented that the people of Afghanistan had accommodated the
demands of the Taliban mainly so that violence will be reduced in the short run and that a
path for long-term peace will be paved. Senators called for an immediate cease fire as a
pre-condition to continue negotiations with the Taliban.
The Afghan government’s strategic weaknesses have emboldened the Taliban to
make demands that would have been unthinkable a decade ago. Throughout its history,
Afghanistan has won many battles and wars against invading forces. Time and again,
however, the peoples of Afghanistan have been betrayed by failed leadership when
matters of political settlements have come up. History seems to repeat itself again in
Afghanistan as the failure of Afghanistan is unravelling in front of us. The enthusiasm of
the Trump administration to hand over Afghanistan to the Taliban suggests that it is
willing to nullify many of the sacrifices that the United States has made in Afghanistan
since 2001. The Ghani administration also seems resigned to all but give in to major
demands the Taliban have made. These developments at the critical juncture in the
history of Afghanistan demonstrate leadership failure. Present and past leaders over the
last twenty have repeatedly failed in bringing stability and order. What has been common
among these leaders is that there is that a major disconnect between the goals they
pursued and the ones the public endorsed. For the most part, leaders ignored the wants
and the needs of their constituents. This scenario makes a compelling case for
transformational leadership. The time has finally come for transformational leadership to
take the center stage and make strategic decisions that would both liberate Afghanistan

Chapter 2 - Nuristani

21

from this ongoing turmoil and turbulence and open a new chapter in its leadership
history.
Literature Review
The literature reviewed in this section address the two main topics of interest to
this study, namely corruption and social capital. To identify the problem, extant literature
on corruption is reviewed first.
Corruption
This section of the chapter discusses the second lens within which this proposed
study is conducted.
Introduction and Background
Corruption has been part of the human civilization and remains a universal
phenomenon that affects societies around the world (Choi, 2007). Corruption resonates
with countries around the world, regardless of where in the developmental trajectory they
stand (Liu & Mikesell, 2014). Corruption poses a fundamental challenge for democracy
and public administration, and it seriously undermines the rule of law (Villoria et al.,
2013). Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016) characterize government corruption as
conflicting “with democratic and republican values” (p. 7). In terms of its causes, a host
of factors exist that also interact with each other. Conceptually, these fall into (a)
incentives, (b) institutions and (c) personal ethics. Corruption, thus, takes place when
incentives, institutions and personal ethics intersect (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016).
Its consequences include low trust, high inequality, low economic growth, low
investment, high crime rates, poor education and low-quality infrastructure (RoseAckerman & Palifka, 2016).

Chapter 2 - Nuristani

22

Definitional Ambiguity
While there is no consensus on the definition of corruption, generally it is
understood as the ‘misuse of public power for private gains.’ The World Bank, the United
Nations, and the Transparency International employ similar definitions (Rose-Ackerman
& Palifka, 2016). In this sense, corruption concerns a particular interaction between a
state and the society in it. The state is often represented by civil servants, or bureaucrats,
or by politicians. It is when state actors turn public goods with which they are entrusted
into private gains that are generally referred to as corrupt practice.
When civil servants responsible for policy execution engage in corrupt acts it is
considered ‘petty’ or ‘bureaucratic’ corruption. When politicians and those responsible
with policy formulation engage in corrupt acts, in contrast, it is called ‘grand’ or
‘political’ corruption. While this distinction is useful in theory, it is often less clear in
practice. These two forms of corruption often reinforce each other as political corruption
is facilitated by bureaucratic corruption, whereas political corruption instills in civil
servants the norms and accepted conduct as embodied by political leaders. In the end,
political and administrative corruption feed off of one another.
Consequences of Corruption
Spending on education has been shown to be consistently lower in more corrupt
contexts (Mauro, 1998) as such expenditure does not present “lucrative” means of selfenrichment for corrupt officials. In contrast, spending on infrastructure and capital
projects has been shown to be higher in more corrupt contexts. For instance, using data
for all 50 states in the United States during the period 1997-2008, Liu and Mikesell
(2014) show that “states with higher levels of corruption are likely to favor capital,
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construction, highways, total salaries and wages…” at the expense of social sectors such
as education and health (p. 353). Due to low investment in public education and health,
countries with higher levels of corruption also have lower levels of human development
(Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). Poverty and inequality are other devastating
consequences, indicating that while corruption-fueled growth may benefit those in
privileged positions, the poor ultimately suffer the most. To further exacerbate inequality,
corruption results in regressive tax systems such that the rich engage in “corruption with
theft (tax evasion and avoiding fees and fines), while the poor engage in corruption
without theft (extorted for bribes above and beyond official fees)” (parenthesis in
original) (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016, p. 76).
Corruption is also credited with deaths in circumstances where building inspectors
approved, in exchange for bribes, certification of buildings in which substandard
materials were used and, as a result, were less resistant to pressure than buildings in
which higher quality materials were used. For instance, a follow up report of a garment
factory in Bangladesh that collapsed in 2013 in which 1,127 people were killed revealed
“that the factory had been constructed with substandard materials and in blatant disregard
for building codes” (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016, p. 71). Similarly, earthquakes of
nearly identical magnitude, 7.0, occurred in both Haiti (at the bottom of Corruption
Perception Index) and New Zealand (at the top of Corruption Perception Index) that had
totally divergent consequences. In Haiti, for instance, more than 300,000 were killed and
nearly 100,000 houses destroyed; 60% of administrative buildings were destroyed, and
25% of civil servants died (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016, p. 72). In New Zealand, in
contrast, there were no earthquake-related deaths. Further, an earthquake of higher
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magnitude, 8.8, in Chile (among the least corrupt countries in South America) only
resulted in “hundreds” of deaths (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016).
Corruption in Post-Conflict Contexts
Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016) explore corruption in post-conflict countries.
Among key features of post-conflict situations are weak and untested public institutions,
influx of foreign aid that sustains these institutions, and the omnipresence of particular
elite groups that hold near monopoly/duopoly over political power (Rose-Ackerman &
Palifka, 2016). These features create powerful incentives for corruption, and the flow of
external aid is directed disproportionately to the pockets of elite groups, thereby
depriving the vulnerable and the poor of essential services and goods they direly require.
This creates an ultra-rich minority class and leaves the majority poor, resulting in
heightened inequality. Because external donors are often concerned with maintaining
peace and stability (albeit fragile), building democratic and functioning institutions is
relegated (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). In addition to poorly functioning public
institutions, lax oversight of resources by the international community and outside donors
exacerbates the problem of corruption in post-conflict countries.
Lack of oversight by the international community has been evident in postTaliban Afghanistan, which can result in corruption being institutionalized in the public
sector (Nuristani & Vanhove, 2018). Maintaining a balance between the international
community’s need for short-term stability goals and that of the host society for
functioning institutions remains a challenge in many post-conflict countries, including
Afghanistan (Nuristani & Vanhove, 2018). Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016)
underscore two “most troubling” situations of corruption, one of which is particularly
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relevant to context of Afghanistan, specifically “the entrenchment of an old elite with
access to significant rents” (p. 336). This is particularly problematic in Afghanistan given
that a political elite group has been dominating political power (and by extension,
economic power) since the Bonn Agreement, which paved the way for the establishment
of democratic regimes in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. This elite class has continued to
assume power ever since.
Corruption and Conceptual Ambiguity
Jancsics (2019) laments the lack of conceptual clarity of corruption in the public
administration literature and the unidimensional approaches so far. Current literature on
corruption is organized around seven dominant theories that attempt to explain corruption
and each places blame on different actors/entities (Jancsics, 2019). The public choice
theory, for instance, is concerned with the rational decision of a corrupt public official
who determines that potential benefits of engaging in corruption outweigh the potential
costs. The bad apple theory, on the other hand, blames the compromised moral character
of the public official engaged in corruption, not the rational calculation that the public
choice theory proposes.
Organizational culture theories, moreover, blame the meso-level organizational
characteristics as the main cause of corruption. Thus, the structure and culture of
organization that promote certain behaviors within that structure are considered at fault.
Clashing moral values theories, furthermore, focus on the larger societal-level values that
shape/impact the values and norms within that society. The agent’s personal duties to
friends and family overrule his obligations as a public servant. The real blame, thus, falls
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on the conflict between two value systems that compels the public agent to make a
choice.
The ethos of public administration theories focus on the larger political and
economic factors on public institution. Accordingly, major shifts influenced by the New
Public Management (e.g., deregulation, privatization, corporate-style management) had
significant negative impact on public management. This move toward the market ethos
neglected and undermined the traditional ethos of public administration (e.g., integrity,
merit, accountability, responsibility, and longevity of service). This change,
consequently, increased the level of corruption in the public sector. Lending credibility to
this assertion, De Graaf and Huberts (2008) found that all corrupt public officials
included in their case studies fit the type of managers for which New Public Management
advocates.
Correlation theories are a collection of research papers that use quantitative
analyses to identity macro-level factors (e.g., income, age, democracy, education,
economic development, government size) that correlate with corruption. In their analysis
of corruption, studies employing this framework attempt to identify correlated factors
across countries, regions or states. Collective action problem theory, finally, posits that
corruption exists “because the public agent perceives that all other agents are likely to be
corrupt” (Jancsics, 2019, p. 525) and his corrupt conduct therefore fits the accepted norm.
Thus, corruption is a rational means-end calculation by a public agent who will engage in
such behaviors when corruption is an expected/accepted behavior.
Despite an increase in the amount of corruption literature produced and the
amount of resources allocated to curtailing corruption, the result is inconclusive
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(Jancsics, 2019). One reason for this ambiguity, according to Jancsics (2019), “is poor
alignment between actual forms of corruption and policy responses” (p. 523). To
overcome this problem of misalignment, he proposes “typology-based” conceptualization
of corruption. Based on this, different forms of corruption require specific response,
rather than a uniformed approach to all forms of corruption. Accordingly, four types of
corruption emerge: (a) market corruption, (b) social bribe, (c) corrupt organizations, and
(d) state capture. Because each anticorruption strategy is appropriate to a particular type
of corruption, Jancsics (2019) then proposes four unique anticorruption strategies: (a)
internal top-down, (b) internal bottom-up, (c) external top-down, and (d) external bottomup.
For instance, market corruption—where actors interact, and transfer and counter
transfer of resources takes place—can be best minimized by maximizing the cost of
corruption and minimizing its benefits (i.e., internal top-down strategy). An external topdown strategy—such as the use of surveillance and recording devices—is also an
effective measure for detecting corruption. To tackle the state capture form of corruption,
external top-down (e.g., international conventions and pressures) and external bottom-up
strategies (e.g., monitoring by: citizens/community, press, civil society and NGOs) can
pressure the corrupt elite group for change.
The state capture type of corruption, which often takes place in developing or
transitioning states, is particularly relevant to the context of Afghanistan. This is akin to
institutional corruption, or grand corruption, in which corruption is rampant and
penetrates the highest levels of government. Jancsics (2019) argues that misalignment
between corruption type and the anticorruption strategy used undermines the
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effectiveness of anticorruption strategies. This might explain the failure of multiple
anticorruption strategies in Afghanistan. The inability of external donors to apply
sufficient pressure to compel the Afghan government (external top-down strategy) and
the ineptitude of the Afghan citizens to apply collective force on their leaders (external
bottom-up strategy) to implement efficient anticorruption strategies epitomize this failure.
Graaf and Huberts (2008) advocated for methodological variation in the analysis
of corruption. They lamented that quantitative methods of analyzing corruption often
draw attention away from the context such that both the “corrupt agent” and the “corrupt
practices” that are being studies disappeared in the process. The authors employed a
qualitative case study method and demonstrated the importance of methodological
variation to capturing the nuances, contexts, motives (especially the non-monetary),
characters of the corrupt actors, and the process by which they become corrupt. These are
important features that quantitative methods are ill-equipped to detect and reflect upon
them. The findings by Graaf and Huberts (2008) challenge the rational cost-benefit
calculation by corrupt agent that the public choice framework proposes. Instead, they find
that it is a slippery slope process in which corrupt actors “slide down toward corruption”
(p. 644), rather than a calculated cost-benefit analysis by a public agent.
By pointing out the failures of numerous reform strategies in the largest schoolcleaning agency in the United States, Segal (2002) lends credibility to Jancsics (2019)
who advocates that anticorruption strategies should be custom-fitted to the type of
corruption facing an organization. Segal’s (2002) case study, which demonstrated the
inability of traditional accountability devices (e.g., oversight, audit, performance
evaluation, surveillance, sanctions) to curtail corruption in one of the largest and richest
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school districts in the United States, resonates with the failure of numerous anticorruption
strategies in post-Taliban Afghanistan wherein corruption continues to thrive and prosper
despite the abundant anticorruption strategies.
Liu and Mikesell (2014) examine the effect of public sector corruption on states’
spending and budgeting in the United States. They list the following four negative
consequences of corruption: (a) reduced capital investment, (b) reduced economic
productivity, (c) illicit and underground economy making up a higher share of overall
economic activities, and (d) increase in economic inequality and poverty. They
underscore that budgetary corruption is the most serious type and it “is closely linked to
inefficiency and ineffectiveness in government resource allocations” (347). Corrupt
public officials are likely to spend public resources on programs for which it is easier to
extract payoff—such as capital intensive projects--whereas spending on social sectors—
such as health and education—will be much smaller.
Using a network analysis lens, Choi (2007) demonstrates the prevalence of
government corruption in Japan. Scarce and highly valuable information is exchanged
through network channels, which are maintained through repeated interactions and
exchanges among participants. These culturally embedded network relations enable
transfer of valued resources—including knowledge, money, and authority—from one
actor to another. Thus, restrictive networks allow participants to pursue self-enrichment
at the expense of the public. The government-business network in Japan, which
developed over a lengthy period, epitomizes this highly specialized and structurally
embedded network relations. While it played a crucial role in the development of postwar
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economy in Japan, the government-business network eventually morphed into a
culturally embedded structure that facilitates systematic corruption.
For instance, the prevalence of gift-giving among Japanese civil servants and
politicians or between businesspeople and civil servants/politicians creates a culture in
which access to government on the basis of personal connections is sold to buyers who
want something in return. These connections often facilitate systematic deep-rooted
forms of corruption that easily evade detection. Tackling corruption in a context where it
is systematic and structurally embedded certainly requires long-term and sustained
efforts. These include promoting diversity so that the civil service is not a homogeneous
force dominated by a particular ethnic, religious, or political group. In addition,
transparency in policy making is needed so that the public is engaged in such processes
and given opportunities to provide input. Informational and telecommunication (IT)
technologies are a useful tool to facilitate transparency and to engage the public.
Corruption and Public Trust
Villoria et al. (2013) studied empirically the social and political consequences of
corruption. They noted that while democracy is spreading around the world, citizens’
confidence in democratic institutions and the stewards of such institutions is in decline. A
possible explanation to the decline in confidence in leaders “is the perceived ethical
deficit in the behavior of political and administrative representatives in terms of loyalty to
citizens” (Villoria et al., p. 86). Similarly, government corruption is also blamed for
distrust in government and the diminishing legitimacy of political institutions. In the long
run, corruption feeds into growing dissatisfaction with democracy and its institutions, and
acceptance of rule-breaking behavior as a norm. Erosion of both interpersonal and
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institutional trust that result from government corruption can propel illicit networks that
leverage public institutions and resources for private gains and acquire undue privileges
that shield them from legal prosecution. As such, corruption poses a fundamental
challenge for democracy and public administration, and it poses serious risk to the rule of
law.
The problem of endogeneity between corruption and trust is well recognized
(Clausen et al., 2011; Della Porta; Guerrero & Castillo, 2010; Morris & Klesner, 2010).
These studies acknowledged that the direction of causality between corruption and low
trust in government institution runs both ways. Hence, it is likely that corruption and
mistrust in government institutions cause one another and feed from each other. Thus,
while corruption undermines trust, those who have low trust in government might also be
more likely to engage in corruption. According to Della Porta (2000), “lack of confidence
in government actually favors corruption insofar as it transforms citizens into clients and
bribers who look for private protection to gain access to decision-makers” (p. 205).
Guerrero and Castillo (2003) also support this argument: “If a particular institution
projects a corrupt image, the individuals that interact with that institution will tend to
perceive low risks in offering a bribe” (p. 2) and, therefore, are likely to participate in
corruption to facilitate their goals.
As the public’s mistrust in government institutions grows, it is more likely that
public institutions will become more corrupt as people will be more willing to pay public
officials to get anything done believing in the inefficiency and arbitrariness of public
administration and the need to ‘grease’ it in order for it to move ahead. Seeing no
alternative but to ‘grease,’ people are more likely to believe that accommodating corrupt
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demands of public institutions they will get things done in weeks that would otherwise
take months or even years when such corrupt demands of public institutions are not
fulfilled. The ‘grease the wheel’ argument (Leff, 1964) was presented precisely to
‘overcome’ the inefficiency and arbitrariness of government rules and regulations and
thus “enhance” the speed and efficiency of their transactions.
Clausen, Kraay and Nyiri (2011), however, establish a one-way causation by
using the corruption experience question such that corruption undermines trust. While the
use of corruption perception questions might not entirely rule out the reverse causality
such that those who perceive widespread presence of corruption are also likely to pay
bribes to government officials. The use of the corruption experience question, however,
renders it less likely that a public official would ask for bribe because the individual
involved in the interaction has low trust in government institutions. The public officials
involved in the exchange, the authors argue, is highly unlikely to have such an advanced
knowledge about the individual. Another study that investigated the effect of corruption
on citizens’ trust in government (and its institutions) in Spain found corruption to erode
trust in government (Sole-Olle & Sorribas-Navarro, 2014). The study matched
municipalities in which corruption scandals emerged with those in which such a
characteristics did not exist. These matched municipalities were comparable in other
characteristics. In doing so, the study isolated the effect (erosion of trust in government)
to corruption scandals and controlled for the endogeneity problem.
Summary
Government corruption is the ‘misuse of public power for private gains’ which
pose a plethora of negative consequences. These include low investment in social sectors
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such as education and health, lower level of human capital, poverty and inequality. While
corruption benefits those in privileged positions, the poor suffers the most. What resonate
with Afghanistan particularly are that corruption in post-conflict contexts coincide with
weak institutions, influx of foreign aid and poor oversight of resources.
An ominous instance of corruption in post-conflict contexts is the emergence of
an elite class that holds near monopoly/duopoly over political power. Leveraging this
power, the elite class funnels most of the foreign aid into their pockets while the poor are
deprived altogether. The result is a heightened inequality, which is evident in
Afghanistan. Additionally, because external donors prioritize security and stability,
building institutions that function is relegated to the periphery. Misalignment between
corruption forms and anticorruption strategies is a common problem that undermine
effectiveness of such measures. The failure of numerous anticorruption measures in
Afghanistan could be attributed to this misalignment. For instance, the international
community, especially the donors, have failed to exert sufficient force upon the Afghan
government to enact measures that actually work. The government-business nexus in
Japan sheds some light on how corruption is enacted. The culture of ‘gift’ giving by
businesspeople to public officials, for instance, means that exclusive access to
government officials is monetized and that a barrier is erected and the public is faced
with overcoming them in order to access public officials and/or public goods and
services.
Social Capital
This section reviews literature relevant to social capital. The review of extant
literature on social capital was made possible by employing certain inclusion criteria that
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narrowed the scope of the review. What follows is a summary of the inclusion criteria
that set the perimeters around the search for literature. To begin with, seminal works that
have been influential to the development of social capital as a theoretical concept were
automatically included. Weiler and Hinz (2018) consider the works of Bourdieu (1986),
Coleman (1988), and Putnam (2000) as providing traction to social capital as a theoretical
concept. Their influence remains conspicuously evident and, according to Google
Scholar, these studies have been cited 39,937; 45,304; and 59,664 times respectively as
of March 2019. Following Weiler and Hinz (2018), only articles that presented
operationalization—rather than relying solely on definition—of social capital were
selected for inclusion in the review. Similarly, articles that focused on in-person
networks, rather than networking in the virtual world, were included. Finally, recognizing
the multi-dimensionality of the concept, only articles that investigated at least more than
one dimension of social capital were included. This criterion was further refined to only
include articles that employed more than one variable as indicators of each dimension.
Definitions and Characteristics
Social capital is a relatively new phenomenon and French scholar Pier Bourdieu is
credited with presenting the “most theoretically refined” conceptualization of this
construct (Portes, 1998, p. 3). In a book chapter, Bourdieu (1986) classified capital into
three categories, namely: economic, cultural and social. Bourdieu’s positioning of social
capital alongside economic capital is deliberate, and is done to highlight its utility and
convertibility into "currency" that can be used to acquire goods and services. Bourdieu
(1986) defines social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which
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are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (p. 248).
At the heart of social capital reside relationships and the networks with which one
is connected. Therefore, the number of connections and the size of network that one can
mobilize as well as the volume of other capitals (economic, cultural) possessed by those
to whom one is connected determine the totality of one’s social capital stock (Bourdieu,
1986). Thus, one with rich social capital could potentially accrue material benefits by
virtue of connections to those who are economically well endowed. Because of these
characteristics, social capital inevitably “exerts a multiplier effect” (p. 249) whereby less
well-off members of a network can also reap tangible benefits due to membership in
networks comprised of economically well-off members. Bourdieu (1986) asserts that
economic capital is at the root of all other forms of capital, and it is the reducibility to
economic capital that makes social capital useful and relevant. Further, social capital can
be an asset for individuals as well as groups and communities.
While recognizing the importance and utility of social capital, Bourdieu (1986)
acknowledges its limitations. For instance, unlike economic capital which can provide
immediate access to certain goods and services, social capital needs to have been
established and sustained for a long period of time in order for it to be liquidated into
"currency" that provides immediate access to tangible goods and service (Bourdieu,
1986). This is especially relevant to societies emerging out of conflicts as they will
require investing a great deal of time and effort not only to rehabilitate the linkages
severed because of the protracted conflicts but also to establish and sustain new ones.
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Bourdieu’s (1986) work remains the theoretical foundation to which subsequent scholars
have contributed and enhanced our understanding of the concept, as a result.
James Coleman (1988), an American contemporary of Bourdieu, presents his own
conceptualization of social capital: “It is not a single entity but a variety of different
entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social
structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors” (p. S98). Like Bourdieu, Coleman
(1988) sees the value of social capital in the function it serves, which is to make possible
the achievement of certain goals that could not be realized in its absence. To illustrate,
Coleman (1988) uses the example of the wholesale diamond markets in New York City
in which merchants, in the process of negotiating sales, hand over to one another bags of
diamonds worth thousands, or hundreds of thousands, of dollars. The inspecting merchant
examines the stones at his leisure with no formal insurance that he will not substitute one
or more inferior stones or a replica. “Such free exchange of stones for inspection is
important to the functioning of this market,” and in the absence of such social capital,
“the market would operate in a much more cumbersome, much less efficient fashion”
(Coleman (1988, p. S98).
Concerning the creation of social capital, Coleman (1988), like Bourdieu (1986),
asserts that it emerges through change in relations among individuals, is much less
tangible and is contingent entirely upon the relations among persons. Coleman (1988)
likens an individual with rich relations and with multiple individuals to having
established a large body of credit slips upon which the individual can draw when needed.
Thus, social capital is considered as fungible that can be utilized to procure goods and
services (Bourdieu, 1986) and to facilitate certain actions (Coleman, 1988).

Chapter 2 - Nuristani

37

Coleman (1988) outlines three distinct forms of social capital: (a) obligations and
expectations, (b) information-flow capability of the social structure, and (c) norms
accompanied by sanctions. In illustrating the obligations and expectations form of social
capital, Coleman (1988) extends the concept of social capital to political contexts, such as
the legislature, where a legislator who has built rich sets of obligations from other
legislators is able to get certain laws passed that would otherwise be stifled in the absence
of such social capital. Similarly, Coleman (1988) asserts that effective norms are a
powerful form of social capital and make possible certain features of our lives. For
instance, norms that hinder crimes “make it possible to walk freely outside at night in a
city and enable an old person to leave their houses without fear for their safety” (p.
S104). The third form of social capital becomes especially relevant and salient in
countries transitioning from conflict as the absence of norms enforced by sanctions
contribute to disorder and therefore distrust in such societies.
In addition to presenting a theoretical analysis of the concept, Coleman (1988)
conducted an empirical study to investigate the effect of social capital on educational
outcomes for children. In doing so, Coleman (1988) demonstrated that parental social
capital in the family—two parents vs. single parent; one siblings vs. four siblings;
mother’s expectation for child’s education—available to a child is a resource that affects
a child’s intellectual development. An educational outcome that was of particular interest
to Coleman (1988) was completion of high school for students with differential access to
family social capital. Coleman found that, after controlling for other family resource, the
dropout rates for high school sophomore students with one parent, four siblings and no
expectation of the mother for college (which collectively indicate deficit social capital) is
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22% higher than the dropout rate for sophomores with two parents, one sibling and a
mother’s expectation for college (which together indicate enriched social capital).
Coleman (1988) also investigated the effect of social capital outside the family on
a child’s educational outcome. Social relationships that exist among parents and parents’
relationships with the institutions of the community were used as indicators of social
capital outside the family. Overall, richer social capital outside the family available to
students were associated with lower dropout rates than those with deficient social capital.
An important contribution of Coleman’s (1988) work to the social capital literature is the
concept of closure of social structures necessary for the emergence of effective norms.
Closure of social structures is the existence of sufficient ties among a certain number of
individuals to ensure that norms are observed and deviations are sanctioned. Thus,
closure of social structure results in effective norms that can sanction behaviors, whereas
norms may be ineffective in instances where social structures lack closure. Using an
example, Coleman (1988) illustrates the differential outcomes of norms in structures with
and without closure:
In an open structure… actor A, having relations with actors B and C, can carry out
actions that impose negative externalities on B or C or both. Since they [actors B
and C] have no relationship with one another…, then they cannot combine forces
to sanction A in order to constrain [A’s] actions. Unless either B or C alone is
sufficiently harmed and sufficiently powerful vis-à-vis A to sanction alone, A’s
actions can continue unabated. In a structure with closure…, B and C can
combine to provide a collective sanction, or either can reward the other for
sanctioning A. (pp. S105-6)
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Closure of social structures, therefore, is critical both for effective norms and the
trustworthiness of social structures that sustain “proliferation of obligations and
expectations” (p. S107).
Noticing the proliferation of the concept of social capital, Portes (1998) laments
that social capital has been extrapolated extensively and applied in so many contexts to
the extent of losing its “distinct meaning” (p. 2). According to Portes (1998), systematic
analysis of social capital necessitates understanding the motivations of donors who make
assets available to recipients without any immediate return. For a systematic treatment of
social capital, it is critical, according to Portes (1998), to differentiate among the
following factors: “(a) the possessors of social capital (those making claims); (b) the
sources of social capital (those agreeing to these demands); and (c) the resources
themselves” (p. 6). Regarding the source of social capital, Portes (1998) contends that it
is the people with whom an individual is connected through a social network. Portes
(1998) lists consummatory and instrumental motivations as factors motivating individuals
to make resources available to others in a social capital exchange (i.e., possessors of
social capital).
Consummatory motivation is the internalized feelings of obligation to provide
resources to others without expectation of repayment. Instrumental motivation, on the
other hand, is the “accumulation of obligations from others according to the norm of
reciprocity” (Portes (1998, p. 7) such that donors provide access to resources in the
expectations that they will be reciprocated in the future. In certain cases, concedes Portes
(1998), donors are motivated to make resource available with the expectation of
repayment based not on knowledge of the recipient but on the fact that both actors (donor
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and recipient) are embedded in a common social structure such that the repayment “may
not come directly from the recipient but from the collectivity as a whole in the form of
status, honor or approval” (pp. 8-9). In essence, the collectivity itself acts as guarantor
that debts incurred will be repaid.
Portes (1998) contends that, like any other social phenomenon, social capital is
certainly not without flaws, which include exclusion of outsiders, excess claims on group
members, and restrictions on individual freedoms. The first negative consequence of
social capital can be easily spotted in societies comprised of diverse groups on racial,
ethnic, linguistic, religious, and socioeconomic grounds. Such factors can be manipulated
to divide people and undermine cohesion. This problem can be exacerbated further in
post-conflict contexts where social capital among different groups is already eroded by
prolonged conflicts and that weakened rule of law is unable to sanction deviation from
societal norms. In his analysis, Portes (1998) illustrates many of the negative
consequences of social capital. Portes (1998) considers the exclusion of ‘outsiders’ as a
negative consequence of social capital. Putnam (1993; 2000) later characterizes this as
boding social capital, which is also viewed in negative light in certain contexts.
Portes (1998) further expands the dialogue on social capital by broadening the
unit of analysis from individuals, groups and communities to societies. This aligns with
Halpern’s (2005) conceptualization of social capital at micro, meso and macro levels.
Portes (1998) cites the work of Robert Putnam (1993) who equates “social capital with
the level of civicness” (p. 3) in towns, cities or even entire countries. While Portes (1998)
holds reservations regarding Putnam’s (1993) conclusions and the circular logics
allegedly evident in his arguments, he seems to approve of Putnam's assessment of social
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capital at a national level. The expansion of unit of analysis in social capital to include
countries certainly lends credibility to this study's goal of examining the stock of social
capital at the national level in a post-conflict context.
Noting the gap between the concept of social capital and its measurement,
Narayan and Cassidy (2001) provide a framework for measuring social capital. In so
doing, the authors developed a set of survey items that underwent rigorous validity tests.
Drawing from multiple sources, including the World Value Survey (WVS), New South
Wales Study (Onyx & Bullen, 1997), The Barometer of Social Capital, Colombia
(Sudarsky, 1999), and the Index of National Civic Health, USA (National Commission of
Civic Renewal, 1996), the authors present a set of statistically validated survey items for
measuring social capital in developing countries. Through their exploration of the various
scales/measures of social capital, they encounter problems undermining many of the
scales they analyzed. These include insufficient items to capture fully a given dimension
of social capital, inability to include certain features of social capital prevalent in
developing countries, and unreliability of items included in scales. From the World
Values Survey (WVS), Narayan and Cassidy (2001) extracted generalized ‘trust’ and
‘membership in associations’ as the “variables most directly linked to social capital” (p.
62).
Having identified the shortcomings, Narayan and Cassidy (2001) developed the
Global Social Capital Index (GSCI) that attempts to remedy the deficiencies they
encountered in the literature. Using both exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses,
the authors establish the multidimensionality of social capital. Narayan and Cassidy
(2001) implemented the resulting survey in two different contexts, Ghana and Uganda.
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Their work is particularly relevant to this study. In addition to exploring the corrosive
effects of government corruption on social capital, this study also surveys the stock of
social capital at the national level in Afghanistan. Among the strengths of Narayan and
Cassidy’s (2001) study is that they embrace the multidimensionality of social capital,
operationalize each dimension and present a scale to measure each dimension. In
addition, the authors both validate the scale statistically and verify it empirically in two
different studies conducted in two different contexts.
Lending support to prior research that recognized the dark side of social capital
(Coleman, 1988; Portes, 1998), Narayan and Cassidy (2001) identified one such negative
impact of social capital: “corruption and cronyism in political and government
institutions” is evident in “tightly knit social groups, not accountable to citizens at large”
(p. 60). Furthermore, in the absence of external allies, tightly knit indigenous
communities in Asia, Africa and Latin America were unable to mobilize either “for
fundamental rights or for greater access to economic and political participation” (p. 60).
Putnam (2000) describes the exclusive relationship that exists among tightly knit social
groups as bonding, which are “inward looking and tend to reinforce exclusive identities
and homogenous group” (p. 22). Bonding social capital, Putnam (2000) goes on to argue,
"bolsters our narrower selves” and “may also create strong out-group antagonism”
through “creating strong in-group loyalty” (p. 22).
Paxton (2002) characterizes these types of relationships as isolated associations,
with a strong negative influence on democracy. Paxton (2002) considers it important to
distinguish “between groups that are tied to the wider community through associations
and trust, and those that are not” (p. 259) as both will have distinct implications for their
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respective communities. An important implication is that social capital is relational and,
unlike other forms of capital, it grows only when it is shared. More importantly, its
influence is most profound when relationships are shared between/among heterogeneous
groups. Putnam (2000) labels this type of relationship as bridging social capital, which is
an “outward looking and encompasses people across diverse social cleavages” (p. 22) and
is likely to generate positive externalities. Paxton (2002) characterizes this type of crosscutting relationship as connected networks and considers it to have a positive outcome on
democracy.
Synthesizing prior work, Paxton (2002) views social capital as composed of (a)
"objective associations among individuals" and (b) associations that are "reciprocal,
trusting, and involving positive emotion" (p. 256). When these two conditions are
present, social capital can facilitate the production of goods, economic or non-economic,
and at multiple (e.g., micro, mezzo and macro) levels. Social capital aids democracy,
according to Paxton, in two important ways. First, social capital "can create and
disseminate antigovernment discourse" (p, 257). Second, social capital can "provide
resources for the organization of opposition movements and large-scale collective action"
(ibid).
Paxton also (2002) acknowledges the negative effect of social capital, and notes
that many mistakenly presume that associations produce positive and equivalent effects
on democracy. Paxton (2002) draws clear distinctions between “groups that are tied to
wider community through associations and trust, and those that are not" (p. 259). This
distinction helps clarify the differential effects of association on democracy. Accordingly,
negative effects of associations on democracy "would be expected when there is high
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within-group trust and networks but low between-group trust and networks" (ibid). In
contrast, associations with positive effects on democracy are those "connected to other
associations and to the larger community" (Paxton, 2002, p. 259).
Paxton (2002) used data from the World Value Survey (WVS) and the Union of
International Associations and tested empirically the relationship between democracy and
social capital. Paxton (2002) concluded that connected associations influence democracy
positively whereas isolated associations influence democracy negatively.
Francis Fukuyama (2001) defines social capital as “an instantiated informal norm
that promotes co-operation between two or more individuals” (p. 7). He argues that
norms constituting social capital can range from as simple as the norm of reciprocity
common between two friends and to as complex and elaborately articulated doctrines as
those perpetuated by Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism or Confucianism. In order
for norms to meaningfully constitute social capital, they have to result in cooperation
among individuals and/or groups (Fukuyama, 2001). This linkage between norm and
cooperation is equivalent to what Coleman (1988) characterized as ‘closure’ that enables
members of a network to enforce norms and impose costs when such norms are violated.
Like other scholars that remind us about the negative side of social capital,
Fukuyama (2001) also identifies the negative aspects of social capital and labels them as
‘negative externalities’. For instance, norms that compel individuals to trust members of
their own families but take advantage of those outside their immediate surrounding is
certainly not social capital outside the family. This type of reciprocity exclusive among
family members and personal friends that excludes those outside of this circle is known
as bonding social capital, which is considered to produce negative externalities. Among
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the negative externalities of bonding social capital is “internal cohesion at the expense of
outsiders, who can be treated with suspicion, hostility or outright hatred” (p. 8). The Ku
Klux Klan and the Mafia are such examples that enjoy internal cohesion and cooperation
but produce ample negative externalities for the larger society of which they a part
(Fukuyama, 2001). In terms of the positive externalities of social capital, Fukuyama
(2001) discusses ‘radius of trust,’ which is “the circle of people among whom cooperative norms are operative” (p. 8). When a group’s social capital produces positive
externalities its radius of trust is said to be larger than the group itself.
A major obstacle to social capital development in Afghanistan is parallel to what
Fukuyama (2001) noticed about the nature of social capital in the Chinese parts of East
Asia and in much of Latin America: “Social capital resides largely in families and a
rather narrow circle of personal friends. It is difficult for people to trust those outside of
these narrow circles” (p. 9). Given the small trust radius, people in Afghanistan also tend
to trust only family members and close friends; individuals that are outside this narrow
radius of trust are viewed with suspicion and often with hostility. Fukuyaman (2001)
argues that a narrow radius of trust produces a two-tier moral system wherein good
behavior is reserved for family and personal friends “and a decidedly lower standard of
behavior in the public sphere” is exhibited (p.12). This two-tier moral system erects a
cultural foundation for corruption, as it is “regarded as a legitimate way of looking after
one’s family” (ibid). Additionally, the absence of ‘weak ties’ in a traditional society like
Afghanistan hampers bridging social capital. Weak ties, according to Fukuyama (2001),
allows “individuals at the periphery of the society’s various social networks…to move
between groups and thereby become bears of new ideals and information” (p. 9).
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The literature reviewed so far clearly indicates a lack of consensus concerning the
definition of social capital, its component parts, its dimensions and the variables
employed to capture the underlying meaning of this construct. In addition, different
studies employ different approaches to both the operationalization and measurement of
this concept. Furthermore, while some studies use a narrow approach in that they rely on
insufficient indicators to capture this construct, others employ a more expansive approach
in that they employ multiple indicators to capture sufficiently the many dimensions of
social capital. Although different studies have emphasized different characteristics as
they pertain to social capital, there is nonetheless some overlap. Below is a synthesis of
the many approaches to the operationalization and measurement of social capital.
Operationalization, Measurement and Dimensions
Fukuyama (2001) considers the lack of consensus on how to measure social
capital as one of its greatest weaknesses. While various studies have taken different
approaches to operationalizing and measuring social capital, trust, political engagement
and membership in association are present in many studies. Putnam (1993), for instance,
measured social capital using membership in associations and voting in non-mandatory
elections in Italy. Fukuyama (2001) identifies two broad approaches: (a) an account of
groups and group memberships in a given society, (b) use of survey data on levels of trust
and civic engagement. The World Values Survey (WVS) uses trust and membership in
voluntary organizations, and active engagement in them, as measures of social capital
(Narayan & Cassidy, 2001). Their review of multiple studies on social capital
demonstrates that trust and membership in associations were included in all of them.
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Consistent with these, this study measures social capital using membership in voluntary
associations and trust levels among the citizens and in public institutions.
Trust Dimension.
Various forms of trust have been used as a measure of social capital. Three forms
of trust emerge from Stone’s (2001) review. These include: (a) particularized trust (trust
of the familiar, found within established relationships and social networks); (b)
generalized trust (trust extended to strangers based on expectations of behavior or shared
norm); (c) trust in institutions (trust in the formal institutions of the state). Paxton (1999)
finds generalized trust more relevant to the examination of social capital at the national
level than its particularized variant. Similarly, Paxton (1999) sees trust in institutions as
necessary for assessing national-level social capital. This study uses the generalized trust
and trust in institutions as manifestations of the trust dimension of social capital.
Network Dimension.
Network, another dimension of social capital, has been operationalized in two
different ways. Putnam (2000) first proposed the bridging and bonding networks. Paxton
(2002) introduced the concept of connected and isolated networks in an attempt to
operationalize the bridging and bonding networks. Connected associations are those
whose members have membership in multiple other associations, and these associations
are connected with one another via their shared members. Isolated associations, in
contrast, are those whose members are not tied to multiple organizations.
Political Participation Dimension.
Putnam (1993) used participation in non-mandatory referendum in various Italian
regions as a measure of political engagement. For the purpose of this study, voting in
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national level (presidential and parliamentary) elections is considered as the high order
political engagement. Given the highly centralized structure of the Afghan government,
major policy and budgetary decisions are formulated and finalized at the central
government level, leaving little leeway or discretion to local level governments. The
impacts of national level elections, therefore, are much more salient and tangible which
affects the population around the country. Thus, national level elections (e.g.,
presidential, parliamentary) are more consequential, more closely contested, and potential
voters are made aware, through the media, of these high-stake and hotly contested
elections.
Local level legislatures lack the power, both in principle and practice, to enact or
amend laws, nor are they empowered to function as a checks-and-balance force on the
other two branches of the government. Because power and resources are concentrated at
the central government, local level elections are usually ceremonial and often held to
merely satisfy constitutional requirements as well as to create lucrative positions for the
well-connected individuals and groups. Furthermore, external pressures from donors to
democratize often reduce holding local level elections to merely holding these
ceremonies at frequent intervals. Such arrangement renders results of local level elections
much less consequential to the general public. For these reasons, the quantitative strand
of this study uses participation in national-level elections as an indicator of political
participation.
Summary
Social capital is considered a capital that can be converted into “currency” which
can then be used to acquire goods and services. At its heart, resides relationships and the
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networks with which one is connected. Bourdieu (1998) asserts that economic capital is
at the root of all other forms of capital, and it is the reducibility to economic capital that
makes social capital useful and relevant. It can be an asset to individuals, communities,
and nations. Social capital, however, is not without limitations. Unlike economic capital,
social capital needs to have been established and sustained for a long period of time in
order for it to be liquidated into “currency.”
Coleman (1998) offered the concept of closure as part of his contribution to the
literature. The closure of social structures is the existence of sufficient ties among a
certain number of individuals to ensure that norms are observed and deviations are
sanctioned. Putnam (1993) highlights the utility of norms of reciprocity and
trustworthiness in that they facilitate coordinated actions. Fukuyama (2001) sees the
value of norms only when it is translated into cooperation among interacting parties.
Despite the accolades that social capital receives, it also has some drawbacks.
These include exclusion of outsiders, bonding forms of social capital, and isolated
associations. Fukuyama (2001) describes the negative externalities associated with the
bonding social capital. In the bonding social capital, the “very strength of those internal
bonds creates something of a gulf between members of the group and those on the
outside” (p. 15). Ideally, internal cohesion and large radius of trust are needed. Strong
cohesion among in-group members, for instance, enables high level of collective action.
Large radius of trust, meanwhile, facilitates cooperation with out-group members. To
facilitate collective action, ideally one would maximize internal cohesion and increase the
radius of distrust (Fukuyama, 2001).
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While there is no consensus on the definition and measurement of social capital,
there is nevertheless some overlap in the literature. Generalized trust, trust in institutions,
trust in leadership, political engagement and associational membership are present in
multiple studies. This study also uses the three subdimensions of social capital that
emerge from the literature reviewed. These include trust, network, and political
participation subdimensions.
Conclusion
The theoretical framework guiding the current study facilitates exploring the
overall climate of trust in the society, government corruption, and its corrosive effects on
the various dimensions of social capital. The corruption section reviewed literature
concerning the consequences of corruption, its antecedents, and contributing factors. It
also explored the grave consequences of corruption in post-conflict contexts; this is
particularly relevant to the context of Afghanistan. Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016)
warned of the emergence of a new elite class that would dominate political power and
therefore impact other aspects in that context. This study embraces and uses the various
measurements of social capital that emerged from the literature review. In summary,
Chapter 2 described the theoretical framework guiding this study and reviewed the
relevant literature. These theoretical lenses include (a) government corruption (used to
establish and define a problem); (b) social capital lens is used to illustrate the corrosive
effects of corruption on highly valued and useful assets in a society; and finally (c)
transformational leadership lens is applied to reveal the failure of the current leadership
model and to make the case for a drastic change in leadership model.
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Chapter 3: Methodology

This chapter provides a comprehensive review of research design, methods, and
plan for data analysis of the qualitative and quantitative strands. Steps used for data
collection and data management are also discussed. Institutional review board (IRB)
permission was obtained to ensure that all standards and procedures were met and
guidelines were followed to ensure the protection and safety of the research participants.
This study employs the convergent mixed methods design (see Figure 1). The
quantitative strand utilizes a national survey data produced by The Asia Foundation
(n.d.).
The quantitative strand employs Binomial Logistic Regression to test the
proposed hypotheses (see Appendix E). Models 1 and 2 predict generalized trust as a
function of corruption perception while controlling for the effects of age, and gender of
respondents. Model 3 predicts trust in public institutions as a function of corruption
perception while controlling for the effects of age, and gender of respondents. Model 4
predicts the likelihood of trusting President Ashraf Ghani as a function of corruption
perception while controlling for the effects of age, and gender of respondents. Model 5
predicts the likelihood of trusting CEO Abdullah as a function of corruption perception
while controlling for the effects of age and gender of respondents. Model 6 predicts the
likelihood of membership in voluntary organizations as a function of corruption
perception while controlling for the effects of age, and gender of respondents. Model 7
predicts the likelihood of voting in the 2014 presidential election as a function of
corruption perception while controlling for age and gender of respondents. Model 8
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predicts the likelihood of voting in the 2010 parliamentary election as a function of
corruption perceptions while controlling for age and gender of respondents.
In the qualitative phase, insights and perceptions about the phenomena that are
central to this study are captured in depth through face-to-face interviews with lawmakers
and high-ranking government officials (both present and previous) in Afghanistan. The
four research topics upon which the qualitative strand focuses include:
o How do participants evaluate the current climate of trust among the different
ethnic groups in Afghanistan?
o How do participants assess public trust in public institutions?
o How do participants assess the current state of government corruption in
Afghanistan?
o What role, if any, can leaders play to (a) improve the climate of trust among
the many ethnic groups, and (b) bring down the scale of government corruption
in Afghanistan?
Philosophical Perspective
This study embraces the constructivist research paradigm. This philosophic
perspective gives primacy to how individuals assign meaning to and interpret their
experiences. This approach assumes that reality is socially constructed and that there is
no single, observable reality; rather, there are multiple realities or interpretations of a
single occurrence or event (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Individual’s understanding and
interpretation of an event is central to this paradigm and paying attention to the context or
the natural environment in which experiences/events take place is critical as well. The use
of mixed methods design, especially the convergent design, fits this approach as the
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researcher places a high value on the views expressed by the research participants,
instead of imposing his or her views on the data collected. Also, a mixed methods design
is appropriate for this study because the questions posed are better answered using the
integration of qualitative and quantitative strands, instead of using either method alone.
While theories about social capital and government corruption abound, none of them
adequately captures the lived experiences of the peoples of Afghanistan and their
interpretations of such experiences. The lived experiences of individuals that is being
captured qualitatively can amplify and accentuate the findings of quantitative strand.
Using both qualitative and quantitative data is therefore a useful approach to
understanding the phenomena investigated in this study.
Researcher’s Positionality
The author was born in Afghanistan and attended Kabul University before
moving to the United States. He is fluent in both official languages of Afghanistan, and
knowledgeable about its culture, religions, ethnic composition and other socioeconomic
conditions. Thus, the author holds a mix of emic and etic positions as a researcher. This
insider/outsdider position can affect access to participations as well as the type of data
elicited from participants (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). The emic position increased the
author’s access to participants and improved the authenticity of the information collected
from the study participants. The outsider status, on the other hand, enabled the author to
uphold the methodological rigors of a mixed methods design, which enhances the quality
of the data and the analysis produced.
Study Design
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This study employs a convergent mixed methods design. The qualitative strand
captures (a) the lived experiences of the participants in their natural habitat that they
communicate through the expressive tools of their choosing that the researcher does not
manipulate, and (b) the participants' interpretations and the meanings that they assign to
their experiences. This falls into the qualitative research's realm, according to Merriam
and Tisdell (2016), which is "understanding how people interpret their experiences, how
they construct their worlds, and what meaning they attribute to their experiences" (p. 6).
The quantitative strand deductively tests pre-determined hypotheses as they pertain to the
association between government corruption and the many dimensions of social capital.
The qualitative strand, meanwhile, is an inductive process used to explore how
participants construct their “realities,” the experiences they live and the value judgements
they assign to their experiences (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017). This fits within the
constructivist philosophical framework, according to Merriam and Tisdell (2016), and
privileges subjective lived experiences as “we can only know what we experience” (p. 9).

Quantitative data
Collection &
Analysis

Quantitative
Results

Qualitative data
Collection &
Analysis

Qualitative
Results

Merge
Results for
Comparison

Interpret or
Explain
Convergence
/Divergence

Figure 1: Diagram of Convergent Mixed Methods Design (Creswell, 2015)
Quantitative Strand
Below is a description of key components of the quantitative strand of this mixed
methods study.
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Sample and Data Collection
The quantitative strand uses a deductive approach and tests the hypotheses below
framed to answer the main quantitative research question: How does government
corruption in Afghanistan affect social capital in that context? To answer this question,
the quantitative portion of this study utilizes a dataset from The Asia Foundation (n.d.)
survey; which is the longest on-going national survey conducted annually in Afghanistan
since 2006. The survey captures public opinions of over 8,000 respondents each year on a
variety of topics including the media, economy, security, corruption, government,
elections and political participation. The survey covers all 34 provinces, all 400 districts,
and it captures all ethnic groups residing in Afghanistan. The fact that women constitute
nearly half of the survey participants is an advantage of the dataset and shows inclusivity
and diversity of opinions. This high rate of participation by women helps capture the
perspectives of the often-ignored but equally important constituency in Afghanistan.
Variables Used in the Quantitative Strand
The quantitative strand employs both individual variables and composites to test
the proposed hypotheses. Table 1 below lists the variables and composites used in this
study along with basic description for each variable.
In addition to capturing an underlying concept, a major benefit of composite is that it
minimizes the familywise error.
Composites.
This study uses two composites: Institutional Trust Index and Corruption
Perception Index. Composites are computed by combining multiple related variables.
Doing so allows the investigator to capture the underlying concept that cannot be
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sufficiently captured by a single variable/indicator. In addition to capturing an underlying
concept, a major benefit of using a composite/index is that it minimizes familywise error.
In the case of this study, some models would have necessitated running 4-8 individual
tests, which would have increased the family-wise error by 20%-40%, if the alpha level is
set to .05.
Four variables are used to compute the Institutional Trust Index, which captures
respondents’ overall level of trust in the public institutions. This composite is comprised
of respondents’ trust in the Courts, the National Parliament, Provincial Councils, and
Public Administration. By combining these variables the composite captures respondents’
overall level of trust in public institutions. Each branch of the government is represented
by at least one variable.
Similarly, Corruption Perceptions Index is computed from four separate but
related variables that capture respondents’ views on how much problem corruption is in:
(a) their daily life, (b) their local authorities, (c) their provincial government, and (d)
Afghanistan as a whole. When combined, the composite captures an underlying concept
of corruption in Afghanistan as perceived by respondents.
Predictor Variables.
Corruption Perception Index is used as the predictor variable throughout the eight
models employed to test the proposed hypotheses. This composite captures a more
comprehensive picture of government corruption as perceived by respondents.
Outcome Variables.
This study uses seven outcome variables. These include, (1) interpersonal trust
among citizens (generalized trust), (2) trust in President Ashraf Ghani, (3) trust in CEO
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Abdullah Abdullah, (4) trust in government institutions (Institutional Trust Index), (5)
participation in the 2014 presidential election, (6) participation in the 2010 parliamentary
elections, and (7) membership in voluntary associations. These outcome variables capture
the many subdimensions of social capital established in literature reviewed in Chapter.
Control Variables.
Baseline characteristics, such as age, and sex are used as control variables. The
purpose of doing so is to examine the relationship between government corruption and
social capital while controlling for these factors. As such, the use of these control
variables serves a practical purpose. With regards to effects of demographic variables on
institutional trust, Chang and Chu (20006) note that older generations who experienced
turmoil in their early life due to conflicts, displacement, and forced migration are more
likely to express less trust. Likewise, because women are largely marginalized in the
highly religious, patriarchic and conservative society, it is likely that men and women
differ with regards to trust factor. Thus, age, and gender are used as control variables.
Exploratory Factor Analysis
The use of composites necessitated conducting factor analysis. One of goals of
factor analysis includes summarizing patterns of correlations among variables that
correspond to their respective constructs/themes (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). The utility
of factor analysis includes reducing numerous variables to a few factors (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2012). In addition, its benefit is that “when scores on factors are estimated for
each subject, they are often more reliable than scores on individual observed variables”
(p. 613). Likewise, a factor is easy to interpret meaningfully “when several observed
variables correlate highly with it and those variables do not correlate with other factors”

Chapter 3 – Nuristani

58

(ibid). In line with this rationale, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted to
ensure that the observed variables used in this study hang together and that they load onto
their respective factor(s) with acceptable level of strength.
Corruption Perception Index.
When conducting factor analysis, Tabachnick and Fidell (2012) suggest
examining the correlation matrix of the measured variables itself. If no correlations are
found in excess of .30 (in absolute value), then there is little point in factor analyzing the
matrix. In line with this rationale, principle axis factor extractions with oblique rotation
(direct oblimin) were performed in SPSS version 26. I obtained a correlation matrix of
the four variables used to compute the Corruption Perception Index to determine if these
variables are sufficiently correlated and therefore appropriate for factor analyzing. As
shown by the correlation matrix (see Table 1), I obtained multiple bivariate correlations
at or above .30 but no bivariate correlation above 0.60 was found, indicating absence of
multi-collinearity. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure verified the sampling
adequacy for the analysis. The KMO value (.68) is well above the acceptable level of 0.5
(Field, 2013), and a significant Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity also indicated the
appropriateness of factor analyzing. All four items loaded onto one factor (see Table 3),
as suggested by both the scree plot and eigenvalues. All variables, except one, loaded
above the cutoff value of .40, the highest being 0.87. The lowest loading was.34, just shy
of the .4 cut off value. This one factor solution accounted for 52.55% of the variance.
Next, I conducted reliability test. The reliability test shows a respectable Cronbach’s
alpha value of .74, which is within the acceptable range of 0.7.
Institutional Trust Index.
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I ran a correlation matrix of the four variables used to compute the Institutional
Trust Index to determine if these variables are sufficiently correlated and thus appropriate
for factor analyzing. As shown by the correlation matrix (Table 2), I obtained multiple
bivariate correlations at or above .30 but no bivariate correlation above 0.60 was found,
indicating absence of multi-collinearity. Principle axis factor extractions with oblique
rotation (direct oblimin) were performed in SPSS version 26. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
(KMO) measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis and a significant
Barlett’s Test of Sphericity also indicate the appropriateness of factor analyzing. The
KMO value (0.75) is well above the acceptable level of 0.5 (Field, 2013).
The EFA extracted one factor solution and with a cutoff value of .4 for inclusion
of a variable in interpretation of factors, all variables loaded into one factor. Concerning
the number of factors to retain, Costello and Osborne (2005) recommend a combination
of scree test, eigenvalue (above 1) and parallel analysis. The one factor solution
accounted for 53.12% of the variance. Item loadings are above the cutoff value of 0.4, the
lowest being 0.57 and highest being 0.65. The loadings of each variable on their
respective factors is described in Table 3 below. Next, I conducted reliability test. The
reliability test shows a respectable Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.79.
Table 1: Pearson Correlations among Corruption Perception Index Variables
Corruption Perception Index Variables
1. (x23a_rec): Please tell me whether you think
that corruption is a major, a minor, or not a
problem at all in your daily life
2. (x23c_rec): Please tell me whether you think
that corruption is a major, a minor, or not a
problem at all in your local authorities

1

2

-

0.307

-

3

4
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3. (x23d_rec): Please tell me whether you think
that corruption is a major, a minor, or not a
problem at all in your Provincial Government
4. (x23e_rec): Please tell me whether you think
that corruption is a major, a minor, or not a
problem at all in Afghanistan as a whole

60

0.24

0.487

-

0.182

0.388

0.582

-

Table 2: Pearson Correlations among Institutional Trust Index Variables
Institutional Trust Index variables
1. (x34d_rec): Please tell me how much trust
you have in the Court system to perform its job.
2. (x34g_rec): Please tell me how much trust
you have in the Public Administration to
perform its job.
3. (x34k_rec): Please tell me how much trust
you have in the Provincial government to
perform its job.
4. (x34l_rec): Please tell me how much trust you
have in the National Parliament to do its job.

1

2

3

4

0.265

-

0.291

0.325

-

0.303

0.388

0.582

-

Sample Descriptive Statistics
Means, standard deviations, and the sample size for the variables arranged by
theme/construct are presented in Table 4. The means for each index differ; the means for
variables used to compute Corruption Perception Index are reported on a scale of 1 to 3,
with 1 representing corruption as a major problem and 3 representing corruption as not a
problem at all. The means for variables used to compute Institutional Trust Index and
Leadership Trust Index are reported on a scale of 0 to 1, 1 representing trust and 0
representing no trust in a given public institution. The variables representing trust in
President Ghani (x34aa_rev) and CEO Abdullah (x34ae_rev) are also reported on a scale
of 0 to 1, where 1 represents trust and 0 represents no trust. In addition, variables that ask
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about generalized trust (x230_rev & x23a_rev) are also reported on a scale of 0 to 1,
where 1 represents generalized trust and 0 represents no generalized trust.
Table 3: Factor Loadings for Two Composites: Corruption Perceptions Index and
Institutional Trust Index
Theme

Corruption
Perception
Index

Eigenvalue
Percent of variance


Institutional
Trust Index
Eigenvalue
Percent of variance


Item

Loadings

x23d_rec
x23e_rec
x23c_rec
x23a_rec
2.638
44.6
0.742
x34k_rec
x34L_rec

0.868
0.676
0.419
0.337

x34g_rec
x34d_rec
3.157
35.99
0.795

0.597
0.569

0.646
0.636

Table 4: Means, Standard Deviations, and Sample Sizes for the Variables Used in the
Quantitative Strand
Variable

Description

M

SD

N

x23a_rec

Please tell me whether you think that corruption is a major
problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in your daily life.

1.52

.69

12,495

x23c_rec

Please tell me whether you think that corruption is a major
problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in your local
authorities.

1.52

.65

12,495

x23d_rec

Please tell me whether you think that corruption is a major
problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in your provincial
government.

1.39

.60

12,495

x23e_rec

Please tell me whether you think that corruption is a major
problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in Afghanistan as a
whole.

1.30

.56

12,495

x34aa_rev

Please tell me how much confidence/trust you have in President
Ashraf Ghani to do his job.

.48

.50

12,567
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x34ae_rev

Please tell me how much confidence/trust you have in the CEO
(Dr. Abdullah Abdullah) to do his job.

.36

.48

12,550

x34d_rec

Please tell me how much confidence you have in the Court system
to perform its job.

.49

.50

7,864

x34g_rec

Please tell me how much confidence you have in the public
administration to perform its job.

.62

.48

7,840

.65

.47

7,833

x34k_rec

Please tell me how much confidence you have in the provincial
councils to perform their jobs.

x34l_rec

Please tell me how much confidence you have in the National
Parliament to perform its job.

.60

.49

7833

x230_rev

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted
or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?

.41

0..49

6,013

x231_rev

Do you believe that in most instances people are only thinking
about themselves or do you believe that in most instances people
try to help others?

.37

0.48

6,099
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Corruption is a major problem in Afghansitan as a whole
(2016-2018)
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Figure 3: % of Respondents Viewing Corruption to be a Major
Problem in Daily Life.
Corruption is a major problem in my daily life
(2016-2018)
100.0%
90.0%
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Figure 2: % of Respondents Viewing Corruption to be a Major
Problem in Afghanistan as a Whole.

The above figures illustrate the overall state of government corruption in
Afghanistan. A majority of respondents perceives corruption to be a major problem in
daily life and in Afghanistan as a whole. Because these figures summarize data from
three years, it becomes evident that (perception of) corruption has increased over time.
Hypotheses and Theoretical Justifications
The proposed hypotheses and theoretical justification for each are discussed
below.
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Corruption and Generalized Trust.
Morris and Klesner (2010) note that mistrust among citizens in a society impedes
the adoption of universalistic ethos and cooperative approach. Distrust among citizens,
the authors argue, cultivates “a tolerant and or acquiescent attitude toward corruption
and… feeds individual participation in corruption” (pp. 1260-1). The authors cite studies
showing that perception of corruption is high in a culture where mistrust is high, which
then rationalizes such behavior. A key consequence of government corruption is
diminished trust among citizens (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). A source of distrust
is “embedded corruption” that impedes building a participative and representative
government responsible for security and efficient delivery of public goods and services
equitably (p. 316). Villoria et al. (2013) also found diminished interpersonal trust to be
associated with corruption.
Hypothesis 1: Government corruption will be negatively related with inter-ethnic
trust among the peoples of Afghanistan.
Corruption and Trust in Public Institutions.
In their study of the social and political consequence of bureaucratic corruption in
Spain, Villoria et al. (2013) found corruption to be “associated with lower levels of
satisfaction with democracy and the performance of government, diminished levels of
interpersonal and especially institutional trust” (p. 92). Chang and Chu (2006) show that
corruption reduces citizens’ trust in public institutions. Another study (Sole-Olle &
Sorribas-Navarro, 2014) that investigated the effect of corruption on citizens’ trust in
government (and its institutions) in Spain found corruption to erode trust in government.
The study matched municipalities in which corruption scandals emerged with those in
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which such a characteristics did not exist; these matched municipalities were comparable
in other characteristics, however. In doing so, the study isolated the effect (erosion of
trust in government) to corruption scandals and controlled for the endogeneity problem.
Christine Lagarde (4 May 2018), former president of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and current president of the European Central Bank, also identified corruption as a
major factor that undermines trust in government institutions.
Hypothesis 2: Government corruption will be negatively related with trust in
public institutions.
Corruption and Trust in Public Officials.
Because the public entrusts government officials with valued resources and
authority, there is a great deal of trust involved. According to Chang and Chu (2006), the
engagement of government officials in malfeasance for private gains is “a direct and
brutal betrayal of trust” (p. 259) that the public places upon them. As the public’s trust in
public officials decreases and sufficient number of them become convinced in the
unavoidability of corruption (e.g., the belief that paying bribes in fact reduces the wait
time and transaction costs) they are more likely to respond positively to illicit demands of
corrupt public officials. People often develop complex systems of values to cope or even
neutralize any feeling of guilt about engaging in such corrupt exchange (Della Porta,
2000). Because President Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah are at the top of
the leadership hierarchy in the executive branch, this study focuses on trust in these two
individuals as the manifestation of public trust in leaders.
Hypothesis 3a: Government corruption will be negatively related with public trust
in President Ghani.
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Hypothesis 3b: Government corruption will be negatively related with public trust
in CEO Abdullah.
Corruption and Associational Life.
Voluntary associations enable members to overcome collective action problems.
Such associations are likely to facilitate citizens’ monitoring of public officials’ conduct.
Voluntary associations are, therefore, likely to be viewed as a threat by corrupt public
officials. As a consequence, it is likely to observe fewer associations, and most notably
fewer members in them, in contexts where corruption is prevalent. Low interpersonal
trust between/among diverse groups in post-conflict situations—wherein ethnic and other
sectarian considerations may have played a role in widening social cleavages—is likely
to further harm associational life.
Hypothesis 4: Government corruption will be negatively related with
associational membership.
Corruption and Political Participation.
Because corruption undermines key mechanisms of democracy (Rose-Ackerman
& Palifka, 2016), and erodes basic principle of democracy, including openness,
accountability, and responsiveness (Heywood, 1997), it is likely that corruption also
undermines political participation. While democracy strives for the inclusion in a given
polity, corruption fosters exclusion by discouraging potential voters to abstain from
voting. They create a false impression that electoral participation has little effect on the
outcome of the election and the policies that are eventually formulated. In a study that
included more than 50 countries and multiple observations in each country, Stockemer et
al. (2013) found a negative relationship between corruption and voter turnout. The
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authors concluded that corruption prevents democracies from functioning properly and
that citizens in corrupt countries distance themselves from political systems by not
participating in elections.
Another study that investigated voter turnout in 200 elections in more than 70
countries, between 1990 and 2011, found political corruption to be negatively related
with voter turnout (Stockemer, 2013). Interestingly, the authors mention that the impact
of corruption on voter turnout changed very little on the basis of regime type and
socioeconomic status of the countries. Bauhr and Charron (2018) provide empirical
evidence that grand corruption demobilizes the citizenry and fosters a deep divide
between the potential beneficiaries of the system (insiders) and those left on the sideline
(outsiders), effectively diluting constituents’ ability to punish corrupt officials.
Hypothesis 5a: Government corruption will be negatively related with
participation in the 2014 presidential elections.
Hypothesis 5b: Government corruption will be negatively related with
participation in the 2010 parliamentary elections.
Statistical Procedures
The quantitative strand employs Binomial Logistic Regression to test the
proposed hypotheses. Models 1 and 2 are used to predict generalized trust as a function
of corruption while controlling for the effects of the age and gender of respondents.
Model 3 is used to predict trust in public institutions as a function of corruption
perceptions while controlling for the effects of the age and gender of respondents. Model
4 is used to predict the likelihood of trust in President Ghani as a function of corruption
perceptions while controlling for the effects of age, and gender of respondents. Model 5
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is used to predict the likelihood of trust in CEO Abdullah as a function of corruption
perceptions (Composite) while controlling for the effects of the age and gender of
respondents.
Model 6 is used to predict associational membership as a function of corruption
perceptions while controlling for the effects of age, and gender of respondents. Model 7
is used to estimate voting in the 2014 presidential election (i.e., political participation) as
a function of corruption perceptions while controlling for the age and gender of
respondents. Model 8 is used to predict voting in the 2010 parliamentary election
(another indicator of political participation) as a function of corruption perception while
controlling for the age and gender of respondents.
Qualitative Strand
In the qualitative phase, insights and perceptions about government corruption
and the subdimensions of social capital are captured in depth through face-to-face
interviews with lawmakers and high-ranking government officials (both present and
previous) in Afghanistan. The qualitative strand explains in depth the trust dimension of
social capital. I probed generalized trust in detail as it has strong implications for multiethnic societies where trust among the diverse segments of the population is likely to be
impacted negatively by decades of sectarian conflicts and violence that were often fought
along ethnic and sectarian lines. The qualitative phase necessitated site visits twice to
Afghanistan where face-to-face interviews were conducted over a period of 18 months
with individuals in the capital, Kabul. A draft of the interview questions is attached as
Appendix A.
Sampling
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Following recommendations by Creswell and Plano Clark (2017), the sample for
the qualitative strand was drawn using the purposive sampling procedure, which
suggesting selecting participants based on certain characteristics. Participants for this
study were selected based on their knowledge of the subject matter (especially social
capital and corruption) and the ability to provide rich perspectives on the topic. Also,
participants’ professional experience was used as indicator of their ability to draw on
their extensive experience with and about the topics that this study investigates.
Hence, law-makers, politicians and government officials in critical positions,
presently or in the past, were selected for one-on-one and face-to-face interviews. The
use of individuals in leadership positions was a deliberate choice, the purpose of which
was to elicit expert opinion and lived experiences of these leaders. These insights
certainly enhanced the quality of data and the resultant analysis. Tapping to this rich
source of information allowed the investigator to collect privileged information that may
not be accessible to ordinary individuals.
It must be noted that the two samples employed in these two strands differ; the
individuals selected for participation in the qualitative phase are not the participants from
the quantitative phase. Rather, they are individuals selected to offer rich perspectives on
the phenomena that form the core of this study.
Data Cleaning
After completing the qualitative data collection, the data was cleaned. To ensure
participant privacy, all personally identifiable information or hints that could be traced
back to participants were removed. The qualitative database was de-identified by
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assigning each respondent a pseudonym. Respondents’ telephone numbers and/or e-mail
addresses were stored separately from the data.
To ensure the quality of the final data used in the analysis phase, data from certain
respondents were excluded from the final analysis. Justification for such removal is
briefly provided below. While the total number of participants reached twenty, only
fourteen of them were included in the final analysis. The individuals included in the final
data analysis were able to provide high quality data. Data omission was done for a variety
of reasons. Depth of the insight provided, clarity and relevance of the information shared,
and honesty and transparency were the criteria used to filter out data. Data from one
participant was omitted because the participant had been under the influence of a cough
medication he had taken prior to the interview. Data from one parliamentarian and
another high-ranking government official were also excluded from the analysis due to
extremely low quality of their insights. The remaining three participants were excluded in
the analysis due to their reluctance to offer sufficient information or comments that could
be misconstrued as critical of the Afghan government.
Interview Protocol and Data Collection
The interview questionnaire (see Appendix A) is designed to elicit participants’
response to these specific qualitative research topics:


Evaluation of the current climate of trust between/among different ethnic
groups that comprise the Afghan society



Assessment of the public confidence in government institutions



Assessment of the current state of government corruption in Afghanistan
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The role of leaders in improving trust between/among the many ethnic groups
in Afghanistan as well as in bringing down the scale of government corruption
in Afghanistan.

In-depth face-to-face interviews was conducted with each participant selected
using purposive sampling procedure. Taking the security situation of Afghanistan into
account, each participant was given the option to select the time and venue—within
Kabul, Afghanistan—for the interview. Each interview proceeded after (a) each
participant was provided a translated copy of the IRB protocol that details the purpose of
and the procedures involved in the interview, and (b) each participant provided an audio
consent for the interview to take place. To establish rapport with participants and avoid
participant fatigue at the same time, each interview session was limited to between 1 to
1.5 hours. While no more than one session was conducted with any one participant, a
saturation criteria was put in place that would have been activated if additional data
collection did not contribute to enrich the overall data quality.
An audio recorder was used to capture digitally each interview in its entirety with
the consent of participants. In addition to audio recording, the author took extensive notes
during the interview as a backup. Follow-up notes are kept providing context to each
interview session as well as to record the overall interview process in each session. To
ensure anonymity, no signature of the participant was captured; instead an audio consent
was obtained from each participant to record each interview.
Although the questionnaire was used as a guide, participants had the freedom to
express their viewpoints unfiltered and the researcher facilitated the natural flow of
conversation in an organic environment. For instance, during one interview session the
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conversation went deep into describing how President Ghani had become under intense
scrutiny regarding his original last name, Ahmadzai. Because of his identifying with the
Ahmadzai sub tribe of the Pashtun ethnic group, critics questioned his ability and
willingness to be inclusive of all tribes and ethnic groups, not just the Ahmadzais or the
Pashtun ethnic group. Realizing that this could limit his appeal to the diverse electorate
groups, Ashraf Ghani eventually dropped the ‘Ahmadzai’ last name, and instead chose
‘Ghani’ as his new last name before entering the 2014 presidential race.
Data Analysis
Interview data were first transcribed. Because nearly all interview were conducted
using either one of the two official languages of Afghanistan (Dari & Pashtu), they were
first transcribed manually and with the help of Microsoft Word and then translated into
English. As suggested by Creswell and Plano Clark (2017), the analysis began by reading
through the data and to obtain a general sense. The analysis ensured that researcher’s
preconceived notions are not imposed on the data, rather the codes reflect and fit the data
(Charmaz, 2014). Initial coding was done on each translated and transcribed interview.
Using the constant comparative method (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016), emergent codes were
explored to identify themes across the data. This method recommends searching for
themes or categories as one collects data. The categories that emerged during initial
coding were compared to the original data and the ones collected afterwards. Through
constant comparison, categories are further refined in successive steps. Initial codes were
explored in each transcript and categories were thus established. Emergent codes and
themes were also compared to the findings in the quantitative strand. Some interview
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questions also served as codes and themes. Microsoft Word was used to conduct coding
on the qualitative data alongside traditional pen and paper method.
Rigor and Trustworthiness
Several qualitative rigors proposed in the literature are employed to enhance the
quality of this study. Member checking is used to establish trustworthiness and validity of
the data collected and analyzed. Member checking is an important method of
triangulation, which ensures that multiple sources of data are used to establish and verify
themes (Candela, 2019). Member checking is a way "to ensure the accurate portrayal of
participant voices by allowing participants the opportunity to confirm or deny the
accuracy and interpretations of data" (p. 620).
Credibility is established by carrying out a field experience, triangulation, and
member checking. Triangulation, according to Krefting (1991), is the "convergence of
multiple perspectives for mutual confirmation of data to ensure that aspects of a
phenomenon have been investigated" (p. 219). Peer examination, according to Krefting
(1991), entails "the investigator's discussing the research process and finding with
impartial colleagues who have experience with qualitative methods" (p. 218).
Mixed Methods Integration
Government corruption and its corrosive effects on the dimensions of social are
explored in depth in the qualitative phase; quantitative results are illuminated and put into
context in order to answer the overall research questions posed in the qualitative phase.
Results of the quantitative phase are triangulated with unique perspectives gained from
the research participants. Integration of the two data is an important feature of the mixed
methods design. Integration is done through a joint display of the two results. The joint
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display integration is done by bringing the data from both strands to draw out new
insights beyond the information gained from the separate quantitative and qualitative
results.
Limitations
This section addresses the limitation of this study, which mainly stem from the
fact that this study used a dataset (available for free online) provided by The Asia
Foundation. These include inconsistency of the survey items used in this study, and
limited indicators for some dimensions of the social capital.
Inconsistency of Survey Items Used
I used a dataset that The Asia Foundation provided. There are number of
limitations associated with the dataset that also spell over to this study. Namely, the
dataset is inconsistent in that some survey items are present in most or all waves whereas
other items are present only in very few waves. This inconsistency meant that sample
sizes for many of the survey items used in this study differ drastically. As shown in Table
4, these range from a low of 6,099 to a high of 12,567. The fact that some items are
missing in several waves also means that the information they capture are not up-to-date
or in par (chronologically) with other items used in this study.
For instance, survey items dealing with generalized trust (x230_rev & x231_rev)
are only available in waves 1 through 3. Similarly, items dealing with perceptions of
corruption in various contexts are also inconsistent. Some items (x23b_rec, x23d_rec) are
available in waves 1 through 11, some are present in waves 2 through 11 (x23c_rec), and
some (x23a_rec, x23e_rec) are present in waves 1 through 11 and then in wave 13.
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Additionally, the items dealing with trust in public institutions are also
inconsistent. Item dealing with trust in courts (x34d_rec) is present in waves 1 through 8;
item dealing with trust in public administration (x34g_rec) is present in waves 2 through
7. Item dealing with trust in the provincial council (x34k-rec) is present in waves 2
through 13. Item dealing with trust in the parliament (x34l_rec) is present in waves 5
through 13.
Insufficient Indicators
Another limitation is that limited indicators are used to capture some dimensions
of social capital. For instance, generalized trust is captured using only two indicators.
Associational life is also captured using only one indicator. This unidimensional
approach is certainly not capable of providing clarity regarding whether the association of
which the respondent is a member is a connected one or an isolated one. Paxton (2002)
made distinction between the two types and remarked that connected associations have
positive influence on democracy whereas isolated associations influence democracy
negatively. Similarly, merely being a member of a voluntary association does not provide
information as to whether the social capital produced as a result is bridging or bonding.
Putnam (2000) argued that these two forms of social capital have opposite impact. For
instance, bonding social capital may pose negative externalities, whereas bridging social
capital is likely to generate positive externalities.
Conclusion
This convergent mixed methods study was conducted to explore corrosive effects
of government corruption on various dimensions of social capital. The quantitative strand
used a dataset The Asia Foundation produced. This survey is the longest on-going
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national survey conducted annually in Afghanistan since 2006. The survey captures
public opinions of over 8,000 respondents each year on a variety of topics including the
media, economy, security, corruption, government, elections and political participation.
The qualitative strand used interview data from fourteen high-ranking government
officials with knowledge on the subject matter and possessing privileged information on
the topics central to this study. In addition to describing data analysis method, procedure
for sample selection, data collection and data handling for both the qualitative and
quantitative data were explained in this chapter. Results of the two strands are reported
in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4: Results

In this chapter, I present the results of both the qualitative and quantitative
strands, respectively. I first present results of each strand individually and then integrate
them in order to present a more complete picture of the phenomena that constitute the
topic of this study. The qualitative results respond to the following qualitative research
topics:


How do participants evaluate the current climate of trust among the diverse
ethnic groups that comprise the Afghan society?



How do participants assess public trust in public institutions?



How do participants assess the current state of government corruption in
Afghanistan?



What role, if any, can leaders play to (a) improve the climate of trust among
the many ethnic groups, and (b) bring down the scale of government
corruption in Afghanistan?

Background
The pre-war Afghanistan was largely poor, inert, and static and there were no
extensive interactions among the various ethnics groups residing in it. Whatever existed
was at the most basic level and rudimentary. Other than medium scale commerce that
facilitated interaction among diverse groups of people, the government provided the only
means through which people from different ethnic groups and backgrounds came into
contact with each other. For instance, through military service and government
employment a limited number of people from different ethnicities came into contact with
each other. Because the size of the government vis-à-vis the society had been very small,
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this interface among different ethnic groups affected only a small percentage of the
population. There was no comparable conduit in the private sector to foster
communication and interaction between and among different ethnic groups. Each ethnic
group was thus confined to its immediate geography, interacted with its own people and
went about its business without coming into contact with other groups for an extended
period of time.
The segregated nature of co-existence meant that relations among the peoples
were largely neutral, rather than hostile. While each ethnic group lived in isolation from
one other, there was no violent confrontation between or among ethnic groups. The only
exception is when Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (re: 1880-1901) invoked religion to carry
out a genocide of the Hazara ethnic group who subscribe to the Shia version of Islam. By
resorting to (or perhaps fueling) religious tensions between Sunni and Shia Muslims, The
Amir carried out mass murder of the Hazara people. Apart from this horrific episode,
there was no violent incident on a large scale that pitted one ethnic group against another
in the pre-war Afghanistan.
Relations among the diverse ethnic groups changed for the worse since the
Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, however. The subsequent wars, including civil war
and conflicts among the various factions of Mujahedeen, altered the nature of the
relations among the peoples of Afghanistan. The once benign and neutral relations were
replaced with distrust, outright hostility and even violence. Conflicts have altered the
nature of the inter-ethnic relations in the post-war Afghanistan. Consequently, distance
among the various ethnic groups of Afghanistan has become grew wider and tensions
among them has reached a new height.
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Qualitative Results
The results of the qualitative strand are presented below. Five major themes
emerged from the qualitative data, each theme is discussed in detail below. Table 6
provides a summary of the five emergent themes and illustrates how they converge with
the findings of the quantitative strand.
1. The Climate of (dis)Trust
Majority of the research participants recognized the erosion of trust among the
diverse ethnic groups comprising Afghanistan. They offered perspectives that ranged
from superficial and cursory to the more sophisticated and deep analyses. The
perspectives offered included both introspective and extrospective angles; some
participants engaged in critical self-examination while others merely pointed fingers at
outsiders. The introspective perspectives examined this erosion of trust from within and
thus largely attributed it to internal factors. Those resorting to the usual cliché of blaming
outsiders largely attributed the erosion of trust to external factors including interference
by neighboring countries and the United States. Others offered a composite of
introspective and extrospective analyses. Below, I describe major factors that emerged as
contributing to the erosion of trust among the peoples of Afghanistan.
The Impetus.
The impetus to the current climate of inter-ethnic tension and distrust has been the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviets, following Stalin’s modality that was
implemented in central Asia, pursued the policy of isolating people from one another and
thus popularized the term “ethnicity” in Afghanistan. Before that, the British had
employed the ‘Divide and Rule’ policy in Afghanistan. On the other side of the Afghan
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border in Peshawar, Pakistan employed similar policy of fueling division along ethnic
lines when it sought to organize and equip Afghan refugees to fight against the Sovietbacked regime in Kabul. Instead of creating a unified front against the invading Red
Army, seven different, and often competing, parties were formed in Pakistan. Similarly,
Iran organized and equipped Afghan refugees there around several competing parties.
Thus, the seeds of dissonance and division among Afghan diaspora in Iran and Pakistan
were sown. Those seeds of discord have now borne fruits; and the cumulative results of
such destructive efforts are visible throughout the country. Hence, a climate of distrust
among the various ethnic groups of Afghanistan has engulfed the country.
The Filthy Class.
The first thing the peoples of Afghanistan lost as a result of the war was the social
fabric of its society. The social fabric had been built and maintained over millennia and
had become an accepted feature of the society. It had functioned as a social contract
amongst the peoples of Afghanistan. It had maintained an equilibrium such that diverse
groups of people co-existed peacefully alongside each other. Armed groups, narcotics
smugglers, land usurpers, thieves of natural resources—especially mines and forests—
and religious extremists emerged as a direct consequence of protracted conflicts that has
been going on for nearly four decades. This new class has supplanted the organic social
fabric that had held together the peoples of Afghanistan for centuries.
Traditions, customs, and deeply held values have been desecrated and torn down;
arms and gun culture have replaced them; gun lords and corrupt elements have taken over
the political order and its institutions. Lais labeled this burgeoning group the ‘filthy
class.’ This new segment of the population, according to Lais, is the biggest culprit that
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has rattled the very foundation of the Afghan society. It has dismantled the equilibrium
and relative tranquility that once existed to the point that Afghanistan cannot return to
normalcy anymore. The ‘filthy class’ has contaminated religion, betrayed every tribe and
ethnic group; it has corrupted the moral compass of the Afghan society. It has
contaminated everything that was good about Afghanistan. In its pursuit of self-interest,
the filthy class ruins everything along the way.
The Outbreak of the Civil War in the 1990s.
Erosion of trust among the peoples of Afghanistan is also attributed to the
outbreak of the civil war following the fall of Dr. Najibullah’s regime. Qader provides
this perspective:
The problem of inter-ethnic trust has become obvious since the collapse of Dr.
Najibullah’s regime in the early 1990s and the civil war that erupted afterwards.
This problem became more prevalent during the Mujahedeen era. The country
disintegrated into such fragments as North, South, East and West, for instance.
People moved away from nationhood and rushed toward ethno-nationalism and
factionalism, instead. The adjective ‘Afghan’ used to describe everyone
possessing citizenship of Afghanistan and living under its flag, regardless of one’s
ethnic and linguistic affiliation. Now, though, the word ‘Afghan’ is hijacked and
Pashtuns claim its sole ownership, and it has thus lost such symbolic powers as
unity and cohesion that it used to command. Consequently, Afghanistan has been
derailed from the path of nationhood and led down the narrow alleys of
parochialism and ethno-nationalism.
National Unity Government and the Erosion of Trust.
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A more recent culprit contributing to the erosion of trust among the various ethnic
groups in Afghanistan is the formation of the National Unity Government (NUG) that
brought Ashraf Ghani to political power as President and Abdullah as the Chief
Executive Officer (CEO). Behzad described how all this unfolded:
Relations among the various ethnic groups of Afghanistan have been damaged,
particularly in the last five year [i.e., during the Ghani-Abdullah administration].
The government itself has created tensions among various groups so as to
maintain power by fueling division. The minority ethnic groups have been
particularly sidelined altogether as their representation in the government is
minuscule. This division has penetrated the core of the society. For instance, the
Independence Day has been politicized during Ghani administration as it tries to
attribute all the sacrifices and struggles during the war of independence to
Pashtuns alone, whereas the sacrifices and struggles of other groups are being
dismissed entirely or trivialized. Historically, the Independence Day has served as
a source of unity and pride for the entire nation—not just one particular ethnic
group. It used to represent and instill harmony among all peoples of Afghanistan.
Now, though, the Independence Day is reduced to a source of contention among
people. Given this reality, there are now campaigns for cessations as peaceful
coexistence seems no longer tenable.
Ethnic Isomorphism of Government Institutions.
Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016) warned about a grave consequence of
corruption in post-conflict context: the taking over of political power by a certain class of
people. In the case of Afghanistan, ethnic homogenization has taken root. The purpose of

Chapter 4 - Nuristani

83

homogenization efforts is to fill major government ministries and agencies with
individuals from the same group to which the top official leading the agency also
belongs. For instance, most ministers and those at the top of the hierarchy in government
agencies pack important positions with individuals from their own ethnicities even when
they lack the qualifications and credentials needed to fill these positions. Filling most
government institutions with homogenous groups is considered to contribute to the
erosion of trust.
This packing of government ministries and agencies with homogenous groups has
fueled strong distrust among people and created a sense of despair among the young
people, especially from the less dominant and minority groups as they see no place for
themselves in the current political arrangement, no matter their qualifications and merits.
As a result, everything in Afghanistan is seen through ethnic (as well as tribal) lens and
everything is thus ethnicized. Competent and qualified individuals become
disenfranchised while public institutions become monopolized by the dominant ethnic
groups. Ethnic isomorphism of government institutions undermines inter-ethnic trust, a
critical ingredient for national unity and cohesion.
Political Parties as Ethnic Enclaves.
The relegation of major political parties into ethnic enclaves and their pursuit of
ethno-nationalist agendas has also contributed to the erosion of trust among people.
During the war of independence against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the
Mujahidin parties had been extremely successful in inspiring and mobilizing the Afghan
people. Their success owed to the fact that they pursued a vision shared by the majority,
not just one ethnic group or an influential individual. However, by early 1990s, these
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political parties disintegrated into mere shadows of their former selves when they drifted
to promoting and pursuing ethno-nationalist agendas. The impetus of unity in a multiethnic state is democracy; and the impetus of democracy is legitimate political parties
that are inclusive and representative of diverse constituencies. In the absence of
pluralism, democracy is reduced to merely holding elections at fixed intervals.
In addition to being reduced to mere ethnic associations with far less appeal and
mandate, current political parties are inherently flawed because they were established
mainly to advance war agendas. Consequently, these parties are not equipped to bring
peace to the people severely impacted by wars. When political movements orbit around
ethnocentric agendas, cracks among people becomes visible.
It is worth pointing out that the devolution of major political parties into ethnic
enclaves impacted both those on the right and the left ends of the political spectrum.
Disintegration of political parties into ethnic fragments infected both the left-wing and
right-wing parties. For instance, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) of Afghanistan—a
major left-wing communist party—was split along the Pashtun-Tajik lines soon after the
communist regime came into power. Pashtuns formed the Khalq splinter group, whereas
the Tajiks formed the Parcham offshoot.
Frictions also impacted the right-wing parties established across the border in
Pakistan. Pashtuns, for instance, largely congregated around the more conservative and
fundamentalist party of Hezbe Islami of Gulbadin Hekmatyar, whereas Tajiks flocked to
Burhanuddin Rabbani’s Jamiat-e-Islami party. What is interesting is that once the
communist regime of Dr. Najibullah fell apart, the leftists abandoned their respective
parties (i.e., Khalq & Parcham) and joined the right wing parties of their fellow ethnic

Chapter 4 - Nuristani

85

groups precisely on ethnic and linguistic grounds. For instance, the leftist Pashtuns (i.e.,
Khalqis) joined the Pashtun-dominated right wing party of the Hezbe Islami Hekmatyar.
Meanwhile, the leftist Tajiks (i.e., Parchamis) joined their fellow Tajiks under the Jamiate-Islami banner.
Ideologically, the PDP used to portray itself as transcending such trivial issues as
ethnicity and language and instead believed in the proletarian internationalism that
allegedly cut through ethnic and national boundaries. The Islamist parties established in
exile in Pakistan also abandoned their global outlook inspired by the Muslim
Brotherhood. They used to proclaim that Islam recognized no boundaries, be it physical
or socially constructed. Ironically, though, they erected boundaries not only around
religion abut also around ethnicity. Afghanistan continues to move along, and be shaped
by, these demarcations drawn along ethnic and religious lines. Both the left- and rightwing parties eventually succumbed to the gravitational forces of ethnocentrism and
sectarianism. They eventually became prisoners of their narrow and parochial outlooks
that supplanted both the Pan-Islamic views of the right-wing parties and the proletarian
internationalism ideals of the left-wing parties.
Planned Segregation.
Lack of properly designed and well executed urban development means that
major cities are relegated into ethnic enclaves and that opportunities for integration are
rare and interaction among diverse groups of people is minimal. Lais describes this
problem in detail. Urban dwelling provides opportunities for integration and interface
among the different ethnic groups. In the past (i.e., pre-war Afghanistan), cities were
being built and developed according to plans. Through planned urban development, the
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state was able to bring people from various ethnicities into contact with one another.
Unfortunately, no planned urban development took place during the post-Taliban regimes
or the ones prior to that. Most of the public land fell into the hands of the filthy class.
That is, new urban developments and townships are built in such fashion that the Afghan
population is segregated. The filthy class distributed lands on the basis of ethnicity for
two important reasons. The first goal is to protect themselves by living amongst their own
kind as they can invoke tribal and ethnic identity when doing so serves their interest. The
second goal is to extract votes by living among a safe and reliable electorate.
Because these lands have been usurped and devoid of any title deeds, those
purchasing such properties would continually need, and rely upon, the filthy class in
order to protect “their” properties. In exchange for ‘protection,’ this filthy class extracts
votes from their constituents and thus get elected to “represent” the national parliament or
provincial councils. It is thus no surprise that Tajiks have flocked to the north of Kabul,
while Pashtuns have concentrated in the south of the city. Hazaras, meanwhile, have
settled in the west of Kabul. Other cities—such as Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif—that house
diverse groups of people have also been segregated along ethnic line.
This planned segregation of people on the basis of ethnicity, language and region
severed communication and interaction among different groups that comprise major
cities. Because mutual trust and good relations cannot be fostered in isolation, the climate
of trust among segregated ethnic groups has eroded. In the long run, integration of the
various ethnic groups into a nation is severely hampered. Thus, cities are bereft of the
characteristics that bring together diverse groups of people. The filthy class has gravely
undermined integration that cities and urban dwellings once used to facilitate.
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Leadership Failure.
The failure of leadership to articulate a vision for the nation and bring together the
diverse groups was recognized by an overwhelming majority of the research participants.
This inability of current leadership to define a vision and inspire the nation around it
means that people are left on their own to fill that void. Ethno-nationalism is an inevitable
consequence that can flourish in the absence of encompassing leadership at the national
level. Leadership failure manifests when national leaders abdicate their responsibility of
envisioning a desired end state for a nation and fail to mobilize people to reach that ideal
state. While leaders speak of national unity in the public, they have often been the very
cause of schism and divisiveness. When leaders are unable to offer anything of value to
the public, they resort to and flaunt their ethnic identities as a means to garner support
and loyalty from their niche groups. Leaders that appeal to the grassroots, in contrast,
transcend such trivial issues and instead bring together diverse constituencies.
2. Current State of Government Corruption
There was a near unanimous consensus concerning the fact that corruption has
now become widespread and that leaders, especially President Ghani, have failed in
addressing this problem. Qader remarks: “The state of corruption is in its most severe and
dire stage. Every government institution is replete with corruption. In every government
you step in, you witness corruption.” A consequence of widespread corruption is that
corruption has now become a new cultural norm in Afghanistan. The cultural stigma
attached to corruption has evaporated entirely or diluted. This loss of stigma is one of the
reasons that a large number of political leaders, parliamentarians, members of the cabinet,
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governors and high ranking government officials are engaging in corruption with
impunity and without any repercussions.
Many respondents implicated the President in being involved in high level
corruption. Allegations such as the awarding of major defense contracts to a Lebanese
firm owned by President Ghani’s brother in-law and that many Senate seats are filled in
exchange for large sums of money exist. Many respondents implicated the President in
filling Senate seats by wealthy individuals willing to pay the asking price, which one
respondent claimed to be at least US $300,000. It is relevant here to mention that the
constitution of Afghanistan empowers the President to fill a third of the Senate seats.
The appointment of the son-in-law of President Ghani’s brother as the chairman
of Afghanistan Central Bank (Da Afghanistan Bank) is another dark stain that places
President Ghani at the fore-front of corruption. It must be noted that the said chairman is
a foreign national—a Lebanese national—not a citizen of Afghanistan. It is an
extraordinary political gamble by President Ghani to appoint a foreign national as a head
of a major and critical government agency. To date, there is no such precedent in
Afghanistan.
While implicating the President and cabinet members in corruption, Behzad
explains how government officials engage in corrupt acts:
Major contracts are given to individuals linked personally to the President or his
deputies. Smaller contracts are then awarded to those connected to members of
the cabinet or their families. Lesser valued contracts are then awarded to those
linked to governors and so forth. Thus, the level and size of contract determines
the type of connection required to win; you cannot be considered free from
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corruption when those in your inner circle engage in corruption. When corruption
stems from the Presidency, or the cabinet, we cannot expect their subordinates to
not engage in corruption.
A majority of respondents also highlighted the fact that corruption has contributed
to the erosion of trust in public institutions and that it poses a threat to other societal
values. Many participants identified a new trend and a departure from the previous model
that was in place until the end of President Karzai regime. They identified two models of
corruption: centralized and decentralized. Supplanting the decentralized model, the
centralized model came into effect under Ghani administration. Because the centralized
model funnels major opportunities for corruption to the top leadership, a false sense of
reduced corruption may prevail. In reality, though, corruption has become the purview of
the privileged class and thus beyond the reach of low level government employees. The
scale of corruption, however, has steadily gone up.
Factors Contributing to Corruption.
Research participants explicated a number of factors as contributing to government
corruption in Afghanistan. Below, I describe each factor in detail.
Faulty Foundation.
Many respondents pointed to Bonn Agreement as the prime cause of the
corruption problem with which Afghanistan is grappling. The Agreement built the
foundations upon which post-Taliban regimes stand. The expediency that went into
crafting the Agreement also means that indigenous and organic approaches to peace
building were overlooked while western idiosyncrasies were prioritized. For instance, the
inclusion of a major party to the conflict—the Taliban—was dismissed only to realize the
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devastating consequences of this gross error. This half-baked and imported framework of
peace has cost thousands of lives and billions of dollars. Having realized the
shortcomings of the Bonn Agreement, both the U.S. and Afghan governments have gone
back to the drawing boards and are trying to appease the Taliban by any means possible,
including dismantling the very regime they had conceived in 2001.
This could have been avoided 19 year ago. Countless lives—of Afghans and
international allies—and billions of dollars could have been saved had there been
sufficient understanding of Afghanistan and willingness on the part of the international
allies to incorporate indigenous approaches to the peace process in 2001. There are
numerous reports that the Taliban leadership, including its founding leader Mulllah
Omar, had pleaded to be included in the peace process that was being discussed in late
2001 in Bonn, Germany. And yet they were rejected out of hand by the Bush
administration only to regret it in the years to come. Now that the balance of power
seems to have shifted, the Trump administration and the Afghan government are pleading
with the Taliban and employing whatever incentives, including appeasement, necessary
to strike a deal.
The above critique rings true especially now that the U.S. appears to have realized
its prior mistakes concerning the handling of the Taliban and is now adamant to reach a
deal with them, irrespective of its consequences to the peoples of Afghanistan. Potential
costs include nullifying the democratic ideals for which the U.S. and its allies had
engaged in Afghanistan and foregoing the modest progress achieved over the past 19
years. There are reports indicating that the Taliban gained several concessions from the
U.S. when it signed an agreement in early 2020. The mass release of over five thousand
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Taliban prisoners (George, 2020a) tops the list. That prior negotiation with the U.S.
incentivized the Taliban to agree to formally enter into peace talks with the government
of Afghanistan for the first time in nearly 20 years.
There is a justified fear among Afghans that unconditional deal with the Taliban
is in effect regressing back to the early 2000s and essentially admitting that overthrowing
the Taliban regime had been a big blunder by the international community. The preagreement struck between the Trump administration and the Taliban before the current
peace talks was initiated provides credence to this fear and validates the assumption that
the Trump administration is foremost concerned with reaching a deal with the Taliban, no
matter its implications. Given the highly contentious nature of the 2020 presidential
election and that it is considered one of the most consequential elections in modern times,
there is incentive for the Trump administration to strike a deal overseas in order to ensure
an electoral win at home come November 3rd, 2020 (Baker, Mashal & Crowley, 2020).
In the 2001 peace process Afghans and the U.S. committed a major blunder by
not including in the peace talks a major party to the conflict, the Taliban. In 2020, the
U.S. and Afghan governments are on the verge of committing another grave error by
appeasing the Taliban. Peace at any cost hardly brings about lasting peace.
Rapid Privatization.
Karim believes that interaction among a number of factors during the early phase
of the Interim Administration—headed by Hamid Karzai—contributed to widespread
corruption. For instance, the conception of the Interim Administration coincided with
influx of unprecedented amount of foreign aid. Individuals and groups that assumed
power at the time held considerable sway over how and where the foreign aid was used.
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In addition, a major portion of the foreign aid was channeled through contracting with
private individuals, businesses and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in lieu of
government agencies. These contracts went largely unsupervised. This arrangement
denied government agencies the much needed opportunity to improve their capacities and
enhance their legitimacy through delivering developmental projects. Also, these contracts
to private individuals/companies in lieu of government agencies created opportunities for
corruption.
The entry of the private sector into the business of providing goods and services
that fall within the realm of the public sector has been popularized by the West in various
developing countries. While this may have been a success elsewhere, it has been a failure
in Afghanistan. The resulting goods and servicesMillions of dollars have been lost to
corruption and waste in the process. Furthermore, the public, and especially people who
have been impacted negatively by the provision of subpar services and goods, have no
recourse to hold accountable private firms involved. There is no doubt in the overall
benefits, and necessity, of fostering conducive environment for the private sector to
flourish. A strong private sector is imperative for the long-term survivability of a regime.
This is only possible in the presence of a strong public sector that enforces contracts and
protects property rights.
Large scale privatization of state responsibilities in the absence of a strong public
sector is futile as parties to contracts suffering harm and/or loss cannot turn to the state
for relief. The state is unable to intervene when it is not equipped with the requisite
personnel, financial resources and the legal framework. Under such scenario,
privatization is only an attempt to mask a foundational problem and to evade
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responsibility by passing it down to the private sector. What emerge as a consequence
are: (a) a weakened public sector that is ill-equipped to foster a conducive environment
for the private sector, and (b) an inefficient private sector that delivers inferior products
that only detracts from its credibility in the public eye.
Zabi also blames corruption on the rapid privatization of state responsibilities
without critical analysis of accountability and their long-term implication for the peoples
of Afghanistan. The U.S. and its allies imposed/popularized the practice of delivering
goods and service through contracting with the private sector. In the privatization
process, contracts are often first won by foreign firms. These firms then sell the contracts
to lowest bidders, without any regard to the quality of the final product. During its life
cycle, a contract is likely to switch hands multiple times, paving the way for corruption in
the process. The Afghan government was in no way capable of managing properly the
process of privatization, including enforcement of contracts and property rights. A
consequence of rapid privatization is that Afghanistan is left with numerous capital
intensive projects completed with inferior materials and substandard workmanship.
The Emergence of ‘Advisor’ Class.
The proliferation of advisors in various government ministries and agencies is one
particular instance of corruption that comes with an astronomical cost to the treasury of
Afghanistan. The appointment of untold number of individuals in advisory positions with
super scale pay and fully paid related expenses and security personnel is another form of
corruption that has generated strong resentment among the public. Without disclosing
their special expertise and the services they provide, not to mention their qualifications or
competence, these individuals are appointed as advisors in various government agencies.
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This is done largely to support personal friends and those closely connected with
the upper echelon leadership. One research participant noted that many of the advisors
have barely completed primary education and yet they earn thousands of dollars each
month. Ordinary government employees with at least undergraduate education receive
approximately US$200-$250 per month. Some advisors are accused of not even being
physically present to do their job. Other advisors are alleged to conduct their private
businesses while using government-provided vehicles and the attendant security details.
The use of ‘advisors’ class has been a constant presence in government agencies
in Afghanistan ever since the U.S. intervened in late 2001. The advisor class was
originally conceived of and proliferated by the U.S. and its international allies when they
recruited untold number of expatriates in advisory positions and scattered them around in
various government agencies in Afghanistan. The goal, in theory, was to utilize their
special knowledge and expertise to improve institutional capacities of government
agencies and provide technical expertise to high level government officials, both civilian
and military.
However, the government of Afghanistan has adopted this model and employed it
mainly to funnel public resources to their political allies, personal friends and family
members. This practice is particularly appealing to the government of Afghanistan
because, unlike cabinet members, individuals recruited with this designation do not have
to be confirmed by the Wolesi Jirga (equivalent to the British House of Commons or the
U.S. House of Representatives). Many of advisors often receive compensations and
security details comparable to a cabinet minister but with little to no public scrutiny or
accountability.
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3. Trust in Public Institutions
An overwhelming majority of research participants recognized serious deficit in
trust in public institutions; though some institutions are worse off than others. Many
respondents recognized this distinction and explained this disparity in trust levels in each
institutions. The Afghan National Army (ANA), for instance, is the institution that enjoys
the most public trust, whereas the Presidency suffers the most from public trust deficit,
followed by the judiciary branch.
Bezhan summed up this phenomenon succinctly: “other than the security forces,
people do not trust public institutions.” He provided additional details:
The prevalence of corruption and poor governance have resulted in erosion of
trust in public institutions. If you analyze the results of the last parliamentary
elections, you notice that people do not trust this institution as well. Similarly,
people distrust the judiciary branch. You would not be witnessing street
[informal] justice had the public trusted the judiciary branch. Because people lack
confidence in the judiciary, they instead refer to street [informal] justice or that
provided by anti-government elements [e.g., the Taliban].
The fact that people turn to the Taliban and away from the government is the
biggest manifestation of lack of public trust in public institutions. Because of the
widespread corruption in the government, people no longer take their cases—civil or
criminal—to government courts. They prefer the Taliban, due to the expedience of their
rulings and the fact that they do not take people’s money in the process.
Qader also painted a bleak image of public trust in institutions and believes that
these institutions do not serve the interest of the Afghan people. He claims that many
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government institutions, or major aspects of them, have been imported without due
diligence and careful attention to their computability with the sociopolitical and cultural
realities of Afghanistan. The Supreme Court, for instance, has been largely copied and
brought straight from Italy. Similarly, many legislations currently in use in Afghanistan
have been copied from other countries.
Zabi draws a connection between government corruption and the loss of public
trust in government institutions. He illustrates this problem with the help of an example:
At the request of a colleague, I once visited a former cabinet level minister along
with another colleague in another branch of the government to vouch for a certain
candidate for a government job. After extensive pleas and requests, the Minister
agreed to approve the appointment of our candidate as [the position is omitted to
protect the identity of the respondent]. I later became aware that my colleague
who had accompanied me had taken US $80,000 from the candidate for having
taken his case to the Minister [and obtained his approval].
Zabi shared a personal story to further illuminate the link between government
corruption and deficit in trust in public institutions:
Each government position has its sticker price and public officials receive/demand
bribes both directly and indirectly. For instance, the post of governor in a tier one
province is $200,000; lower tier provinces cost a bit less. I myself was offered a
seat [in a government entity] for $300,000. All key government positions have
price tags attached to them. There is corruption in every level within the
government. In a climate such as this, how can one trust any government
institution? It is sometimes the case that people turn to the Taliban in Quetta or
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Peshawar [in Pakistan] in order to get their cases resolved. People even take their
cases to the Taliban in areas under the Taliban control. People prefer the Taliban
over the government.
To know how the Afghan government functions (or fails to function), it is
important to know those who run (or fail to run) the government. Lais offered more
insight into who possess political power in Afghanistan and how they have acquired it.
Revealing those in power and the methods through which they have realized power can
explain the institutionalization of corruption in Afghanistan. Lais provided his insight:
Current breed of politicians came to power through two distinct routes. One group
assumed power through the brute force of weapons and military might, whereas
the second group came to power through the support of western intelligence
networks. It is important to note that these are not collaborators with western
nations or state actors. Instead, they are affiliated with western intelligence
agencies and spy networks that are neither state actors nor representatives of a
particular state. Now that they are in power, they loot and pillage public resources
and wealth. They institutionalized corruption to enrich themselves and to impede
the course of justice.
In summary, the governments formed post the removal of the Taliban regime in
2001, have been largely composed of domestic criminals and foreign-backed spies. For
this reasons, Afghans call the post-Taliban regimes as “the government of foreign spies
and domestic criminals.” This brief but powerful statement sums up the lack of trust in
public institutions and those leading them.
4. Trust in Leadership
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Many research participants expressed distrust in leaders, and they accused the
President, cabinet members and members of the parliament of involvement in corruption,
fueling tensions along ethnic and linguistic lines. One of the reason for the loss of trust in
leaders, according to Behzad, is their inability to deal with the problem of corruption
decisively:
These leaders do not and cannot do anything positive to lower the scale of
corruption. Eradicating corruption collides with their own interests and
undermines their own authority. For this reasons, it is impossible for the current
class of leaders to combat corruption.
Behzad elaborates further. All government efforts against corruption are targeted
toward petty and minor corruption. Those involved in major corruption, however, serve
in the current administration. They occupy important government positions, including in
the cabinet. They are accountable to no one; they have amassed unexplained wealth and
they are never questioned as to the source of such wealth. There is no political will to
fight against corruption and corrupt individuals. The Afghan government supports and
protects a number of major corrupt elements as they belong to the same circle. If you
examine their past it becomes evident that they did not own a tiny fraction of the wealth
they currently possess. Current leaders are not equipped to deal with the problem of
corruption. They are motivated to protect and defend their wealth acquired through
corruption.
Another factor that undermines trust in leaders is that leaders are cut off from the
society at large and therefore are unaware of the dire conditions with which ordinary
Afghans are faced. To ground themselves in reality, argues Eisa, it is imperative that
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leaders interact with the grassroots so that they become informed of the living conditions
of the ordinary people. Leaders need to visit provinces and districts in the process and
reflect in the media upon the needs and sufferings of the people. When interacting with
the public, leaders must not limit themselves to their own ethnic groups. Pashtun leaders,
for instance, need to discuss the challenges faced by Uzbeks, Hazaras, Pashais, Aimaqs,
and so forth. Tajik leaders, similarly, need to become aware of and reflect upon the
sufferings of Pashtuns, Baluchis, Nuristanis, and other groups. When leaders engage in
resolving problems faced by the nation collectively, they can inject a sense of unity and
cohesion among the populace. This is what has been missing in Afghanistan for the past
four decades.
Leaders need to overcome ethnic and linguistic barriers. In-group and out-group
mindset has resulted in tribalism, factionalism and ethno-nationalism in Afghanistan.
Jamshid identifies the lack of vision as another reason for the loss of trust in leaders and
latter’s inability to unite the nation. Bereft of clear vision for the nation, leaders promote
ethnocentric, parochial and short-sighted agendas that conflict with national unity and
cohesion. Because Afghan leaders are unable to define a unifying vision for the country
they are unable to foster a climate of trust among the people of Afghanistan.
Lais considers the presidency as the root cause of corruption and provides an
insight into how President Ghani has classified corrupt public officials into two
categories: insiders and outsiders. This bifurcation of corrupt officials is corroborated by
the duality of treatment to which these two categories of officials are subjected. Lais
describes this classification and its consequences below:
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While corruption has permeated every sector and institution of the Afghan
society, its root cause has been the presidency itself. The institution of the
Presidency has incentivized corruption in the government; it has never fought
against corruption honestly. When the international community or the [Afghan]
society subjects it to criticism it detains a few thieves and corrupt individuals who
belong to other teams and factions, not to his own circle. While President Karzai
treated all thieves and corrupt officials as his own, President Ghani classifies them
into insiders and outsiders. The Ghani administration attacks and prosecutes
forcefully thieves and corrupt officials who are outsiders; it protects thieves who
are insiders, however.
Zabi offered perhaps one of the most detailed and caustic critique of President
Ghani for his alleged role in rendering corruption a centralized business. He offered the
following description and an example to support his claim:
…corruption has reached its climax under this [Ghani] administration. During Karzai,
for instance, we had not witnessed a person securing a Senate appointment in
exchange for bribes. I was once approached to pay $300,000 to be appointed by the
President as a senator. I told them that I did not have the money to pay. They
mentioned a few names in the Senate to back up their claims that they can make it
happen. I also know a few businessmen who have secured senatorial positions in
exchange for bribes [during Ghani administration]. If you trace this corruption it all
leads to the President as he alone has the power and authority to appoint to the
Senate. The level of corruption that is prevalent today is unprecedented. What is
different, though, is that while corruption in the lower level has been reduced to some
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extent, corruption has now been centralized and concentrated at the top. This may
present a false image of reduced corruption under this administration.
5. Associational Life
Based on the insights that research participants provided, associational life in
Afghanistan is in poor condition and in need of revitalization. Lack of political parties
that pursue inclusivity and diversity, and disintegration of existing ones into mere ethnic
enclaves were cited as the main factors that contribute to poor state of associational life in
Afghanistan. In addition, the use of single non-transferrable vote (SNTV) electoral
system is a major legal impediment that has retarded the development of political parties
and consequently that of the associational life. Turbulent past of the political parties and
their role in the violent conflicts between 1979 and 2001 is a historical reason for the
poor state of civic life in Afghanistan. Legacies of the communist and Mujahedeen era
feed public mistrust toward political parties. Additionally, political parties lack roots in
the Afghan society.
Jamshid noted the impact of poor associational life on the society at large. He
believes that the absence of political parties that promote patriotism and inclusivity is a
major blow to the people of Afghanistan. Political parties can and do serve as a bridge
between the people and the government. Through political parties, people defend their
rights and fight against injustice, oppression and despotism of the government. Absence
of political parties, therefore, renders the people of Afghanistan helpless against state
oppression and injustice.
Afridi confessed that the reason that current leaders are even relevant is lack of
political parties that pursue inclusivity, diversity and who represent all Afghans,
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irrespective of their ethnic and linguistic identities. Afridi laments that existing political
parties, unfortunately, are trapped in such petty and trivial issues as ethnicity. Such
parties, therefore, cannot foster trust among the diverse ethnic groups in Afghanistan.
Delawar sees a connection between lack of political parties and the fact that democracy
has not been realized in Afghanistan:
One of the reasons that democracy has not been institutionalized or taken deep
root [in Afghanistan] is the absence of political parties that are inclusive and
representative of all people. Existing political parties in Afghanistan have
morphed into ethnocentric and parochial movements with much more narrow
outlook that focus only on the concerns of their respective groups centered on
their ethic identities. Instead of being a source of national unity and cohesion,
these parties have been the very source of division and fragmentation.
Because the development of political parties is still in embryonic stage in
Afghanistan, democracy also remains in a fragile state. Although Afghanistan has been
experimenting with conducting elections of various types (e.g., presidential, legislative)
and scales (e.g., national, provincial and district levels) since 2001, democracy is far from
being embraced. There is a tendency to falsely equate holding elections at fixed intervals
with embracing democracy and its principles. This, however, does not comfort with
reality. At best, by fiddling with democracy Afghanistan is acclimating itself with the
basics of democracy. At worst, democracy has been used in Afghanistan as a pretext to
engage in large scale corruption.
Conclusion
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Four research questions were posed to be answered by the qualitative data. These
included:


How do participants evaluate the current climate of trust among the different
ethnic groups in Afghanistan?



How do participants assess public trust in public institutions?



How do participants assess the current state of government corruption in
Afghanistan?



What role, if any, can leaders play to (a) improve the climate of trust among
the many ethnic groups, and (b) bring down the scale of government corruption
in Afghanistan?

Concerning the current climate of inter-ethnic trust (i.e., generalized trust), a
bleak image emerged as distrust between and among the diverse ethnic groups in
Afghanistan has deepened. Leadership failure also weaves throughout, and is often
credited with institutionalizing corruption, stoking ethnic division, ethnic homogenization
of state institutions and failing to bring together the nation through unifying vision for the
country. Features of the Afghan society that used to bring people together have now lost
their collective power. Important events such the Independence Day and characteristics of
the Afghan society are now hijacked by certain ethnic groups such that contributions of
others groups to the country are being denied altogether or trivialized. Less dominant and
minority ethnic groups bear the brunt of the gloomy climate of trust.
Similarly, the results show that trust in public institutions has been damaged to a
great extent. The judiciary and the presidency suffer the most from trust deficit, as most
of the research respondents attributed the blame to these two institutions. Many
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particularly underscored the role of the President in institutionalizing corruption. They
accused him of awarding major defense and government contracts to a Lebanese firm
owned by his brother in-law. It is worth noting that the Afghan Frist Lady is of Lebanese
origin. Also, Ghani is accused of appointing the son-in-law of his brother as chairman of
the Afghanistan Central Bank. The chairman in question is a foreign national, not a
citizen of Afghanistan.
In terms of trust in leadership, research participants seriously doubted the
commitment of leaders to confront decisively the most serious problem facing the nation:
corruption. While insecurity and poor economy may be attributed to external actors and
factors upon whom/which Afghan leaders have little control. Corruption, however, is one
such problem that Afghan leaders can tackle given that it is a domestic problem largely
created and sustained by domestic actors. Inability or reluctance of current leaders to
combat corruption with concreate and precise measures has prompted the public to lose
confidence in their leaders.
Because of their involvement in corruption and that corrupt individuals belonging
to the President’s inner circle are protected, the public does not expect leaders to play
positive role in bringing down the scale of corruption. The public also does not believe
that leaders will take meaningful actions to improve the climate of inter-ethnic trust given
that distrust among people serves their interest. Therefore, current leaders are unlikely to
challenge the status quo. Respondents are confident that current leaders do not and cannot
define a compelling vision for the country, unify the Afghan people around that vision
and inspire them to achieve nationhood, which they claimed to be the most important
goal for the people of Afghanistan.
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Quantitative Results
Below I present the results of the quantitative strand. The hypotheses proposed in
the Introduction section (see Appendix E) are tested using statistical procedures.
1. Generalized Trust
The World Value Survey (WVS) uses two indicators to measure the generalized
subdimension of social capital. This study follows suit. Two variables are used to capture
the generalized trust subdimension. Variable x23_rev asks respondents, “Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very
careful in dealing with people?” Variable x231_rev, additionally, asks respondents, “Do
you think in most instances people are helping others or they are only thinking about
themselves. These two variables test Hypothesis 1 from two separate but related angles.
Hypothesis 1: Government corruption will be negatively related with trust among
citizens (i.e., generalized trust).
A binomial logistic regression was performed to ascertain the effects of
government corruption on the likelihood of whether people trust others, while controlling
for the effects of gender and age. The logistic regression model was statistically
significant, X2(3) = 29.499, p<.001, indicating a good fit. While the model excelled in
predicting those who lack generalized trust (100%) than those who do possess
generalized trust, the overall model correctly classified 63.5% of the cases.
Both gender (b=-.055, SE=.053, p>.05) and age (b=-.004, SE=.021, p>.05) are
negative and not significant predictors. Corruption perception, however, is a negative and
significant predictor (b=-.206, SE=.039, p<.001) (see Table 5). This suggests that, after
controlling for age and gender, those who view corruption as a problem are less likely to
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trust others. The odds ratio (.81), for instance, indicates that the likelihood of their
trusting others diminishes significantly.
I also used another indicator of generalized trust (x231_rev), as commonly used
by the World Value Survey, to explore the effect of government corruption on
generalized trust. This logistic regression model was also statistically significant, X2(3) =
51.517, p<.001, indicating a good fit. While the model excelled in predicting those who
lack generalized trust (100%) than those who do not, the overall model correctly
classified 67.2% of the cases.
Gender (b=-.154, SE=.053, p<.05) is a negative and significant predictor.
Combined with its odds ratio of .86, this indicates that men are less likely than women to
trust others. Age (b=.017, SE=.022, p>.05) is a non-significant predictor, indicating no
difference between younger, middle aged and older generations when it comes to
generalized trust. Corruption perception, however, is a negative and significant predictor
(b=-.254, SE=.039, p<.001), and its odds ratio is .78. This suggests that, after controlling
for age and gender, those who view corruption as a problem are less likely to trust others.
These two results provide support to Hypothesis 1.
2. Trust in Public Institutions
Trust in public institution is captured by computing a composite. Four variables
contributed to computing this composite that collectively captures public trust in public
institutions. This composite also captures the trust subdimension of social capital and is
used to test Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2: Government corruption will be negatively related with trust in
public institutions.
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A binomial logistic regression was performed to ascertain the effects of
government corruption (a composite of four different variables examining perceptions of
corruption at four different facets), age and gender on institutional trust. The logistic
regression model was statistically significant, X2(3) = 92.306, p<.001, indicating a good
fit. In terms of correctly classifying cases, however, the model performs modestly as it
only correctly classifies 58% of the cases.
While age is not a significant predictor, gender (b = -0.172, SE=.055, p<.005) is a
negative and significant predictor. This, coupled with its odds ratio (.84), suggests that
men are significantly less likely to trust public institutions. Corruption perception index
(b = -.386, SE=.044, p<.001) is a negative and significant predictor. The odds ratio for
corruption perception index (.68), coupled with its negative coefficient, shows that those
who perceive corruption to be a problem are significantly less likely to trust public
institutions. Thus, the result supports Hypothesis 2.
3. Trust in Leadership
This study measures trust in leadership using two indicators, (a) trust in President
Ghani, and (b) trust in CEO Abdullah. As part of the agreement that was reached in the
aftermath of the lengthy delays in the 2014 presidential election results and allegations of
serious and large scale electoral frauds by the two contestants, the National Unity
Government (NUG) was conceived. A key provision of the NUG was the sharing of the
executive branch’s power between the two candidates, Ashraf Ghani serving as the
President, and Abdullah serving as the Chief Executive Officer. Thus, two procedures
were ran independently to measure trust in leadership; both of these procedures are
executed to test Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b, respectively.
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Hypothesis 3a: Government corruption will be negatively related with public’s
trust in President Ashraf Ghani.
A binomial logistic regression was performed to ascertain the effects of
Government Corruption (a composite of four different variables examining perceptions of
corruption at four different facets), age and gender on whether people trust public
officials. The logistic regression model was statistically significant, X2(3) = 229.119,
p<.001, indicating a good fit. In terms of correctly classifying cases, however, the model
performs fairly as it only correctly classifies 56% of the cases.
Gender (b=.138, SE=.036, p<.001), age (b = -.054, SE=.054, p<.001) and
corruption perception index (b = -.435, SE = .031, p < .001) are negative and significant
predictors. The odds ratio for gender (1.15) shows that the likelihood of men to trust
public officials is a little more than one. Similarly, the odds ratio for age (.95) shows that
older respondents are less likely to trust public officials as compared to their younger
counterparts. The odds ratio for corruption perception (.65) shows that, after controlling
for age and gender, those who see corruption to be a problem are significantly less likely
to trust President Ghani. Thus, the results support Hypothesis 3a.
Hypothesis 3b: Government corruption will be negatively related with public’s
trust in CEO Abdullah.
A binomial logistic regression was performed to ascertain the effects of
government corruption (a composite of four different variables examining perceptions of
corruption at four different facets), age and gender on whether people trust CEO
Abdullah. The logistic regression model was statistically significant, X2(3) = 109.050,
p<.001, indicating a good fit. In terms of correctly classifying cases, however, the model
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performs fairly as it correctly classifies 63.5% of the cases. While age (b = -.008,
SE=.015, p>.05) was not a significant predictor, Gender (b = -.146, SE=.038, p<.001),
and corruption perception (b = -.294, SE = .030, p<.001) are negative and significant
predictors. The odds ratio for gender (.86) shows that the likelihood of men to trust CEO
Abdullah is less than one. The odds ratio for corruption perception (.75) shows that, after
controlling for age and gender, those who see corruption to be a problem are significantly
less likely to trust CEO Abdullah. This result supports Hypothesis 3b.
4. Associational life
Associational life is measured using respondents’ membership in a voluntary
organization for which the respondent does not provide paid work.
Hypothesis 4: Government corruption will be negatively related with
associational life.
A binomial logistic regression was performed to ascertain the effects of
government corruption (a composite of four different variables examining perceptions of
corruption at four different facets), gender and age on associational membership. The
logistic regression model was statistically significant, X2(3) = 159.269, p<.001, indicating
a good fit. While the model excelled in predicting those who would be part of voluntary
associations (100%), the overall model correctly classified 87.6% of the cases.
Gender (b=.941, SE=.084, p<.001), is a significant and positive predictor,
whereas age (b= -.114, SE=.033, p<.005), and corruption perception composite (b= -.216,
SE=.055, p<.001) are negative and significant predictors. This shows that men are more
likely than women to be members of voluntary associations (positive coefficient), and
that older adults are less likely (negative coefficient) to engage in voluntary associations.
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The odds ratio for gender (2.56) indicates that men are 2.5 times more likely than women
to be members of voluntary associations. Similarly, the odds ratio for age (.89) indicates
that the likelihood of becoming members of voluntary organization diminishes with age.
The negative and significant result for the corruption composite and its associated odds
ratio (.81) indicate that, after controlling for age and gender, perception of government
corruption undermines associational life. This result supports Hypothesis 4.
5. Political Participation
This study measured political participation using two indicators: (a) voting in the
2014 presidential election and (b) voting in the 2010 parliamentary elections. Due to
allegations of widespread and large scale electoral frauds by both candidates, a runoff
election was held to determine the victor of the 2014 presidential election. The two
candidates belonged to the two major ethnic groups in Afghanistan (Ghani a Pashtun,
Abdullah a Tajik).
Because ethnic identity and linguistic affiliation is likely to have played major
role in voting behavior of the electorate during the 2nd round, this study considers it to be
contaminated and therefore not an appropriate indicator of the political participation
subdimension of social capital. For this reason, this study considers the first round to be
an accurate indicator of the political participation subdimension of social capital. In his
work on Italy, Robert Putnam (1993) considered participation in the non-mandatory
elections as an appropriate measure of the political participation subdimension of social
capital. Conversely, Putnam (1993) did not consider participation in mandatory election
as a good indicator of political participation.

Chapter 4 - Nuristani

111

Hypothesis 5a: Government corruption will be negatively related with voting in
the 1st round of the 2014 Presidential election.
A binomial logistic regression was performed to ascertain the effects of
government corruption (a composite of four different variables examining perceptions of
corruption at four different facets), gender and age on the likelihood that respondents
participate in the 2014 presidential elections. The logistic regression model was
statistically significant, X2(3) = 201.073, p<.001, indicating a good fit. While the model
excelled in predicting those who would participate in the 2014 presidential elections
(100%), the overall model correctly classified 80% of the cases.
Gender (b =.69, SE=.05, p<.001) and age (b = .04, SE=.02, p<.05) are positive
and significant predictors. This shows that men and older respondents are more likely to
be politically active than women and their younger counterparts. The odds ratio for
gender (1.99) indicates that men are two times more likely than women to participate in
the 2014 presidential election. Similarly, the odds ratio for age indicates that older adults
are 1.04 times more likely to participate in the presidential elections. Corruption
perception composite (b = -.09, SE=4.09, p<.05), however, is a negative and significant
predictor. The odds ratio for corruption perception composite (.913), combined with its
negative coefficient, indicates that—after controlling for age and gender—those who
perceive corruption to be a problem are less likely to vote in presidential elections. This
result supports Hypothesis 5a.
Hypothesis 5b: Government corruption will be negatively related with
participation in the 2010 parliamentary elections.

Chapter 4 - Nuristani

112

This study uses voting in the 2010 parliamentary elections as a second measure of
political participation, another subdimension of social capital. A binomial logistic
regression was performed to ascertain the effects of government corruption (a composite
of four different variables examining perceptions of corruption at four different facets) on
respondents’ participation in the parliamentary election. The logistic regression model
was statistically significant, X2(3) = 1222.114, p<.001, indicating a good fit. While the
model performed relatively better in predicting those who participate in the 2010
parliamentary election than those who do not (72% vs. 61.5%), the overall model
correctly classified 67.2% of the cases.
Gender (.67, SE=.045, p<.001) and age (b=.568, SE=.02, p<.001) are significant
and positive predictors. These results show that males and older respondents are more
likely to participate in the parliamentary election. The odds ratio for Gender (1.95)
indicates that men are nearly 2 times more likely than women to participate in the 2010
parliamentary elections. Similarly, with each unit increase in age, the odds ratio for
participating increases by 1.76. The corruption perception composite, however, was not a
significant predictor. Thus, the results do not support Hypothesis 5b. Table 5 provides
summary of the statistical procedures and results.
This insignificant result, in contrast to significant result obtained concerning the
effects of corruption on presidential election, could be explained by the fact that the
executive branch in Afghanistan holds disproportionate power vis-à-vis the other two
branches. For instance, the President nominates Supreme Court justices. The President
appoints nearly 30 percent of the 120-member Senate. It also holds additional powers that
it can leverage to condition the behavior of the legislators, both in the Wolesi Jirga
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(House of Commons) and Meshrano Jirga (Senate). Additionally, the SNTV electoral
system ensures that no significant opposition forces is formed in the parliament to
challenge the executive branch and assert its oversight role. For these reasons, Afghans
place a higher value on the executive branch and thus vote more vocally in presidential
elections. The fact that corruption undermines voting in presidential elections reveals that
its poses a grave threat to highly valued aspects of the Afghan society. This is a stern call
for action against corruption.
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Table 5: Summary of Logistic Regression Analyses for 8 Models that Test the Proposed
Hypotheses.
B

Gender

-0.06
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SE
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Constant
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0.12
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Model 1
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Generalized
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Testing Trust
in Public
Institutions
(Hypothesis 2)
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B
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Odds
Ratio
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Mixed Methods Integration
A compelling aspect of using mixed methods design is to draw from the strengths
of both qualitative and quantitative designs (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017). Equally
important is the fact that integration of the two databases can dramatically enhance the
value of mixed methods (Fetters, Curry & Creswell, 2013). Integration can be
implemented at the design, methods and interpretation and levels (Fetters, Curry &
Creswell, 2013). They describe four types of integration at the methods level. The
integration approach at methods level that this study employed is merging. This type of
integration approach occurs when two databases are brought together for analysis.
Integration at the interpretation and reporting level can be achieved through three
approaches. These include integrating through: a) narrative, b) data transformation, and
c) joint display (Fetters, Curry & Creswell, 2013). The integration approach at
interpretation level that this study employs is joint display. The joint display integration is
done by bringing the data from both strands together “through a visual means to draw out
new insights beyond the information gained from the separate quantitative and qualitative
results” (p. 2143). This can be achieved through organizing related data in a figure, table,
matrix, or graph.
Regardless of the integration approach used and at which level, it is imperative
that the quantitative and qualitative findings flow coherently. This is known as data
integration “fit” and, when assessed, can result in three outcomes: a) confirmation, b)
expansion, and c) discordance (Fetters, Curry & Creswell, 2013). Data integration fit that
best describe this study’s approach is expansion. Expansion is achieved when results
from the two strands diverge “and expand insights of the phenomenon of interests by
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addressing different aspects of a single phenomenon or by describing complementary
aspects of a central phenomenon of interest” (Fetters, Curry & Creswell, 2013, p. 2144).
As it pertains to this study, the quantitative data show the strength of the association
between government corruption and the subdimension of social capital. The qualitative
data, meanwhile, provide clarity regarding the nature of those associations. Below, I
describe how integration expands insights regarding the corruption and social capital in
Afghanistan.
Results from the two strands concerning the state of associational life in
Afghanistan illustrates the benefit of employing a mixed methods design. The
quantitative result showed an extremely poor state of associational life, creating an
impression that people in Afghanistan might not have any interests in civic engagement.
We are left on our own to explore as to why that is the case. The qualitative data fills that
void in our understanding of associational life by providing clarity concerning the
background and history of associational life in the contexts of Afghanistan. It reminds us
that civil society organizations and political parties lack roots in the Afghan society. It
also underscores the turbulent past of political parties and how they have been distorted
and abused. A USIP report (Larson, 2014) noted, the Afghan public associates political
parties “with the violence of 1979 to 2001: with the communist groups that seized power
in1978 and the Mujahedeen based in Peshawar and Quetta during the 1980s and 1990s
and with the destruction of the civil war” (p. 3). For this reasons, individuals in
Afghanistan find it difficult to see “parties as simple political entities rather than as front
for military organizations” (p. 2)
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These legacies of political parties linger today and still portray political parties—
one of the most vocal and active forms of associational life—negatively. Additionally,
the qualitative results show that existing political parties have devolved to mere
collections of homogeneous groups that excludes members that differ on the basis of
ethnic and linguistic grounds. Putnam (2000) characterized the exclusive relationship that
exists among tightly knit social groups as bonding. This type of exclusionary
relationships are antithetical to the spirit of associational life.
Similarly, the qualitative results concerning trust in public institutions showed
greater clarity and depth as to why the public has lost trust in public institutions. While
the quantitative results provided an overall score card regarding the loss of trust in public
institutions, the qualitative data tended to the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions. For instance,
the qualitative data provided the reasons for the loss of trust in public institutions. It
offered a series of explanations for how trust in public institution has gradually eroded.
These include, public institutions not serving the interests of the people, widespread
corruption in all three branches of the government, including the Presidency, and large
scale electoral frauds in both presidential and parliamentary elections.
Similarly, the quantitative results concerning the state of government corruption is
unidimensional in that it presents a numerical score card. It is devoid of context, depth,
motives, and most importantly, the corrupt actors remain anonymous. The qualitative
data provides us context, the motives and exposes the major culprits, including President
Ghani. It reveals the factors contributing to corruption and how corruption manifests.
Through integration, clarity is gained concerning the stock of social capital at the
national level, the current state of government corruption and how it impacts negatively
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the various subdimension of social capital, and the culprits behind corruption. In
summary, integration positions us to respond to the ‘what.’ ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions
concerning government corruption and social capital in Afghanistan. This level of clarity
would not have been possible had this study employed either of the qualitative or
quantitative method alone. The overall result of the integration has been expansion in our
understanding of the two topics (corruption and social capital) as they pertain to
Afghanistan.
The ultimate message that was uncovered by merging the two data is that
corruption is an underlying factor that prevents Afghans from achieving their most
important goal: nationhood. It does so by attacking highly valued features and the social
fabric of the Afghan society. Thus, nationhood remains an elusive target for the people of
Afghanistan. In its absence, progress in other areas seems insignificant and irrelevant.
Figure 4 provides a visual depiction of how corruption impedes nationhood by
undermining the various dimensions of social capital. Corruption undermines (indicated
by the negative signs) the various dimensions of social capital; this in turn undermines
(indicated by the negative signs) efforts to achieve nationhood. As part of the integration
of the interpretation, I use the joint display approach (Fetters, Curry & Creswell, 2013)
and organize the two data together in a table (see Table 6).
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Figure 4: A Visual Diagram Depicting Corruption as the Underlying Factor that Impedes
Nationhood by Undermining Social Capital
Conclusion
The results of the qualitative and quantitative strands established (a) prevalence of
government corruption in Afghanistan, (b) the erosion of inter-ethnic trust among the
people of Afghanistan, the loss of public trust in (c) public institution, and (d) the leaders
that them, and (e) poor state of associational life. While the quantitative strand presented
generalized score cards and employed advanced statistical procedures in the process, the
qualitative strand offered rich insights, contexts and depths as elicited from the research
participants. Through these enhancements, the qualitative results illuminated the abstract
image that the quantitative strand produced. The qualitative strand also captured nuanced
perspectives about certain issues. For instance, participants offered perspectives
regarding the climate of inter-ethnic trust that ranged from superficial and cursory to the
more sophisticated and deep analyses. Some perspectives were introspective whereas
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others were extrospective; some participants engaged in critical self-examination while
others merely pointed fingers at outsiders.
The use of composites in the quantitative strand adds strength to this study. The
use of multiple variables in isolation to capture an underlying concept such as corruption
and institutional trust for instance would have increased the risk of familywise error.
Additionally, individual variables are not capable of sufficiently capturing an underlying
concept. The strength of the quantitative strand also lies in the fact that I was able to test
empirically the strength of the association between corruption and dimensions of social
capital. Exploring empirically the corrosive effects of corruption on the dimensions of
social capital at a national level in a post-conflict context improves the practical
significance of this study.
The strength of the qualitative strand, meanwhile, lies in its ability to capture the
insights of the research participants and their lived experiences with government
corruption and the many dimensions of social capital, and the meanings they assign to
their experiences. The qualitative strand added the necessary details and thus filled the
gap left by the quantitative strand. Rather than offering a merely satisficing narrative
regarding the two topics this study explores, the qualitative portion incorporated fitting
details about these phenomena. As shown in Table 6, results from the two strands largely
converge.
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Table 6: Joint Display of the Qualitative and Quantitative Results
Qualitative
Themes
(1) The Climate
of (dis)Trust

Summary of the Qualitative Findings

Summary of the Quantitative Findings

An overwhelming majority of the respondents confirmed
the erosion of the climate of trust among the various
ethnic groups. They identified a series of factors that
undermine inter-ethnic trust. In addition, respondents
noted that the climate of trust had worsened since the
establishment of NUG, led by President Ghani.

(Generalized trust) Both the descriptive statistics and
advanced statistical procedures confirmed the erosion of
generalized trust. Nearly 75% of the respondents
reported that, “you need to be careful when dealing with
others.” Similarly, an overwhelming majority of
respondents said that most people think only about
themselves, and do not care about others.
The quantitative strand did not touch on this aspect given
the limitation of the data and the way hypotheses were
proposed.

(2) Current
State of
Government
Corruption

A near unanimous consensus emerged regarding the
prevalence of government corruption. In their rankings
of the most corrupt public institutions, the judiciary
secured the top spot; they consider the President as
fueling corruption by modeling questionable behaviors
that his subordinates then replicate. The respondents
questioned seriously some of the President conducts and
considered them as contributing to the proliferation of
corruption.

Nearly two thirds of the respondents recognized
corruption as one of the top three major problems facing
Afghanistan, poor economy and insecurity being the
other two. Descriptive statistics and tabulation indicated
that an overwhelming majority of respondents considers
corruption to be a major problem both in their daily life
and in Afghanistan as a whole (see Figure 2 & Figure 3).

(3) Trust in
Public
Institutions

An overwhelming majority of the respondents pointed
out the loss of trust in public institutions, and offered a
variety of reasons for it. Corruption, leadership failure,
incompetent workforce in the public sector, hijacking of
the public institutions by the filthy class are among the
reasons respondents listed. Respondents frequently
mentioned the executive and judiciary branches for
having lost the public confidence.

Both descriptive statistics and advanced statistical
procedures corroborated the loss of public confidence in
public institutions. An index that captured public trust
(and lack thereof) in public institutions revealed that the
public had largely lost trust in public institutions. The
respondents expressed their lack of trust in all three
branches of the government.
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(4) Trust in
Leadership

Respondents expressed deep distrust in leadership, and
they especially singled out President Ghani followed by
his inner circles who occupy key government positions.
Given his position, the respondents blamed the President
for much of the failures. The President’s failure to lead
by example and to set the standard for the desirable
conduct in his administration compelled respondents to
attribute most of the blame to the President. Despite the
fact that President has a variety of tools at his disposal
(e.g., coercive, reward, referent, expert), the President
has been unable to alleviate major challenges facing the
nation. His reluctance and inability to address these
problems have imposed grave consequences upon the
peoples of Afghanistan.

(5) Associational Most of the participants described associational life as
Life
extremely poor. While describing the poor state of
associational life they also underscored the need to
revitalize it. A majority offered reasons behind the poor
state of associational life, chief among them is the brutal
past of political parties that had only contributed to the
misery of the public. In addition, participants noted that
civil society organizations and political parties lack
grounding and roots in the Afghan society. Additionally,
most of political parties have been reduced to mere
ethnic enclaves inflicted with short-sightedness, narrow
and ethnocentric vision; these parties fail to a compelling
vision that inspires the Afghan people toward
nationhood

Both the descriptive and advanced statistical procedures
showed that the public had lost trust in President Ghani
and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah. While the
quantitative results provided answers to the ‘what’
questions by producing descriptive statistics and
frequencies, qualitative data provided contexts and
depths and thus tended to the ‘why’ questions.

Both descriptive statistics and advanced models show
that associational life is in poor state; an overwhelming
majority of the respondents does not belong to any
voluntary association, political or apolitical. Even when
respondents were given an extensive list of the voluntary
organizations to report their membership in them, a
commanding majority were not members of any
voluntary association. These images depict an image of
associational life in Afghanistan that was poor and in
need of revitalization.
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Recommendations
Corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan, and since 2010, it has remained
one of the top three major problems facing Afghanistan, alongside insecurity and poor
economy. Under pressure from external stakeholders and the Afghan society, Afghan
governments have introduced various measures to tackle the problem of corruption. The
proliferation of anticorruption strategies and agencies has been the de facto response by
the Afghan government. Both the Karzai and Ghani administrations, for instance,
resorted to this course of action. The result, though, has been an abysmal failure. The
proliferation of anticorruption agencies and measures on the one hand, and increase in
corruption at the same time on the other hand, prompted some to draw a flawed
conclusion that increase in anticorruption agencies and measures is correlated with
increase in corruption.
Government corruption imposes cost both on the Afghan government and on the
Afghan society. The cost of corruption to government includes loss of legitimacy, bruised
reputation and standing in the society. These outcomes are likely to exert immense
pressure upon those who them. The Taliban recognizes the weakened status of the
Afghan government and finds itself in a strong position as it engages in peace talks
directly with the Afghan government for the first time in 20 years. The fact that the
Taliban secured the release of more than five thousand Taliban inmates from Afghan
government’s custody is a testament to the strength of its position.
Afghan government’s weak position is largely attributable to widespread
corruption that has reached the highest level of the government, including the Presidency.
While corruption is a social menace per se, it undermines other highly valued features of
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a society. These high value societal assets includes trust among people, trust in public
institutions, and trust in leaders, political participation, and active civic engagement.
Combined, these features are commonly known as social capital. Like financial capital,
social capital can be converted into "currency" that can be used to acquire goods and
services (Bourdieu, 1986).
This study set out to explore the potential effects of government corruption on the
dimensions of social capital. To do so, it employed a convergent mixed methods design.
The integration of the two databases was done to gain clarity regarding the two concepts
that was not possible by using either method alone. The quantitative strand tested seven
hypotheses stemming from the quantitative research question: How does government
corruption in Afghanistan affect social capital in that context? As detailed in Chapter 4,
the quantitative results show that government corruption: (a) undermines trust among
people, erodes trust in (b) public institutions, (c) and leaders, (d) diminishes associational
life, and (e) impedes political engagement. The proposed hypotheses ware mostly
supported (six out of the seven), indicating that corruption undermines some of the highly
valued societal assets. In addition to exploring the corrosive effects of government
corruption on social capital, a stock of the social capital at national level was also
assessed by the quantitative strand.
The qualitative strand answered these four qualitative questions:


How do participants evaluate the current climate of trust among the diverse ethnic
groups comprising the Afghan society?



How do participants assess trust in public institutions?
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How do participants assess the current state of government corruption in
Afghanistan?



What role, if any, can leaders play to (a) improve the climate of trust among the many
ethnic groups, and (b) bring down the scale of government corruption in Afghanistan?
The qualitative results confirmed the quantitative findings and the two results

largely converged. Results from both strands established that corruption indeed imposes
these negative costs. The qualitative results added contexts, depths and explored the
characters of the corrupt actors. The mixed methods integration uncovered the extent of
the damage that corruption imposes on the Afghan society. It revealed corruption to be
the underlying reason that derails the struggles of the Afghan people to achieve
nationhood.
The following sections offer recommendations that are grounded in the results
established in this study, and provides direction for future research.
The Case for Transformational Leadership
Burns (1978) argued that “the most tangible act of leadership is the creation of an
institution—a nation, a social movement, a political parity, bureaucracy—that continues
to exert moral leadership and foster needed social change long after the creative leaders
are gone” (p. 454). The most essential element for a society is leadership that inspires
followers and empowers them to act in pursuit of greater good. Disintegration and
fragmentation of Afghanistan is a textbook example indicating the failure of leadership to
inspire followers to achieving the most important goal: nationhood. It has eluded them for
decades. For decades, the peoples of Afghanistan have waited for a leader to emerge who
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would unite them, empower them to transcend petty issues, and inspire them to work
toward nationhood.
Results from the two strands clearly established that current leaders in
Afghanistan have failed in fulfilling the critical leadership function that Burns described.
The integration of the two strands of data established that corruption undermines the
many dimensions of social capital, including inter-ethnic trust, trust in public institution
and the leaders that manage political participation and civic engagement. The integration
further revealed corruption as the underlying factor that has derailed attempts at
nationhood. It does by first weakening important and valuable features of the society. A
number of factors contributed to this leadership failure. To begin, the leaders themselves
must own a large percentage of this failure. After all, they are in charge of the resources
and possess the authority to make certain things happen. As the upper echelon theory of
leadership (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) posits, leaders can effect changes by virtue of
their position within their respective organizations.
The failure to act therefore falls on the leaders themselves. Leaders in
Afghanistan, unfortunately, are foremost concerned with preserving the status quo that
has earned them both political power and wealth. They have largely been unable to
provide a vision for the country to unite the people and strive toward nationhood. They
thrive because of the disintegration and fragmentation of the Afghan society. An
overwhelming majority of the respondents recognized leadership failure and expressed
their yearning for a leadership that can propel the Afghan people toward nationhood.
Inability of current leaders to integrate a diverse society is on display; their inability to
articulate a vision for the country and devise a plan to realize that vision is also evident.
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Research participants also made it clear that current leaders are not loyal to its
people and the country. They are foremost interested in self-enrichment and power. They
use their positions to accumulate wealth while experiencing a tiny fraction of the
hardship and sufferings that most Afghans confront on daily basis. Not only there is a
lack of shared goal between leaders and the ordinary people, there is a deep disconnect
between on several regards
Many leaders are accused of being in the service of foreign intelligence networks;
their strong grip on power is largely attributed to the external support they receive from
their foreign handlers. A systematic analysis would show that, since 2001, a particular
group of individuals has ruled Afghanistan. While this elite group may occasionally
admit new members, it remains an exclusive club comprised only from certain dominant
ethic groups. Occasionally, though, new members from minority groups are brought in;
this is done to improve the image of the government as an inclusive and representative
body. These new members are devoid of any authority to effect meaningful change in the
system. They eventually end up perpetuating the status quo.
In mid-2020, the Afghan government entered into direct peace talks with the
Taliban. At this critical juncture, Afghanistan needs moral leadership not only to ensure
that it does not lose any more ground to the Taliban but also to ensure that it preserves the
progress made in the past 19 years. So far, though, the Afghan government seems
incapable of performing the essential task of leading the country during heightened
uncertainty and insecurity. Despite releasing over five thousand Taliban prisoners and
offering other concessions to them, the Afghan government has not received anything of
value in return. Violent attacks by the Taliban, on both civilians and military personnel,
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have intensified and the Afghan government continues to lose grounds to the Taliban.
Most importantly, no substantive progress has been made in the peace talks so far.
These factors suggest that unless the Afghan government goes through a series of
transformation, current leaders cannot do much to improve the status quo. The status quo
has inflicted sufferings, poverty, insecurity, instability, and moral failure upon
Afghanistan. However, the status quo has been extremely kind to the political elites. To
alter the status quo such that it works for all people, not just the elite class, there is a need
to enact transformational leadership. Burns (1978) noted that transformational leaders
have greater effect on followers and collectives. This type of leaders “raise the
consciousness of followers for what is important especially with regards to moral and
ethical implications, and make them transcend their self-interest for that of the greater
good” (p. 263). The moral excellence that transformational leadership strive for can help
the Afghan people’s quest to cleanse Afghanistan from the immorality of corruption.
Unlike current leaders, who are foremost concerned with pursuit of self-interest,
transformational leaders pursue goals that are shared with their followers.
Through idealized influence, according to Bass (1985), transformational leaders
are able to “have profound and extraordinary effects on their followers” (p. 35) and
inspire them to transcend their self-interest in favor of the collective interests.
Transformational leaders, in addition, boost followers’ confidence and create a selffulfilling prophecy that inspire them to reach new heights of achievement (Antonakis,
2012).
Armed with these powerful tools, transformational leadership is well positioned to
overcome the stagnation and inertia that has crippled the peoples of Afghanistan for
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decades. Leaders with these specifications have the potential to liberate the peoples of
Afghanistan from the psychological captivity and perceived inadequacies that have
prevented them from realizing their true potentials. The fact that nearly identical or very
similar types of leaders have assumed power since 2001 indicates that this failure is
largely attributable to the leadership model employed. It is time that transformational
leadership is enacted in the turbulent context of Afghanistan. Transformational leadership
is considered more effective in turbulent contexts where uncertainty reigns (Bass, 1990).
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Recommendations

In this section, recommendations for practice are presented.
Strengthening the Public Sector
Results from the two strands show that large-scale privatization of the provision
of services and goods that traditionally fall within the public sector’s jurisdiction has
crept up since 2001. The implications of rapid privatization include increased opportunity
for corruption, denying the public sector the opportunity to gain expertise and legitimacy
through providing goods and services. Additionally, it meant that the public sector was
starved of talented workforce as the private sector enticed them with the newfound
resources that were diverted away from the public sector. This is not taking a position
against the private sector. Quite the opposite. The duty of the public sector is to create a
conducive environment in which the private sector prospers by fulfilling market
demands.
What I argue instead is that the private sector must not detract from the ability of
the public sector to deliver goods and services that fall within its jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, precisely this has occurred in Afghanistan. By encroaching upon its
territory, the private sector has weakened an already fragile public sector. A strong and
effective public sector is beneficial to and critical for the private sector. The private
sector benefits from a strong public sector it in the form of trickle down. For instance, a
well-functioning public sector creates conducive environment for the private sector to
prosper; it creates favorable legal environment for it; it intervenes in the event contracts
are breached, and protects property rights. A weak and ineffective public sector, in
contrast, detracts from the ability of the private sector to survive and prosper.
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In addition to detracting from the ability of the public sector, rapid privatization
also creates opportunities for corruption by adding an extra layer of complication and
confusion. For the purpose of clarification, let’s contrast two health care facilities, one
run by the public sector and the other run by a private firm. When the facility operated by
the public sector fails to fulfill its duties and responsibilities, the community has a
recourse in the form of taking their case to a local representative body, the District
Council, for instance. In addition, the affected community can appeal to the relevant
ministry in the capital or its representative department in the provincial capital. While
utilizing these avenues are cumbersome, at least they are available to be utilized.
However, when the health care facility operated by a private firm fails to fulfill its
duties and obligations, the recourse options are complicated and difficult to maneuver.
Because the affected community cannot reach the firm running the health care facility, it
is forced to take its complaints to an elected body or a government agency. This added
layer of confusion complicates the process of accountability and often serves as a
deterrent.
Also common is that the private firms evade accountability procedures simply by
paying bribe to the relevant official(s). To make matters worse, private firms that win and
implement government contracts pay large sums in bribe at the two different point. First,
they pay bribes to win the contracts. Second, they pay bribes before they can receive the
final installments that they are due upon the completion of each project. This means that
they have to cut corners in order to compensate for the bribes paid to officials. The public
ultimately pays the price in the form of low quality produces and/or services.
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Part of strengthening the public sector involves creating fertile ground for the
private sector. A key monetary policy that it should pursue to boost the economy is
legalizing and legitimizing all the ill-gotten cash amassed since 2001. The qualitative
results showed that many individual who made their fortune through corrupt means fear
that if they invest inside Afghanistan their wealth will be seized by the government. To
boost domestic investment, illicit cash gained in the past should be given amnesty. The
Afghan government offers immunity to members of the Taliban who have committed
atrocities against the people of Afghanistan. There is no reason that the same should not
done to illicit cash. After all, a major portion of the unexplained cash in the past three
decades has been accumulated illicitly. During the Taliban, for instance, it came from the
opium trade. In the post-Taliban era, lion’s share of the foreign aid to Afghanistan has
been looted and lost through corruption and waste. Ironically, the same cash is treated
clean and legitimate when it is smuggled out of the country, whereas it remains illegal in
Afghanistan.
Fearing asset freezing or confiscation altogether, many individuals who
accumulated wealth illicitly in Afghanistan transferred them to foreign destinations where
their investment is welcomed and incentivized. In Afghanistan, however, this cash is still
treated unclean, illegal and which cannot be invested. This dual treatment of the same
cash needs to be overturned so the cash can be freed for domestic investment. In addition
to creating revenues for the government, this will also free up the resources and personnel
that the Afghan government expends pursuing illicit cash.
Creating Favorable Conditions for Political Parties
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Active, engaged and pluralistic political parties are the cornerstone of democracy.
Democracy needs persistent and active participation in public affairs by citizens
organized around a variety of interests and topics (Carothers & Ottaway, 2012). Political
parties, and civil society organization, are considered important for the democratization
process through their intermediation between the state and citizens (Blomberg & Szocsik,
2014). The development of political parties in Afghanistan and cultural infrastructure for
such efforts are still in embryonic stage (Larson, 2014; Reynolds, 2006). The nascent
political parties are not yet able, according to Larson (2014) to be “organizers of political
belief or mobilizers of voters in the way that parties in mature democracies are” (p. 2). In
addition to being substantiated in the literature, these salient points were also uncovered
by the qualitative strand.
In light of these revealing concerning the development of political parties, specific
actions are needed to foster a conducive environment so that political parties emerge and
prosper in Afghanistan. Respondents recognized the lack of political parties that are
inclusive and representative as contributing to corruption and erosion of inter-ethnic trust.
The emergence of ethno-nationalist tendencies and factionalism is inevitable in the
absence of political parties that offer an encompassing vision for the nation. The public is
largely left at the mercy of the ruling class and the self-serving traditional leaders in the
absence of political parties that can inspire and energize the grassroots to pursue a shared
goal. Because of this void, politics and political affairs in Afghanistan are dictated
according to the whims of narcissistic and person-centered leaders surrounded by
sycophantic followers.
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Former President Hamid Karzai, and traditional leaders like him, feared that their
individualistic and person-centered appeal would evaporate should political parties
flourish. Because political parties provide a vision for a nation and present a pathway to
achieve that vision, they have the potential to foster national cohesion by bringing
together diverse constituents. Political parties attract members to whom their platforms
appeal. Tribal and traditional leaders, who largely rely on their individualistic and personcentered appeals, assessed correctly their demise should political parties establish a
foothold in the Afghan society.
Many leaders, for these reasons, detested and feared political parties (Reynolds,
2006; Reynolds & Wilder, 2004). Karzai, for instance, had a strong disdain for political
parties. While in office, Karzai expressed frequently and vocally his antipathy towards
political parties, and made sure that political parties remained weak and fragmented.
Active campaigns by influential individuals against popularizing party system retarded
the development of political parties in Afghanistan (Reynolds, 2006). Because they are
unable to define a compelling vision for the country, the appeal of traditional leaders to
the society is limited. Using their influence and positional power, however, they manage
to remain at the helm of political power.
Political parties, in contrast, provide vision, inspire people around that vision and
outline specific and clear strategies to realize that vision. They strive for inclusivity and
diversity. Combined, these features can empower political parties to transform
Afghanistan by mobilizing its diverse population and leading them toward nationhood.
Party system can liberate people from the psychological captivity of the self-serving and
person-centered leaders who have contributed only to the growing climate of distrust,
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division, and ethnocentrism. Developing a sustainable party system is the antidote to the
fragmentation and disintegration of Afghanistan along ethnic lines. Thus, creating a
fertile ground where political parties can prosper serves the best and the immediate
interest of the Afghan people: achieving nationhood. When grounded in the principles of
transformational leadership, political parties’ appeal and potency can rise exponentially.
Time to Outgrow the SNTV Electoral System
The qualitative results indicated that a major impediment to the development of
political parties in Afghanistan is the use of single non-transferrable voting (SNTV)
system. According to the SNTV system, Afghan voters cast their votes for individuals,
rather than political parties. Most post-conflict countries, including Iraq, employ a variant
of the list-based proportional representation (list-PR) voting system (Reynolds, 2006).
Afghanistan, however, uses the rarest electoral system, SNTV, that is in use only in five
other countries (e.g., Indonesia, Jordan, Pitcairn Islands, Taiwan & Vanuatu) in the world
(Ace Electoral Knowledge Network). The current voting system was designed to keep
political parties in Afghanistan weak and ineffective (Reynolds & Wilder, 2004). The
selection of SNTV as the electoral system in Afghanistan was intended to exclude
political parties and to impede opposition to the new government (Larson, 2014). SNTV
electoral system poses practical challenges for political parties. The ACE Electoral
Knowledge Network explains this problematic electoral scenario for political parties:
In, for example, a four-member district, a candidate with just over 20 per cent of
votes is guaranteed election. A party with 50 per cent of the vote could thus
expect to win two seats in a four-member district. If each candidate polls 25 per
cent, this will happen. If, however, one candidate polls 40 per cent and the other
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10 per cent, the second candidate may not be elected. If the party puts up three
candidates, the danger of ‘voting-splitting makes it even less likely that the party
will win two seats.
Additionally, Reynolds (2006) identified some of the negative consequence of
SNTV: “a high disproportionality between votes and seats won, a tendency to exclude
minority parties, the encouraging of clientelism and corruption among those elected, and
ultimately the fragmentation of the ruling party” (p. 108). Regarding the
disproportionality between votes and seats won in the parliament, Reynolds (2006) shows
that 32 percent of the votes cast resulted in winning all the seats in the 2005
parliamentary elections in Afghanistan. Thus, 68 percent of the votes were cast for
candidates that lost in that election. This percentage of “wasted votes” in Afghanistan is
considerably higher than those in Iraq and South Africa, 5.3 percent and less than one
percent, respectively. It is worth noting that, unlike Afghanistan, both of these countries
employ some variants of the proportional representation (PR) electoral system.
As intended, the use of the SNTV electoral system continues to hinder the appeal,
relevance and growth of political parties in Afghanistan. Reynolds (2006) argues: “SNTV
electoral system weakens the role of political parties, thereby working against the rise of
a stable, dynamic, and accountable party system” (109). For instance, candidates do not
have compelling incentives to compete for parliamentary seats on behalf of a political
party as they can easily do so independently without incurring any electoral loss as a
result. Because of the SNTV system and because a many members of the parliament
(MPs) do not represent political parties, they cannot form political blocks, alliances, and
coalitions so as to act as a formidable oversight force vis-à-vis the executive branch. This,
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coupled with the fact that the President appoints nearly one-third of the Senate members,
means that the ability of the legislative branch to exercise its constitutional authority of
overseeing the conduct of the executive branch is greatly hampered.
Equally problematic for the executive branch is that, due to the fragmented nature
of the MPs and political parties, the President is faced with forming makeshift and ad hoc
alliances in the parliament as the need to do so arises. In order to achieve legislative goals
and to govern, it becomes inevitable to appease individual MPs by acquiescing to the
conflicting (and sometimes outright illicit) demands of individual MPs, rather than a
coalition of them. Reynolds (2006) noted these plausible undesirable outcomes in the
2005 parliamentary elections. Accordingly, the SNTV electoral system served to (a)
fragment the opposition, (b) impede the emergence of new parties, and (c) weaken
President Karzai’s allies. Given the legacy of the SNTV, the problems associated with it
continue to fragment political parties and stifle the emergence and growth of political
parties in Afghanistan. It is therefore long overdue to embrace a variant of the
proportional representation (PR) electoral system that the vast majority of the countries
around the world utilizes.
Reframing Entry to the Public Sector
Most respondents in the qualitative strand described the public sector workforce
as “incompetent,” “ill-qualified,” and “unprofessional.” Consequently, the quality of this
type of workforce is likely to be inferior and suboptimal; this imposes cost and burden
upon the public and government agencies. Other logical outcomes of such a system is
ineffective public institutions, inferior quality of public goods and services, and bruised
legitimacy of the government.
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One of the reasons outlined in the qualitative results for the inferior public sector
workforce is that entry route to the public sector remains a highly guarded asset. Not only
it remains a closely guarded treasure, its boundaries also remain impermeable by
‘outsiders’. It attracts individuals aligned with the political elites and in which
qualification and competence play little role. Excess conformity has engulfed the
government. Innovative approaches to analyzing and addressing the most pressing
problems are stifled. Dissent and creativity are neutralized. Overall, inertia has taken over
the government.
The entry system to the public sector needs to be reframed and rearranged so that
the public sector attracts and absorbs the most talented individuals, irrespective of their
ethnic and linguistic affiliations. A national recruitment policy needs to be developed so
that it can filter the most qualified applicants suited to fill government positions. The
policy needs to spell out the basic qualifications needed to fill government positions. A
diverse team composed of diverse ethnicities and backgrounds should develop this policy
so as to eliminate even the appearance of bias in the system. Also, a diverse board should
oversee the implementation of the policy so that remedies for bias and discrimination are
put in place.
A key requirement of all government positions, especially high-ranking positions,
should be continued presence of the candidate and his or her family (when applicable) for
the entire duration of the appointment. The qualitative results indicated that many of
high-ranking public officials come to Afghanistan alone for the duration of their tenure
while their families live overseas. This continued presence can help boost allegiance and
loyalty to the country and send a strong signal to the public that those who work in the
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public sector are loyal public servants. The fact that many Afghans label the Afghan
government as the “government of domestic criminals and spies” reflects the concern in
the public that those occupying critical government positions do not represent them and
are not loyal to the country.
Part of the reform should also involve employing some form of affirmative action
policy with the sole of purpose of integrating the historically marginalized groups into the
society. In light of the subjugation, repression and marginalization that some segments of
the Afghan population have suffered, it is only reasonable to atone for them. Leveling the
playing field is another rational such that those marginalized through structural injustice
receive some form of relief.
An example of structural injustice is that a considerable segment of the population
(ethnic minorities) is deprived of educational opportunities because of their ethnic and
linguistic affiliation. While there are over twenty languages in Afghanistan, Dari and
Pashtu are the only two official languages. All textbooks are published and taught in
either one of these two official languages. This leaves some segment of the population
unable to receive even elementary-level education, as they do not speak either of two
official languages. The constitution establishes the right to receive elementary education
in one’s native language. In practice, minorities still do not have the opportunity to
receive education in their native languages. This puts them at disadvantage in terms of
competing for high level positions that require, among other things, mastery in one of the
two official languages. To alleviate this problem, there is a need for hiring quotas in
government positions allocated to the marginalized segments of the population until such
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time that the playing field is leveled and that marginalized population receive education,
at least elementary level, in their native languages.
Developing and Implementing a National Integration Framework
With the exception of those who belong to the dominant ethnic groups, most
people feel left out of the political processes and thus excluded from the benefits that
accrue from political participation. Because of their lack of participation in such process
the less dominant and marginalized groups feel that they do not have any voice in the
government and that their concerns and needs are either dismissed altogether or
trivialized. When a substantial portion of a society feels isolated and ignored it is bound
to create resentment among the people. Many research participants shared these
sentiments.
Many of the respondents brought this issue up and considered it as one of the
factors that contribute to tensions among people in the society. It is only logical to feel
resentment and isolated when majority of the important government positions are
occupied by individuals that belong to one of the three dominant ethnic groups. So far,
the government has done little to alleviate this pain among the less dominant ethnic
groups. While token representation by the less dominant groups can be detected, the
dominant ethnic groups occupy an overwhelming percentage of the government
positions.
To rectify this problem, the government is likely to benefit from developing and
implementing national integration framework. In addition to equitable distribution of
public resources, the framework should facilitate interactions among the diverse groups
that comprise Afghanistan. The government should facilitate a healthy environment
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wherein engagements among diverse groups takes place organically and safely. Planned
urban development could serve to facilitate interaction among the diverse population of
Afghanistan.
Research participants noted that urban developments in pre-war Afghanistan were
carried out according to well-designed and carefully studied urban planning. The cities
that were conceived according to these plans became avenues for organic engagements
among diverse groups, which would not have otherwise occurred in the absence of such
conducive environment. Through planned urban development, the state was able to bring
people from various ethnicities into contact with one another, which contributed to
national integration. Present governments can use prior models as a starting point and can
build upon them as needed.
The current state of urban development is a major impediment for national
integration. Cities and urban spaces are developed in such a manner they people are
segregated along ethnic lines. They are isolated from one another, and are in touch only
with individuals from same/similar ethnic background. The filthy class is largely
responsible for this segregated nature of urban spaces. The filthy class distributed the
land they acquired illicitly along ethnic lines. They divided major cities and urban spaces
along ethnic lines and turned them into safe electoral districts/zones. Because they live
among their own groups in these ethnically segregated communities, they are able to
extract votes when running for elected offices. Thus, they control both political and
financial resources.
A diverse country such as Afghanistan is likely to benefit from planned
integration framework that brings people from different ethnicities, religions and regions
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of the country. Urban development in this fashion can facilitate interface among
dissimilar groups. Interface is unlikely to occur in segregated environments. Cities and
urban spaces need to be built in such fashion that dissimilar groups are brought into
contact with one another. Both the government and private sector can play positive role
in fostering a conducive environment for interaction among diverse groups. Proximity
and exposure to diverse groups is the first ingredient for interaction among them. One
way social capital is built is through building networks—even weak ones—with
dissimilar groups. The bridging form of social capital that cuts across ethnic and religious
line is what Afghanistan needs the most and from which it is likely to benefit.
Building an Active Indigenous Civil Society
As indicated both by the quantitative and qualitative results, there is a lack of
political will to invest in building social capital. The political establishment views any
challenge to the status quo as a direct threat to its power. In light of this information, the
burden of developing social capital falls on the shoulders of private citizens. Democracy
hinges on civically informed citizens who both understand the political system and share
a healthy dose of skepticism about the conduct and intent of those at the helm of political
power and institutions (Carothers & Ottaway, 2012). The foundation upon which this
belief rests is that democracy can indeed take root through the work of grassroots and
indigenous activists, rather than the top-down approach alone. Under this notion, citizens
will need to invest financially and in terms of time and effort to establish and engage with
voluntary associations in order to fill the void left by the public and private sectors. By
forming civil society groups, citizens can create new social and cultural organizations and
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institutions encompassing of diverse movements and interests and thereby seek to fashion
alternative ways of coordinating collective actions.
To realize this, creating a public sphere, virtual or physical, that facilitates
interactions among diverse groups of people and exchange of ideas, information and
human capital is needed. Book clubs, debate societies, sports groups, and poetry society
are examples of public sphere. Humans are innately suspicious of strangers, and a mere
proximity (physical or virtual) can tear down that initial inhibition to interact with
strangers. This is not to say that most or majority of interactions would lead to trust
building among interacting parties. What is argued here, however, is that interaction is
the necessary first ingredient to cultivating trust among parties involved in the exchange.
In a multiethnic country faced with deficit bridging social capital, presence of weak ties
are an invaluable vehicle for traversing the complex and intricate terrains of inter-ethnic
relations. Weak ties, according Fukuyama (2001), are “heterodox individuals at the
periphery of the society’s various social networks who are able to move between groups
and thereby become bearers of new ideas and information” (p. 9). In their quest to
forming engaged civil society, citizens can also seek help from sympathetic state and
non-state actors and entities, domestic and overseas.
Helping developing countries overcome these obstacles thus can also serves the
interests of donor countries, entities and actors in these countries. Potential benefits to
them could accrue in the forms of reduced burden of mass migrations to these highly
desirable destinations for migrants, not to mention the threats of terrorism and security
that pose to these countries. If not for the altruistic reasons, supporting the formation and
development of an engaged civil society that seeks alternative ways of coordinating
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collective actions and thus fill the void left by the government and the business sector is
worth on a purely selfish grounds alone. A balance, though, must be struck between
providing the necessary support for the emergence of indigenous civil society and the
independence the latter must maintain. To be relevant and effective, independence is
paramount to indigenous civil society organizations.
Direction for Future Research
These findings suggest areas where additional research is needed. I discuss two
directions for future research.
Capturing Informal Associations in the Global South
The research on social capital is largely dominated by scholars from the Global
North. This may cause scholars to overlook some aspects of the social capital in the
Global South. One such overlooked issue is the informal associations prevalent in the
Global South. While social capital in the Global North mostly focuses on formal
associations as indicator of associational life, informal associations and engagements in
collective actions abound in many developing countries, or the Global South. The
informal associations that are pervasive in the Global South are not being adequately
captured and reflected upon in the literature as a legitimate indicator of social capital,
especially the associational life subdimension. A method that recognizes and integrates
such informal associations into the overall measure of social capital is likely to present a
more complete picture of social capital in the Global South.
Informal associations, that is, associations that are not necessarily registered with
or endorsed by a state apparatus, have played, and continue to play, critical roles in
maintaining and brokering peace in many developing countries. The use of informal
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associations does not necessarily supplant formal ones; rather it complements the formal
ones. These informal institutions have been successful in resolving local disputes within a
local community as well maintaining peaceful and productive relationships with outside
communities; essentially serving both as a bridging and bonding forms of social capital.
These can be considered as indigenous civil society organizations that spring up
organically and perform numerous duties that the private and public sectors do not or
cannot provide. While the informal associations in the Global South do not fit the
structures of the formal associations with which the Global North is familiar, they do
possess the norms of reciprocity evident in many of the formal associations in the Global
North. Future research will benefit from integrating, as well proposing mechanisms to
operationalize and measure, the informal institutions prevalent in the Global South.
Proximate vs. Distal Views of Corruption
It is likely that different facets of corruption (perceived corruption at local,
provincial or central levels) are related differentially to the various subdimensions of
social capital. Corruption in central government, for instance, might undermine certain
dimensions of social capital (e.g., trust in institutions) more than others (e.g., network).
Corruption in local government, likewise, might undermine the network dimension more
than the trust in institutions dimension. The big picture implication of the multi-faceted
presentation of corruption and its differential impact on the many dimensions of social
capital is that corruption at certain levels (center vs. local, center vs. provincial,
provincial vs. local) might have more negative consequences than at other levels.
In the context of Afghanistan, for instance, it is likely that when people perceive
the prevalence of corruption in Afghanistan as a whole it might have more damaging
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consequences than, say, when perception is limited to local level. A possible explanation
is that the central government formulates major policy and budgetary decisions;
therefore, corruption at this level is likely to have more debilitating and wide-reaching
consequences. Corruption at local level, while undoubtedly detrimental to victims, is
inherently confined to that locality and its effect may not go as far. Thus, the reach and
damage of corruption at the sub-national level might not be as far-reaching and grotesque
as that of corruption at the national level.
There is some support, at least statistically speaking, for the differential impacts
of proximate and distal forms of corruption. For instance, using an exploratory factor
analysis (EFA), I obtained a two-factor solution for corruption perception index
(Proximate View of Corruption vs. Distal View of Corruption). Due to certain limitations,
however, I did not explore this dichotomy extensively. Future research might benefit
from mapping out the differential outcomes of proximate and distal views of corruption
as well as providing clarity on how to do best address each of the two forms.
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Conclusion

This study employed a mixed methods design to examine the corrosive effects of
government corruption on the many dimensions of social capital. Corruption has been
studied extensively, as are the remedies and anticorruption strategies to confront
government corruption. The integration of the quality and quantitative data revealed
corruption as the underlying factor that impedes efforts of the people of Afghanistan to
achieve nationhood (see Figure 4). By attacking other important societal features—
including social capital—corruption causes far more damage than the loss of public funds
and resource. One of the goals of highlighting the impacts of corruption on social capital
was to establish that government corruption imposes hefty costs on both the government
and the society.
While the government may not be compelled to combat corruption with strong
political will and commitment for altruistic reasons, it can, however, be persuaded to do
so on selfish grounds. This can be done only if the connection between corruption and its
potential costs to the government is made clear. If left unattended, however, corruption
could contribute to the downfall of the regime altogether. Heightened insecurity that
Afghans have endured in 2020 and the fact that the Afghan government continues to lose
grounds to the Taliban and other armed opposition groups in many regions of the country
support this assessment. Corruption has been one of the reasons that many people turn to
the Taliban and away from the government. Thus, confronting corruption can result in
huge gains to the government in the form of enhanced legitimacy and improved
reputation in the society.
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The results of the qualitative and quantitative strands established (a) prevalence of
government corruption in Afghanistan, (b) the erosion of inter-ethnic trust among the
people of Afghanistan, the loss of public trust in (c) public institution, and (d) the leaders
that mange these institutions, and (e) poor state of associational life. While the
quantitative strand presented generalized scorecards and employed both descriptive and
advanced statistical procedures in the process, the qualitative strand offered rich insights,
contexts and depths elicited from the research participants. The qualitative results
illuminated the abstract image that emerge from the quantitative strand.
The use of composites in the quantitative strand adds strength to this study. The
use of multiple variables to capture an underlying concept such as corruption and
institutional trust, for instance, would have increased the risk of familywise error.
Additionally, individual variables are not capable of sufficiently capturing an underlying
concept. The strength of the quantitative strand also lies in that I was able to test
empirically the corrosive effects of government corruption on social capital at a national
level in Afghanistan. As shown in Table 6, results from the two strands largely converge,
and show the usefulness of the mixed methods design.
The strength of the qualitative strand, meanwhile, lies in its ability to capture the
insights of the research participants and their lived experiences as they relate to the topics
of this study. The qualitative strand added the necessary and fitting details and thus filled
the gap, which the quantitative strand was ill equipped to do. It presented rich insights
regarding the prevalence of government corruption and its contributing factors. Rather
than offering a merely satisficing image regarding the current climate of inter-ethnic trust
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and trust in public institutions, the qualitative portion of this mixed methods study
enhanced our understanding by incorporating fitting details.
In summary, this study established that corruption is an underlying factor that
impedes nationhood in Afghanistan. It does so by attacking important elements of the
Afghan society, including social capital. It revealed that corruption imposes costs both on
the Afghan government and on the Afghan society. If left untreated, or not brought under
control, corruption is likely to contribute to regime failure in Afghanistan. To avoid these
costs, government corruption needs to be confronted head-on and with strong political
determination and moral leadership.
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Appendix A

Interview Questionnaire
1.

How would you evaluate the current climate/level of trust between/among
different ethnic groups that comprise the Afghan society?

2.

What factors, in your opinion, improve trust between/among different ethnic
groups comprising the Afghan society?

3.

What factors, in your opinion, undermine trust between/among different ethnic
groups comprising the Afghan society?

4.

Given the legacy of lengthy wars and sustained violence in Afghanistan, do you
think Afghan people, in general, are trusting or suspicious of individuals who
are of a different ethnicity?

5.

What sign, if any, do you see that are indicative of improving relations
between/among different ethnics groups of Afghanistan?

6.

What sign, if any, do you see that are indicative of deteriorating relations
between/among different ethnics groups of Afghanistan?

7.

In your opinion, how much trust do Afghans have in public institutions (e.g.,
the presidency, the parliament, and the courts) and the national defense and
security apparatus (e.g., ANA, ANP, ANDS, ABP, ANCOP)?

8.

Based on your knowledge, has the public’s trust in public institutions been
improving or deteriorating since the past 18 years?

9.

How do you interpret the lack of national political parties in which membership
transcend ethnic, linguistic and religious boundaries?

10.

What major impediments, if any at all, do you see for the emergence of national
political parties in Afghanistan?

11.

How do you assess the current state of administrative corruption in
Afghanistan?

12.

In your opinion, what major factors contribute to administrative corruption?

13.

What experiences have you had which helped you understand the prevalence of
administrative corruption in Afghanistan?
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As a leader, how do you feel about the problem of administrative corruption in
Afghanistan?

15.

How do leaders of Afghanistan (in government, civil society, and the private
sector) improve climate of trust between/amongst different ethnic groups of
Afghanistan?

16.

How do leaders of Afghanistan (in government, civil society, and the private
sector) undermine climate of trust between/amongst different ethnic groups of
Afghanistan?

17.

What should/can Afghan leaders in various sectors (public, private, and civil
society) do to influence/create positive climate of trust between/among different
ethnic groups in Afghanistan?

18.

What measures should/can Afghan leaders in various sectors take to bring down
the scale of administrative corruption in Afghanistan?
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Appendix B

)Interview Questionnaire (Dari
 .1فضای اعتماد و باور در میان ملیتهای مختلف را که جامعه افغانستان را تشکیل میدهند چگونه
ارزیابی میکنید؟
 .2به نظر شما ،کدام عوامل فضای اعتماد میان ملیتهای مختلف افغانستان را بهتر می سازند؟ لطفآ از
چند عوامل بزرگ نام ببرید!
 .3به نظر شما ،کدام عوامل به فضای اعتماد میان ملیتهای متعدد افغانستان صدمه می رسانند؟ لطفآ
چند عوامل برجسته را مشخص نمایید.
 .4با در نظر داشت گذشته ای جنگهای متمادی و خشونت های طوالنی در افغانستان ،آیا افغانها باالی
افرادیکه مربوط به ملیت/قوم دیگر باشند باور می کنند و یا هم به انها به دیده شک می بینند؟
 .5کدام عالیم بهتر شدن روابط میان ملیت های مختلف افغانستان دیده میشود؟
 .6کدام عالیم بدتر شدن روابط میان ملیت های مختلف افغانستان به چشم می رسد؟
 .7به نظر شما ،مردم افغانستان به چه اندازه باالی نهادهای عامه (مانند :ریاست جمهوري/قوه
اجراییه ،قوه قضاییه/محاکم ،قوه مقننه/پارلمان) و قوای ملي دفاعي و امنیتي (مانند :اردوی ملی،
پولیس ملی ،امنیت ملی ،قوای سرحدی ،و پولیس نظم عامه) اعتماد دارند؟
 .8براساس معلومات شما ،آیا اعتماد مردم باالی نهادهای عامه مذکور در طول  ۱۸سال اخیر بهبود
یافته و یاهم صدمه دیده است؟
 .9نبود احزاب سیا سي و ملي را که در ان ملیتهای مختلف افغانستان عضویت داشته باشند چی گونه
تعبیر می کنید؟
 .10شما کدام موانع عمده برای تشکیل احزاب ملي در افغانستان را مشاهده می کنید؟
 .11وضعیت فعلی فساد اداري در افغانستان را چگونه ارزیابي میکنید!
 .12به نظر شما ،کدام عوامل به فساد اداري در افغانستان کمک میکنند؟
 .13شخصآ کدام تجربه را داشته اید که معلومات شما را در مورد رایج بودن فساد اداري در افغانستان
افزایش داده باشد؟
 .14من حیث یک رهبر ،در مورد مشکل فساد اداري در افغانستان چی احساس میکنید؟
 .15چگونه رهبران افغانستان (در دولت ،در جوامع مدني ،در سکتور خصوصي) فضای اعتماد میان
ملیت های مختلف در افغانستان بهتر می سازند؟
 .16چگونه رهبران افغانستان (در دولت ،در جوامع مدني ،در سکتور خصوصي) به فضای اعتماد میان
ملیت های مختلف در افغانستان صدمه می رسانند؟
 .17رهبران افغانستان در سکتور های مختلف چی فعالیت را انجام دهند تا درایجاد فضای بهتراعتماد
میان ملیتهای متعدد افغانستان کمک کند؟
 .18رهبران افغانستان در سکتور های مختلف چی اقدام باید کنند که در کاهش و پایان اوردن میزان
فساد اداري کمک کند؟
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Appendix C

Consent Form
Identification of Investigators & Purpose of the Study
You are being asked to participate in a research study conducted by (Samiullah
Nuristani) from James Madison University. The purpose of this study is to (examine the
corrosive effects of government corruption on social capital). This study will contribute
to the researcher’s completion of his dissertation.
Research Procedures
Should you decide to participate in this research study, you will be asked to give audio
consent and I will provide you with a copy of consent form to keep once all your
questions have been answered to your satisfaction. This study consists of interview that
will be administered to individual participants in a place where you feel comfortable to
share your opinions concerning the topic of this study. You will be asked to provide
answers to a series of questions related to (social capital and government corruption in
Afghanistan). I will be audio recording our interview for later reference and ease of
transcription, but the audio recordings would be deleted securely after the project ends.
Time Required
Participation in this study will require approximately 90 minutes of your time.
Risks
The investigator does not perceive more than minimal risks from your involvement in
this study (that is, no risks beyond those associated with everyday life in Afghanistan).
Benefits
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Potential benefits from participation in this study include giving a chance to voice your
opinions about the topic and potentially contribute to the improvement in the
sociopolitical conditions of the Afghan society.
Confidentiality
The results of this research will be presented at dissertation and a conference and possibly
published in peer-reviewed outlets. No personally identifiable data about the research
participants will be collected during the interview process and the results of this study
will be coded in such a way that the respondent’s identity will not be attached to the final
form of this study. The researcher retains the right to use and publish non-identifiable
data. All data will be stored in a secure location accessible only to the researcher. Upon
completion of the study, all data will be destroyed.
Participation & Withdrawal
Your participation is voluntary. You are free to choose not to participate. Should you
choose to participate, you can withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind.
Questions about the Study
If you have questions or concerns during the time of your participation in this study, or
after its completion or you would like to receive a copy of the final aggregate results of
this study, please contact:
Researcher’s Name: Samiullah Nuristani
E-mail: nuristsx@dukes.jmu.edu
Phone: +1 540-822-0543
Department: School of Strategic Leadership Studies
James Madison University
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Advisor’s Name: Dr. Margaret Sloan
E-mail: sloanmf@jmu.edu
Telephone: +1 540-568-7020
Department: School of Strategic Leadership Studies,
James Madison University
Questions about Your Rights as a Research Subject
Dr. Taimi Castle
Chair, Institutional Review Board
James Madison University
(540) 568-5929
castletl@jmu.edu
Giving of Consent
Audio script:
I have read this Consent Form and I understand what is being requested of me as a
participant in this study. I freely consent to participate. I have been given satisfactory
answers to my questions. The investigator provided me with a copy of this form. I certify
that I am at least 18 years of age.
I voluntarily agree to provide audio consent to participate in this audio-recorded
interview.
A copy of this Consent Form will be provided to the participant in the interview.

Appendix D
)Consent Form (Pashto
د څېړونکی پیژندګلوي او د څېړنې موخه
زه سمیع هللا نورستاني د جیمز ماډیسن پوهنتون د ډاکټرئ دورې محصل ،له تاسې نه په درنښت غوښتنه کوم چې په یوه
علمې څېړنه کې برخه واخلئ .د دې علمې څېړنې موخه د اداری فساد او د د ټولنیزې پانګې کمښت تر منځ د احتمالي
اړیکو څېړل دی .دا څیړنه به د څیړونکي علمی رساله په بشپړولو کې مرسته کوي.
د څیړنی طرزالعمل
په څېړنې کې د برخې اخیستلو د پریکړې په صورت کې ،له تاسې به په غږیزې بڼې رضایت ښودلو غوښتنه کیږي او
ستاسې هر ډول پوښتنو ته د ځواب ورکولو وروسته د رضایت فورم یو نقل تاسې ته سپارل کیږي .په څېړنه کې مرکې هم
ترسره کیږي .مرکې به ګډونکونکو سره په انفرادی ډول او په یو آرامه محیط کې تنظیمیږي چی کډونوال د راحتی
احساس وکړي او دڅیړنی پرموضوع خپل نظر شریک وکړي شي .د اداري فساد او د ټولنیزې پانګې کمښت تر منځ د
احتمالي اړیکو په هکله تاسو به یو لړ پوښتنو ته ځوابونه وایاست .دا مرکه به د مرجع په توګه د استفادې او په لیکنې کې
د اسانتیاو په موخه ثبتیږي .غږیز اسناد د څېړنې پای ته رسیدو سره په خوندي ډول له مینځه وړل کیږي.
وخت ته اړتیا
څېړنه کې ستاسې ګدون په تخمیني ډول  ۹۰دقیقوته اړتیا لري.
خطرونه
تاسې ته په څېړنه کې د ګډون له امله د افغانستان د د ورځني ژوند اړوند خطرونونه پرته کوم بل ډول خطر نه لیدل
کیږي.
ګټې
په څېړنه کې ګډون تاسې ته دا فرصت برابر وي چې د یادې موضوع په هکله خپل نظریات وړاندی کړئ او د افغاني
ټولنې سیاسي او ټولنیز حاالتو د پرمختګ لپاره بالقوه مرسته وکړئ.
محرمیت
د دې څیړنې پایلې ممکن په علمی رسالو ،کنفرانسونو کې وړاندی او یا هم په نورو اکاډمیکو مجلو کې خپور شي .د
مرکې په بهیر کې د ګډونوال هیڅ ډول شخصی او پیژندوونکی معلومات نه راټولیږي او د څېړنې موندنې به داسې ډول
لیکل کیږي چې د ګډونوال هویت د څېړنې وروستی بڼه کې ذکر نشي .څېړونکی د شخصي معلوماتو پرته د نورو
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معلوماتو د کارولو او خپرولو حق لري .ټول راټول شوي غږیز معلومات په یو خوندي ځای کي ساتل کیږي چې یوازې
څېړونکی ورته الس رسی لري .د څیړنې له بشپړیدو وروسته به دا معلومات له مینځه وړل کیږي.
ګډون او انصراف
په څېړنه کې ستاسې ګډون په بشپړ ډول داوطلبانه دی .تاسې د ګډون کولو او یا د ګډون نه کولو په هکله بشپړه خپلواکی
لرئ .د ګډون په صورت کې هم تاسې کوالئ شئ چې هر وخت د هیڅ ډول (منفي) پایلې پرته انصراف وکړئ.
د څېړنې په اړه پوښتنې
په څېړنه کې د ګډون پر مهال او د څیړنې له بشپړیدو وروسته مو پوښتنې یا اندښنې درلودلې ،یا د څیړنې د وروستي
پایلو مجموعه مو غوښتله ،تاسې کوالی شی له ما سره اړیکه ونیسئ.
د څیړونکي نوم :سمیع هللا نورستانی
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په غږیز بڼه رضایت ښودنه:
زه د څیړنې د ګډنوال په توګه تایید کوم چې د رضایت فورم مې لوستې او د کومې موضوع په اړه چې ما نه پوښتنې
کیږي هم پوهیږم .همدارنګه په خپله خوښه مې د ګډون رضایت ښودلی او زما پوښتنو ته د قناعت وړ ځوابونه راکړل
شوي دي .درضایت ښودلو فورم یوه نقل له څېړونکي لخوا راکړل شوی دی او تصدیق کووم چې لږ تر لږ د  ۱۸کالو یم.
زه په دی مرکه کی چی په غږیز ډول ثبت کیږي د ګډون کولو موافقه په غږیز بڼه او په داوطلبانه ډول ورکووم.
ددی رضایت فورم یو نقل به مرکه کی ګډونوال ته ورکول کیږي.
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Appendix E

Hypotheses Tested in Quantitative Strad
1.

Hypothesis 1: Government corruption will be negatively related with trust
among citizens (i.e., generalized trust).

2.

Hypothesis 2: Government corruption will be negatively related with trust in
public institutions.

3.

Hypothesis 3a: Government corruption will be negatively related with
public’s trust in President Ghani.

4.

Hypothesis 3b: Government corruption will be negatively related with
public’s trust in the CEO Abdullah.

5.

Hypothesis 4: Government corruption will be negatively related with
associational life.

6.

Hypothesis 5a: Government corruption will be negatively related with voting
in the 1st round of the 2014 Presidential election.

7.

Hypothesis 5b: Government corruption will be negatively related with
participation in the 2010 parliamentary elections.
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Appendix F: Visual Model of the Convergent Mixed Methods Design
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